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1DISCUSSION FORUM

3PREFACE
The Austrian Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Labour,
Martin Bartenstein, invited to a Discussion Forum on 24 January 2002,
devoted to the interlinked issues of "Competition and Competitiveness
in a New Economy". The discussion results were envisaged to feed into
the policy strategies of the Austrian Government as well as into the
Ministers interventions on EU level. As a member of several Council
formations of the EU (Industry, Tourism, Internal Market, Employment
and Social Policy, Foreign Trade, Energy), the host makes use of the
discussion and the results in his interventions in the Council meetings.
Moreover, the efforts to draft a new Austrian competition law, which
did establish an independent competition authority by mid-2002, were
greatly enhanced by the results of the Forum.
The current volume brings together the statements delivered during the
Forum. In addition, a number of articles deal with competition policies
in a rather broad sense, on EU and national level. They include a
summary view from the EU Competition Commissioner on new
developments of Community competition policies, a general view of
how to reform Austrian competition policies as well as internal market
related issues concerning the Cardiff process and barriers to services.
Furthermore, a number of articles are devoted to sectoral regulation in
the electricity, railway, postal services and financial services sector as
well as on the regulation of shop-opening hours. In a final contribution,
the essence of the various articles and the results of the discussion
during the Forum are summarised.
The following few pages contain the programme of the discussion
forum as distributed to the participants.
1. THE TRADE-OFFS AND INTER-LINKAGES BETWEEN
COMPETITIVENESS AND COMPETITION
Do competition and competitiveness reinforce each other? Or is there a
trade-off between increasing competitive markets and the profitability
of a firm? Since only competitive firms and locations can succeed in the
global environment, the two aspects of business life do not seem to be
grossly contradictory. Nevertheless, a case can be made of large firms
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which may be competitive in the world economy but may at the same
time enjoy a dominant market position at the national level.
Moreover, a trade-off between competition and employment can be
argued to exist at least in the short run: Liberalisation and privatisation,
as well as unwinding a merger, could lead to immediate employment
losses in the sector concerned. Such losses due to the failure of a
company are directly visible and perceived by the general public, the
media and politicians. In contrast, the achievements of competition
policies are much less obvious in the short run: an effective competition
policy usually cannot do more than prevent price hikes and set the stage
against decreases in the quality and diversity of goods. However, in the
long run an effective competition policy which ensures a competition-
friendly environment is seen indispensible for sustained
competitiveness of companies in a certain location. This per se would
also have positive employment effects.
Another trade-off might exist between the prevailing degree of
competition and horizontal aid. Such aid may be viewed inevitable for
establishing the competitiveness of a firm in the first place. Policy-
assisted cluster formation and the protection of intellectual property
rights will in the short to medium run underpin competitiveness of
products, but may not be desirable from the competition point of view.
Questions:
• Is there an optimal competition intensity which leads to the
maximum degree of competitiveness?
• Is there an optimal degree of liberalisation which minimises the
differences between short-term and long-term effects on
employment?
• How should horizontal aid (R&D, cluster formation, protecting
intellectual property rights) be judged in the light of competition
policy?
• What role does asymmetric information play in the context of
competition and competitiveness?
2. EFFECTIVE COMPETITION IN A NEW ECONOMY
The New Economy, defined as productivity-driven non-inflationary
long run growth of output and employment, is largely based on (a) fast
dispersion of new technologies, in particular in the information and
5communication branches, (b) salient macro-economic fundamentals and
(c) well functioning markets. The latter may depend on the general
competitive climate in the society as well as on the quality of
competition policy and regulation. Although the myth has lately been
taken out of the New Economy, new technologies still impinge on
product innovation and new production methods, which in turn may
have an important impact on the effectiveness of competition policies.
This leads to questions about how the New Economy does affect
competition:
• In what way and to what extent does the globalisation of markets
impinge on the definition of the "relevant market"? Do regulations
of market entry and exit become obsolete in a globalised market?
• Does increased transparency (resulting from new methods of
providing and transmitting information) reduce the need for strigent
competition policies?
• To what extent have the new technologies contributed to more
competition in former monopolistic network industries such as
energy, telecommunications or postal services? How are the
remaining monopolistic fields (predominantly the network per se)
to be dealt with by the competition authorities?
• Is there a new network monopoly emerging from the world wide
web? How should it be treated by competition policy?
The reform discussion regarding competition policies at the European
level aims at a larger degree of harmonisation as far as the law is
concerned, but at the same time at increased decentralisation when
individual cases are pursued (getting national authorities more involved
than before). At national level, the degree of competition will  among
other factors  also depend on the quality of institutions. The newly-
designed competition authority for Austria would be an independent
administrative body with the possibility to investigate cases and bring
them before the cartel court. The historic involvement of the social
partners in investigating competition cases is envisaged to be reduced.
If it is agreed that competition control must be strong in order to harvest
the full positive effects of the New Economy, further questions arise as
to the concrete implementation of competition control:
• What would be a meaningful division of labour between national,
EU and international competition bodies? E.g.:
Preface6
- National level: improving market access, cooperation between
competition authorities and sectoral regulators, establishing a
network between national competition authorities.
- EU level: harmonisation of the legal system, concentration on
core cases, decentralisation of procedures, cooperation with
national authorities.
- International level: WTO negotiations on trade and
competition, dispute settlement mechanism
• What should be the general design of the relationship between
sectoral regulators and competition authorities?
• Will competition between competition authorities (forum shopping)
be advantagous or detrimental to the single market?
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INTRODUCTION
MARTIN BARTENSTEIN
It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you all here in the Palais
Ferstel. I am particularly honored that Nobel Laureate Prof. Joseph
Stiglitz has accepted my invitation to be the main speaker this evening,
and I am of course well aware that, apart from this event, his presence
in Austria is extensively used in order to profit from his great
knowledge and his many ideas.
This evening we would like to discuss the interlinked topics of
"Competition and Competitiveness in a New Economy". Globalisation
and the Single Market have visibly increased competition, which makes
it necessary for companies to constantly review their competitive
position on international markets.
Competition and competitiveness are highly influenced by the New
Economy, especially by new ways of production and the transmission of
information. These developments also pose new challenges to
competition policy and competition control.
At the extraordinary summit of EU heads of state and government in
Lisbon in March 2000, a new strategic goal for the European Union was
set for the next decade, namely "...to become the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater
social cohesion."
Full employment and a real growth rate of 3% per year were judged as
essential to reach this goal. At this occasion, the shortcomings of the
European labour market were identified.
The reform discussion regarding competition policies on the European
level aims at a larger degree on harmonisation as far as the law is
concerned, but at the same time it aims at increased decentralisation
when individual cases are pursued (getting national authorities more
involved than before).
On national level, the degree of competition will  among other factors
 also depend on the quality of institutions. The newly-designed
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competition authority for Austria will be an independent administrative
body to which in the recent days also our social partners have signalled
their acceptance. The competition authority will have the possibility to
investigate cases and bring them before the cartel court.
At the same time, the traditional involvement of the social partners in
investigating competition cases will be redesigned. However, their
expertise and input will also be appreciated in the future.
Since only competitive firms and locations can succeed in the global
environment, competition and competitiveness do not seem to be
contradictory.
But do competition and competitiveness reenforce each other? Or is
there  on the other hand  a trade-off between increasing competitive
markets and the profitability of a firm? In this context, a case can
certainly be made of large firms that may be competitive in the world
economy but at the same time enjoy a dominant market position at the
national level.
Moreover, a trade-off between competition and employment can be
argued to exist at least in the short run: Liberalisation and privatisation,
as well as a merger, can lead to short term employment losses in the
sector concerned. Such losses are directly visible and perceived by the
general public, the media and politicians.
In contrast, the achievements of competition policies are much less
obvious in the short run: an effective competition policy usually cannot
do more than prevent price hikes and set the stage against decreases in
the quality and diversity of goods.
However, in the medium and long run an effective competition policy
which ensures a competition-friendly environment is seen indispensible
for sustained competitiveness of companies in a certain location. This
per se would also have positive employment effects.
Another trade-off might exist between the prevailing degree of
competition and horizontal subsidies which may be viewed inevitable
for establishing the competitiveness of a firm in the first place.
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Policy-assisted cluster formation and the protection of intellectual
property rights will in the short to medium run underpin
competitiveness of products, but may not be desirable from the
competition point of view.
Questions arise:
• Is there an optimal competition intensity which leads to the
maximum degree of competitiveness?
• Is there an optimal degree of liberalisation which minimises the
differences between short-term and long-term effects of
employment?
• How should horizontal aid (R&D, protection intellectual property
rights) be judged in the light of competition policy?
• What role does asymmetric information play in the context of
competition and competitiveness?
Let me also address the third block in our headline  the New Economy
 defined as productivity-driven non-inflationary long run growth of
output and employment, is largely based on three factors:
1. fast dispersion of new technologies, in particular of information
technologies,
2. stable macroeconomic fundamentals and
3. well functioning markets.
The latter may depend on the general competitive climate in the society
as well as on the quality of competition policy and regulation. Although
the myth has lately been taken out of the New Economy, new
technologies still impinge on product innovation and new production
methods, which in turn may have an important impact on the
effectiveness of competition policies.
Again questions arise as to the concrete implementation of competition
control, especially to harvest the positive effects of the New Economy:
• What would be a meaningful division of labour between national,
EU and international competition bodies?
• What should be the general design of relationship between sectoral
regulators and competition authorities?
Although time seems limited this evening, we are eager to cover a range
of aspects concerning the topic raised  a fact which is mirrored by the
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experts on the podium coming from different fields of work and
institutions:
• Of course I need not introduce Prof. Joseph Stiglitz. By the
economics profession he has long been regarded an outstanding
figure, as is demonstrated by his former posts as Chairman of the
US President's Council of Economic Advisors, as Chairman of the
OECD's prestigious Economic Policy Committee, as Vice President
and Chief Economist of the World Bank, as Professor at Yale,
Princeton, and now at Columbia University, and we applaude him
very much for winning the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics! Prof.
Stiglitz also accumulated quite some practical experience in dealing
with competition cases while serving the US President Clinton.
• Prof. Wolfgang Franz is Professor at the University of Mannheim
and president of the "Zentrum für Europäische
Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)"  an outstanding German economic
research institute. His work is concentrating on employment issues
and can perhaps address the trade-offs between competition and
competitiveness and their likely effects on employment.
• Dr. Paul Gorecki is Director of the Monopolies Division and Acting
Director of the Cartels Division at the Competition Authority. He
joined the Authority in June 2000. After working for the Canadian
competition authorities for several years, he joined the Economic
Council of Canada in 1978, before becoming Director of the
Northern Ireland Economic Council in 1992, from which he joined
the Authority in 2000.
• Prof. Dennis Mueller from the University of Vienna is an
internationally well known expert on regulation and regulatory
reform.
Thank you all again for joining us here on the podium, and thank you
for your attention!
May I now invite Prof. Stiglitz to take the floor.
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COMPETITION AND COMPETITIVENESS IN
A NEW ECONOMY
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
I welcome this opportunity to talk about competition policy, because
there is perhaps no topic that is more important for the functioning of a
market economy. The theorems and analyses stating that market
economies deliver benefits in the form of higher living standards and
lower prices are all based on the assumption that there is effective
competition in the market.
At the same time when Adam Smith emphasised that competitive
markets deliver enormous benefits, he also emphasised the tendency of
firms to suppress competition. Enterprises can generate far more profits
by suppressing competition than by innovating and producing better
products. It has thus become an important role of government to insure
the maintenance of competition.
One of the experiences I had when I was at the White House was the
recognition that all people seemed to adhere to certain principles. One
of them was the strong belief that there should be no subsidies  for
everyone except themselves. Another principle that was universally
agreed upon was the value of competition in every sector of the
economy except their own. And of course a third one was the
importance of transparency and information, except the need for
secrecy in their own room.
It has been an important issue of public policy to analyze the
appropriate extent of competition and the mechanisms by which the
government can promote competition. The subject is vast, and in the
limited amount of time I will only touch upon three specific aspects of
this issue:
1. competition and the New Economy,
2. competition and globalisation and
3. certain issues associated with the administration of antitrust laws.
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1. COMPETITION AND THE NEW ECONOMY
As Mr. Bartenstein said, while the myth has been taken out of the New
Economy, a lot of ideas associated with the New Economy have
remained. In the United States we estimate that, as a result of the
changes associated with the New Economy, productivity has
dramatically increased from the 1.1 percent that prevailed from 1987 to
1993 to around 2.5 to 3 percent. One way of thinking about the New
Economy is that it is an innovation in the process of innovation. In a
way, it has brought to the floor an approach to the economy that was
pioneered almost a century ago by the Austrian economist Joseph
Schumpeter. He emphasised the importance of innovation in a market
economy, and his work, I think, is now beginning to come into its own.
For very long periods of time, the focus in market analysis was on static
models in which innovation was ignored, and clearly, this is an
inappropriate way of approaching the virtues of a market economy. One
has to focus not on the static analysis which is underlying much of
traditional economic analysis, but on the dynamic aspects that were at
the heart of Schumpeterian analysis. Schumpeters view was that
markets would be characterised by a sequence of short term
monopolies. Competition would not be static. There would be a
monopoly for a while, which would be succeeded by another monopoly,
so that competition would be dynamic. In that sense he provided strong
criticism to traditional antitrust policy. He seemed to argue, although he
never formulized the idea, that, through this process of dynamic
competition, the market economy would achieve some form of what
economists would call in templating jargon "intertemporal efficiency".
Schumpeter, I think, was asking the right question, unlike Arrow and
Debreu and many of the neoclassical economists who have ignored the
importance of innovation. But Schumpeter got the wrong answer.
Unlike the picture that Schumpeter envisaged, the analyses of
Schumpeterian models over the past two decades have shown that there
is a real possibility that a firm that established a temporary monopoly
position had a variety of mechanisms by which it could perpetuate that
temporary monopoly. As a result, the overall level of innovation would
be suppressed.
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This was an argument I put forward with my co-author P.S. Dasgupta in
a series of papers in the early 1980s. The points that we raised at that
time have amply surfaced in the New Economy. Take the Microsoft
case. The findings clearly demonstrated that this firm was able to
engage in a number of practices that suppressed competition and
thereby suppressed the overall level of innovation. Very early in the so-
called "wave of New Economy", in the early 1990s, when I was
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the practices of
Microsoft came to our attention and became immediately a source of
great concern. It was not just the Council of Economic Advisors that
was concerned about this issue, but also the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, the Office within the White House that is
responsible for maintaining an overall environment in which innovation
is encouraged. They believed, and we concurred, that the anti-
competitive practices posed a real threat to the level of innovation in the
United States and around the world. So both institutions urged the
Department of Justice to look at this issue more closely.
One of the issues that had been raised was that many of the proposed
resolutions to anti-competitive behaviors would in effect curtail in one
way or the other intellectual property rights (IPR). It is very
important to recognise that IPR are not a matter of natural law, but they
are man-made law. And they reflect the balance between the users and
the producers of knowledge. The Uruguay-Round tried to incorporate
and internationalize IPR by the TRIPS Agreement. In the judgment of
the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Council of
Economic Advisors, and also in my judgement, that agreement did not
get the balance right. It was basically dictated by commercial interest.
The worst aspects of that have already come to light. The poorest
people in the world, in Sub-Saharan Africa, would not have access to
aid and drugs at prices they could afford. This meant that when the
Uruguay-Round was signed, it was effectively condemning to death
thousands of people. Fortunately the outcry that came in the last couple
of years about the TRIPS Agreement has served to redress the
imbalance, but the issue remains.
When we opposed that imbalance, our view was that it was not just an
imbalance of social welfare or protecting the rights of some of the
poorest people in the world, but also one of innovation, as the major
input into research is our given knowledge. Excessive intellectual
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protection can increase the costs of this vital input and this slows down
the pace of innovation. In order to maximize the pace of innovation, and
thereby increase competition, one needs to balance IPR.
There is now a vast literature supporting the perspective that the New
Economy entails huge network externalities, related to the fact that
there are benefits from using common languages. If one was using a
telephone for instance, and nobody was at the other side of the line, this
would not help anybody. You have to be able to talk to somebody. The
value of the telephone increases the more people are linked together in a
network. The same analysis applies to computer software, including
operating systems and word processing. On the other hand, having a
single "language" and communicating with it makes it rather easy to
establish a dominant technology, not because it is the most efficient
one, but because it is used by many people. There are lots of examples
of networks which are inefficient but used because it is difficult to
move from one system to another one. So the network externalities have
created an enormous potential for monopoly power and for the abuse of
that monopoly power.
There is a certain irony in the fact that the New Economy has in some
respect increased competition and the potential for competition, while
at the same time these network externalities and the way they have been
abused have actually reduced competition. To give you one example:
The internet makes it possible for you to easily compare the prices that
firms are charging. Increased information is essential for making
markets work well and the absence of information is an impediment to
the effectiveness of competition.
However, the new technologies have also increased the scope for
suppressing competition. We have seen symptomatic examples of that
within the United States. For instance, the airline reservation network
was abused for communication with each other in ways intended to
limit competition. The practice was discovered and has now been
stopped. But it shows you how the new technologies have enhanced the
scope for suppressing competition.
A great deal of emphasis has recently been placed on the New
Economy. And I believe rightly so, because of the concentrations of
economic power that have occurred in some key parts of the economy. I
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should emphasise, however, that the old economy is still alive and
represents an important part of our economy, and also that anti-
competitive practices remain a deficiency of the whole economy. Let
me just mention two examples in the old economy sector. First, the
largest set of price fixing cases ever discovered have occurred within
the last five years. So the notion that the old-fashioned antitrust
behavior is a relic of the past is clearly not true.
Second, there are a whole variety of other practices which in some ways
have been facilitated by the new information technologies. The most
dramatic example is predatory pricing in the airline industry to prevent
the entrance of competitors into a particular market. This is a problem
more in the United States than in Europe. Normally when a new
competitor enters a market, thereby splitting it up, the aggregate
demand curve facing the incumbent firm shifts to the left and its supply
goes down. In the predation case the response of the incumbent firm
was not only to lower the price but at the same time to increase the
supply. It lost money with the additional airplanes but continued its
policy until the new entrant, who typically had only shallow pockets to
finance the new entry, was wiped out. Miraculously thereafter, prices
went up to very high levels. So when talking about the New Economy
one should not forget the continuation of the old economy and the
threats to competition in that arena.
2. COMPETITION AND GLOBALISATION
I now want to come to the second topic, competition and globalisation.
There are four issues I want to talk about in that context. The first, and
in some ways the most important, is that in an international arena we
have competition policies that are completely incongruent with the
policies that we have within our domestic economies. For instance, we
have embedded a set of anti-dumping provisions within the WTO in
order to stop the very kinds of activities that I just described, predation
among others. Yet the standards used are by no means comparable with
the standards employed in national competition policies. Europe should
be familiar with this, as the United States are currently charging Europe
under the anti-dumping laws with uncompetitive practices in the area of
steel. Analyses have shown that if the WTO standards were used within
the United States, some 80 to 90 percent of American firms would be
judged to be dumping. The standards are completely unreasonable and
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do not compare with any competition standards. Thus we have a double
standard, one for trade within an economy and another one for trade
between economies. The anti-dumping standards of the WTO are
basically anti-competitive principles designed for the protection of
domestic industries. One of the objectives of the next round, the
development round of trade negotiations that just begun in Dohar
should be to eliminate these anti-dumping provisions. The problem is
that they represent the interest of the US export industries in Europe
and vice versa. As time goes by, other countries are learning from the
United States and Europe. Because the American and the European
economies are more competitive than any other economy in the world,
they would be subject to more anti-dumping actions than other
countries in the long run. Thus it is even in the self-interest of Europe
and the United States to get rid of these anti-dumping provisions.
The second issue within globalisation I want to touch on very briefly is
the view that you need to create large firms and reduce competition in
order to be competitive in the international arena. It is my strong
belief that this is wrong. There is a lot of evidence that the most
effective way of attaining competitiveness is to have strong
competition. The force of competition is indispensable to achieve a
dynamic path of innovation. And it is innovation and increases of
productivity, and not economies of scale, that are going to be most
important in attaining competitiveness in the long run. Moreover, one of
the greatest advantages of globalisation is that it has reduced transport
cost. And although the size of firms tends to increase, there can be
many large firms competing in any market. Thus the degree of
competition should in fact be increasing not decreasing.
The third issue has to do with agglomerations and de-agglomerations.
I want to emphasise the distinction between horizontal and vertical
agglomerations. Many of the conglomerates, particularly the
conglomerates in the 50s and 60s, did not really restrict competition.
They bought, say, one firm in the furniture industry, one firm in the
computer industry, and these had nothing to do with each other. These
agglomerations did not result in economies of scope; they just aimed at
an eclectic assortment of profit-making enterprises. They did therefore
not attain market dominance in any of the areas they covered. That is
very different from a strategy of mergers intended to reduce competition
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and obtain market dominance, which is exactly what competition
authorities ought to prevent from happening.
One should also keep in mind that the size of an agglomeration alone
does not necessarily cause limitations of competition, except when it
becomes large within a given society. In countries like Korea, where the
concentration of conglomerates is so high that any of the firms is too
big to fail, competition can be severely damaged. But that is a slightly
different issue. The point was raised that in the last fifteen years, the
restructuring of sectors like electricity and communication has
enhanced the ability of the market to have competition by itself, and has
therefore decreased the role of regulation and government oversight. I
agree, except that there remain areas in most of these industries in
which there is still a large degree of market power that can be abused
and leveraged. In the case of the telephone industry, for instance, the
last mile remains a monopoly. It has been undermined only by the cable
network and by mobile phones.
I was very much involved in the 1996 Communications Act in the
United States. At the time we had a big debate about the necessity for
Justice Department oversight. Some people believed that competition
was about to surface and that we could abandon any oversight. Others,
and I was among those, argued that we still needed oversight, as we did
not know how fast competition would develop. I think we proved to be
correct.
Competition has been growing very slowly and monopoly practices
have remained very strong. In California one has seen a lot of evidence
of abuses of market power in the electricity market. Among firms, it has
long been a standing issue whether competition should be confined by
using trade secrets or patents. Coca Cola is still protected by a trade
secret. The main issue here that any patent policy has to keep in mind is
"getting the balance right". If this is not attained, there would be an
incentive to move out of the patent system. And the patent system has
certainly the advantage of disclosure, as you have to write down what
you want to be patented. Most firms continue to rely heavily on patents.
At least in the United States there has been a massive expansion of the
scope of patents in business practices.
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The fourth issue in the context of competition and globalisation
concerns the co-ordination of antitrust policies among various
authorities. Some people believe that there should only be one antitrust
authority per country and that having more than one results in
unnecessary duplication. I find that view peculiar, because as market
economists we think that duplication is good, because it causes
competition: we are in favor of many firms producing goods and
services and argue that their overlap is in fact of positive benefit. To be
sure, there needs to be some degree of harmonisation and there has to
be a high degree of co-operation. But the big advantage of having more
than one antitrust authority is that there can be a race to the top. The
antitrust authorities that are most stringent, most efficient, most
effective in promoting competition among firms will be the most
important in determining the structure of markets.
For that reason I welcomed the role that European competition
authorities exercised in the Honeywell-GE merger. The American
authorities basically caved in to corporate pressure from American
firms. The European antitrust authority was not under a similar
pressure, it recognised the dangers, and it spelled out ways in which
they could arrange the merger which would mitigate the anti-
competitive effects. And when Honeywell-GE refused to comply, the
merger was blocked. That kind of check and balance between different
competition authorities, I believe, is a very positive development.
3. ADMINISTRATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS
The third broad issue I want to talk about is the administration of
antitrust policies. I want to address two sub-topics within that field. The
first is that antitrust is an extremely complex subject, and one of the
problems is how to administer this complex area, how to generate the
appropriate level of expertise. I believe that it is important to develop
independent traditious systems focusing around antitrust. In the United
States we have developed an independent traditious system focusing on
another complex area, bankruptcy, but we have not done that in the area
of antitrust. If you read some of the court decisions, you realize the
adverse consequence of this: judges who have never studied economics
try to make decisions that are extremely difficult  with disastrous
results.
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The second point I want to raise is the importance of independence. In
the United States we have more than two overlapping approaches to
antitrust. Within the public arena, we have the Federal Trade
Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
But apart from that we have the civil court system: the parties can
directly go to court and ask for a redress of the damages they have
incurred as a result of anti-competitive practices. This provision was put
in at the very early stage of antitrust laws, at the end of the 19th
century. The reason was concern that government may not be strong
enough to sustain corporate interest. Antitrust law in the United States
was not so much influenced by Adam Smith and the theories of market
economies that I alluded earlier, but a broader political movement that
was concerned with the power of large corporations in our society and
the monopoly practices which adversely affected consumers. There was
a worry that those same powers would have been able to suppress the
role of the government in suppressing anti-competitive practices. In the
United States we saw that actually happen in the context of the
Microsoft case. Microsoft, through the Senator in the State of
Washington, tried to persuade Congress to withdraw all funding for the
prosecution of Microsoft. He did not succeed, but he tried very hard. It
is important to have another check, and I think that this check is
provided by civil action. Even though there are large costs and the
system is imperfect, it is an important check.
The final issue raised was the relationship between competition policy
and trade policy. Those of us who have been involved with anti-
dumping cases had to deal at the same time with competition policy.
This resulted in ongoing disputes in some cases. Every year, a few
pages in the report of the Council of Economic Advisers (which is
actually seen as the economic report of the President) have been about
the issue of trying to harmonise competition policy and trade policy,
including anti-dumping policy. The latter is at times called the "fair
trade laws", but actually the laws on dumping are "unfair trade laws", as
they undermine competition. We always had long negotiations with our
US Trade Representative who simply didnt understand our position on
competition. He always won the negotiations in the WTO, but we won
what went into the presidents report. However, there has been
enormous progress in the last five years, as many trade ministers are
beginning to realise that official trade barriers, government barriers to
getting into another country, may turn against themselves when they try
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to get into another country and face a monopoly there that refuses to
buy their goods. As a result, the whole area of competition policy is
becoming recognised as an important part of trade policy.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
I want to conclude by trying to put into perspective some of the issues
that I have raised. I have emphasised that competition is an important
vehicle for increasing competitiveness and that I do not subscribe to the
view that one ought to tolerate anti-competitive practices or dominant
firms because it was necessary to attain competitiveness  quite the
contrary.
I also want to reecho what the Minister said about the importance of
macroeconomic policies. As a consequence of large macroeconomic
disturbances, even well-functioning firms can bust. In that context the
case of Korea comes to my mind, where a great mass of macroeconomic
problems were exacerbated by the policies pushed on that country by
one of the international financial institutions. We did a study attempting
to ascertain whether the firms that went bankrupt were on average more
or less productive than the firms that survived. The answer was that the
firms that went bankrupt tended to have slightly higher debt-equity
ratios, but in terms of efficiency and profitability over the preceding
decade, they could fully stand up with the other firms. When you have
large macroeconomic disturbances, bankruptcy does not serve as a good
sorting device between good and bad firms. This is one of the important
reasons for maintaining sound macroeconomic policies; they are
absolutely essential for maintaining competitiveness.
There is a third related point that I want to emphasise. In American
competition policies we stress the difference between protecting
competition and protecting competitors. We want to protect the
competitive process but not particular competitors. There is another
important distinction and that is between protecting individuals and
protecting firms. When firms go bankrupt the workers in those firms
suffer. However, the Schumpeterian competition that I alluded to
earlier, inefficient firms being replaced by firms that are more efficient,
is an important part of the dynamics of the economy. In that process,
some individuals are adversely affected, and it is an important
responsibility of government to provide social protection as well as
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training to facilitate those individuals moving into other enterprises.
Having a sound macroeconomic policy with low unemployment is
absolutely vital, because it enables individuals to move from one job to
another. It means that when you loose a job there is another job
available. If unemployment rates are ten percent or more, net mobility is
impaired.
These are issues not only of social justice, but they actually relate to the
issue of competitiveness that is primarily of concern today. Success and
competitiveness entail risk taking which in the end is borne by
individuals. Let me deal with two concrete examples of downside risks.
The first one is unemployment. In the United States over the last
decade, we have created an enormous number of firms. In the first two
years of the Clinton Administration two million new firms were created.
But successful economies have lots of failures. In the United States, the
social consequences were minimized both through a retraining program
and, most importantly, because of a very low unemployment rate. That
macroeconomic environment served as a safety net which enabled
individuals to take risks that they otherwise would not undertake. It is
not an accident that one of the most successful economies in the New
Economy besides the United States is Sweden. This country has an
active labor market policy which facilitates the ability of individuals
who loose their jobs to move into other jobs. In the last eight years
Sweden has been able to maintain relatively low levels of
unemployment. The United States and Sweden have been among the
most successful economies in creating new firms and a whole variety of
new technologies.
The second example concerns the relationship between pension reform
and competition policy, namely the higher risk for firms to go bankrupt
because of stronger competition. In the United States right now,
everybody has seen the consequences of one big bankruptcy, Enron.
Many people who thought they had a private pension program have just
discovered that they dont have one. As a matter of standard advice,
individuals are told that you shouldnt have a lot of your wealth in the
company for which you work, because if the company goes bankrupt
you lose not only your job, but you lose everything else. Enron
represented an abuse of that basic principle.
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We have seen in country after country that this volatility is very high
and that individuals are not well equipped to make decisions that
provide them effective protection for their old age. In country after
country, including the model country Chile, we have seen the adverse
consequences of that. Around the world there is a re-examination of the
balance in the three-pillar-approach for pensions and the recognition
that there are some real limitations in the form in which it has often
been applied, particularly for developing countries.
Let me conclude and reiterate what I said in the beginning. I think the
debated issues are among the most important facing any society. In the
long run, designing a competition policy that works will be the most
important part of the strategy for maintaining the competitiveness of the
market economy.
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COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW ECONOMY 1
WOLFGANG FRANZ
Given the topic of this discussion forum I am in the favourable position
that the Scientific Council of the German Federal Ministery of
Economic Affairs and Technology has recently published a report on
"Competition Policy for the Cyperspace".2 As a member of this council
I may or must, as you like, rely on this report, although it goes without
saying that I speak here for myself and not for the council. Moreover,
the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW), which I am
directing, has established a research group on new information and
communication technologies in global networks and, of course, among
other topics competition policy has taken center stage in our research
agenda.3
The basic message of my statement can be summarised as follows: The
New Economy creates new challenges also for competition policy. This
can be illustrated by the internet which is at the heart of the new
economy and will remain important even after the collapse of its
glorification. However, the challenge is not so obvious for
governmental competition policy, provided the country has an
independent and effective competition authority, but more demanding
for the competition authority itself. The rationale behind this thesis is
the high degree of abstraction which governs most of the legal
framework of competition policy. If this law is applied adequately  and
this constitutes the challenge for the competition authority , most
developments in market structures enforced by the internet can be
coped with. Put differently, to adjust in practice the application of the
legal framework to the specific features of the new economy constitutes
the challenge for competition authorities.
The obvious question then is: What are the peculiarities which
characterise the new economy, and the internet in particular, and make
it different from traditional markets in the old economy? At the risk of
                                                     
1 Statement for the Discussion Forum on "Competition and Competitiveness in
a New Economy" organized by the Austrian Federal Ministery for Economic
Affairs and Labour", Vienna 24th January 2002.
2 See www.bmwi.de for downloading ths report.
3 For more information see our web-site: www.zew.de.
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repeating what has been said already, let me very briefly mention the
following outstanding pecularities with an emphasis on the
consequences for competition policy.
(i) Reduction of transaction costs, especially the costs of overcoming
spatial distances: This means that the process of globalisation of
markets will be more rapid and intensive. This has consequences
for regulation policy. Issues such as supervising stock markets,
rules of accounting or crediting, licences for medicaments, access
for youths to pornographical internet pages and the like become
international issues and require closer government cooperation.
Customers enjoy greater price transparency, firms are faced with
reduced possibilities of price differentation.
(ii) Network character, i.e., a single product or service has little or no
value in isolation, but generates value when combined with other
goods.4 While this phenomenon is not entirely new (e.g.
telephones), the degree to which networks shape business
strategies today has changed dramatically. An example is the
hardware/software paradigm: By buying a particular hardware
component, the customer takes into account that, the larger the
network of users of a particular software format, the higher the
value consumers attach to the hardware that uses this format.
Moreover, emails, bulletin boards, chat-groups, mailing lists were
of minor importance, if at all, ten years ago. This network
character has two consequences for competion policy.
Firstly, suppliers of complementary products have to coordinate on
a particular standard and to overcome the critical mass problem
when introducing the standard in the market which often requires
considerable upfront investment. On the other hand, users of an
established standard, the installed base, are reluctant to incur the
costs of switching to the new technology. Hence, the market
success of a competitors product will depend not only on its
inherent attributes (price and quality), but also on its ability to
connect his product with the others by means of a seamless
interface. Such co-ordination problems and installed base effects
pose questions as to how to handle mergers and strategic alliances.
Secondly, the difference between the market and the firm becomes
blurred. Typical examples are internet auctioneers such as eBay or,
                                                     
4 See e.g. Röller and Wey (2001), International Competition Policy in the New
Economy, WZB-Jahrbuch 2001, Berlin (edition sigma).
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already in the old economy, Nike which nearly entirely
concentrates on management issues rather than to produce any
sports article (these are produced by other firms). Competition
policy is then confronted with the need to properly define a
relevant market.
(iii) Maintaining property rights is a final issue to be addressed. Digital
products can be copied at very low costs. A prominent example is
Napster, a virtual market where people "exchanged" music, for
which only one customer has paid sometime.
Taken these and other issues together, the challenges for competition
policy stemming from the new economy should be obvious. As a final
point let me therefore point out these traditional areas where
competition authorities have to adjust to these developments.
(i) Assessment of market structures, i.e. the appropriate application of
rules concerning mergers. This is even more difficult than so far
for the following reasons. How to define the threshold from which
on we speak of "mergers"? One solution could be to use the outline
agreement of all firms involved in the network to decide upon a
possible merger. Moreover, how to define the relevant market?
Will cross price elasticities still do the job? Or should the
competition authority take into account the extent to which a
particular supplier has to anticipate actions from other firms within
a reasonable time period? What is the importance of innovations in
light of short product cycles where the pressure of competition
often does not stem from the same market but from more attractive
substitutes from other markets, that means potential competitors
concentrate already on the next generation of products?
(ii) Control of improper behavior: This control has been traditionally a
difficult job because the competition authority had always to
balance the negative effect due to behavior which aims at
restricting competition against a possible welfare gain. The new
economy increases difficulties at least for the following reasons. In
markets which are characterised by network effects firms have to
achieve a critical level of production. This has to be accepted by
the competition authorities even if this increases the market power
of those firms. More problematic is the judgement upon strategies
of the same firms to conquer related markets such as has been
disputed in the Microsoft case. A second point is price
differentation. This is important in the internet economy due to a
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possible large difference between marginal and average costs.
Frequently, the marginal costs of digital products approach zero.
Full competition is then impossible, the number of suppliers
remains limited. Suppliers can, under certain conditions, react with
price discrimination for several groups of customers. This stragegy
does not necessarly represent an improper behavior as long as the
firm does not exclusively reduce prices in that particular partial
market where a new firm tries to enter.
(iii) Cooperation in research and development: Cooperation in this field
among firms which have already a dominant market power is
extremely dangerous for competition and will not be tolerated by
competition authorities. But sometimes a cooperation can be
justified. For example, if a single firm does not have the manpower
and/or financial means to develop a new product, it may cooperate
with other firms being in the same situation, and form a working
group.
Be that all as it may, competition policy in the new economy is an
international issue. Experience tells us that in most cases national or
supranational competition authorities have cooperated. As long as these
competition authorities come to similar conclusions about market
definitions the internationalization of economies should tend to reduce
the potential for conflict.5 But this agreement may not cover
assessments of market power or over how to remedy. Hence, there may
arise a new potential for conflicts between competition authorities.
                                                     
5 See Röller and Wey (2001).
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COMPETITION POLICY AND COMPETITIVENESS:
THE PERSPECTIVE FROM A SMALL OPEN EU
MEMBER STATE1
JOHN FINGLETON
I intend here today to touch on a number of related topics:
• The economics of competition and what it contributes to
productivity and competitiveness;
• The effect that technological change, new economy issues and
globalisation have on competition enforcement; and
• The nature of relationship between competitiveness and
competition policy.
1. COMPETITION AND COMPETITIVENESS
I want to start my remarks here today on the subject of the economics
of competition. First let me concentrate on the strides forward that
have been made:
• Developments in industrial organisation theory in the late 1970s
and 80s have largely been incorporated in textbooks such as that of
Jean Tirole and the work of many competition agencies. In general,
competition authorities are increasingly sophisticated and much less
likely to rely on outmoded structuralist views, but instead prefer to
examine each issue on its merits. So, for example, high market
shares are less of a concern and in a very small number of cases
small market shares perhaps could be more of a concern. In
particular, there is recognition that intense price rivalry may drive
high concentration.
• Empirical industrial organisation methods associated with names
such as Bresnahan, Porter, Sutton and Pakes have coincided with
the increased availability of retail scanner data and other rich data
sources, giving us many new practical tools to measure
substitutability and indicate the presence or absence of market
power. In countries where such data are available, competition
                                                     
1 This is the written version of remarks prepared for a seminar in Vienna on
January 24th 2002. The speech was delivered by Dr. Paul Gorecki. I am
grateful both to Paul Gorecki and to Dr. Francis OToole of Trinity College
Dublin for comments.
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authorities use such techniques. The Staples-Office Depot case is
usually mentioned in the US context, and recently the European
Commission did similar analysis in the Volvo Scania case. Of
course, many economists argue that they made wrong decisions
using these sophisticated analysis, but it is early days and what is
important is that such techniques come from academia into practice
within a short time span. Indeed, it is often practice that is leading
as opposed to following academia.
• At the political economy level, there is increasing convergence
between the laissez-faire Chicago and more interventionist Harvard
schools of thought. On the one hand, the Chicago school,
exemplified by Posners JPE article in 1975, has successfully
persuaded others and competition authorities that state restriction
on competition and regulation is at least as important in welfare
terms as private restrictions on competition. On the other, the
Chicago school critique on issues such as vertical restraints, tying,
efficiency defences and monopolisation led to a theoretical re-
examination of these theories in a way that made more precise the
conditions under which private markets can be inefficient and be
improved upon. I would say that, as a result, there is much greater
consensus now among economists that anti-competitive harm can
result from private actions, but that the set is narrower than many
would have argued in the 1960s. This consensus is well illustrated
in Posners 2001 edition of Antitrust Law.
All of these improvements mean that the competition policy that is
practiced today is more soundly based and enjoys broader political
consensus, notwithstanding various short-run ebbs and flows in the
political wind. I would say that this has been somewhat of a paradigm
shift. It is worth noting that one of the strongest investigative and
enforcement regimes exists in the United States, a country that places
great emphasis on free markets.
However, there is one area in which I feel economics still has some way
to go, and that is in understanding better the longer term and
macroeconomic welfare effects of competition. Perhaps this reflects my
own position as head of a competition agency sometimes asking myself
"why are we here" rather than always just "how do we do this". Most of
the strides forward in recent decades have informed the "how" rather
than the "why".
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The early welfare analysis of Harberger, who found only small gains
from competition policy, followed by Posners 1975 paper2, which
found large losses but attributed them to government regulation, and
then the work of Cowling and Mueller and others who found larger
losses is not particularly helpful in this regard (i.e. in terms of long-run
or macro welfare effects) for two reasons.
First, this analysis is typically very static in the sense that it looks at the
welfare gains arising in the change between two equilibria. This results
from the fact that we use a simple diagram on which we compare
monopoly and competition as two equilibrium outcomes. Other than the
literature on X-inefficiency, there is little attention to the question of
whether competition, by driving firms to cut costs, actually changes the
equilibrium. Nor do we understand whether the existence of a
competition policy stops bad things happening in the sense that, for
example, explicit price cartels would exist but for such policy. In some
sense this is dynamic as the path of the economy is altered by the
existence of the authority. The positive dynamic effects that
competition exerts on productivity may be much greater than the static
ones, but we still know very little about it. Recent research suggests,
however, that strong competition is associated with higher rates of
productivity growth.3
Understanding the relationship between competition and productivity
growth is of vital importance to the question under discussion here
today. If competition policy can drive higher long-term productivity
growth, then it can improve competitiveness and contribute to real
increases in GDP per person.
Second, the range of estimates given for welfare gains varies between
half of one percent and 15 percent of the output in markets in question,
hardly a useful figure to guide policy priorities. Simply establishing a
clear lower bound on the long-term macroeconomic benefits of
competition would be useful in guiding public policy.
                                                     
2 Richard Posner, "The Social Costs of Monopoly, Journal of Political
Economy, 1975.
3 For a summary of relevant research, see "A World Class Competition
Regime", White Paper from the UK Department of Trade and Industry, July
2001, at page 2.
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While there has always been in varying degrees strong support for free
enterprise and competition policy in the US, this has been much less the
case in the EU. What has changed in recent times is the embracing of
and support for stronger competition policy in many more countries.
Economic arguments have played a vital role in this development.
2. EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Understanding the dynamic effects of competition is also central to
several of the other questions raised today relating to technology, new
economy, globalisation, and competitiveness. I do not believe
competition policy is dead in the face of such issues, but rather that
technology, globalisation and new economy changes raise new
challenges and need for focus in competition policy design and
enforcement. Let me give a few examples.
• Globalisation of markets, whether driven by technology or reducing
trade barriers or both, means that our view of what is a relevant
market becomes broader. This raises important questions about the
efficacy of competition enforcement by single countries when the
market environment spans many. Recent high profile international
cartels in lysine and vitamins point out how much we, in Europe
and the international community, rely on the strong investigative
and enforcement regime that exists in the United States. Such
incidents not only raising concerns about whether our European
investigative and enforcement regime is adequate, they also point us
in the direction of greater internationalisation in competition policy.
Foremost in my view is the ability to share information and conduct
joint investigations, and not international talking shops. But
international talking shops do not require solemn treaties, whereas
sharing information usually does. In mergers it is often in the
parties interest to facilitate sharing. Perhaps parties should be
offered the chance to allow sharing of information  perhaps it
could act as a signalling mechanism? I also strongly believe that
Europe will, perhaps as a result of a bottom up learning experience
by Member States, be obliged to introduce criminal sanctions. I
realise that this is contrary to the current view in Austria, but I
understand and appreciate that different countries and cultures in
Europe will have very different experiences and perspectives on
this question for the present.
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• My second example relates to technology and the regulation of
natural monopoly. In many areas, technology has improved the
possibility of having service competition over a fixed network. In
some areas, and here telecommunications comes to mind, it has also
augured greater competition between networks. However, these
developments do not reduce the need for stringent competition
policies. First, these markets put even greater burdens on
competition policy in the short run while they are being liberalised.
The process of generating entry into formerly monopolised markets
is slow, not least because governments have frequently been loathe
to restructure and to give regulators the powers to liberalise quickly.
Second, even once they are fully liberalised, these markets will still
have all the usual competition issues such as mergers, the
possibility of cartels, and exclusionary vertical restraints. Finally, I
do not believe that these markets will need less regulation in future.
Monopoly networks will remain, and regulation will be needed to
deal with one-way and two-way access problems. The involvement
of new private firms and, if it occurs, privatisation, will mean that
regulation will become more explicit and transparent, as has begun
to happen. For this reason, it may seem as though we have even
more regulation.
• Thirdly, it is not clear what effect new economy issues will have on
competition enforcement. In the short run, new technologies
increase the burden on competition authorities for two reasons. For
example, markets in which technology feeds network effects
demand that competition authorities develop new expertise and
analysis. Second, platforms such as the Internet that increase
competition in markets such as ticket sales may raise concerns
about the natural monopolyelement inherent in the platform. The
very ability of the platform to contribute to competition in
downstream markets where it is an input may be the factor that
leads it to require closer competition scrutiny.
3. COMPETITIVENESS AND COMPETITION POLICY
Let me turn now to the third aspect of my talk, namely the relationship
between competitiveness and competition policy. Competition policy
drives productivity growth. Higher productivity leads to a direct
increase in domestic welfare, but it also leads to increased
competitiveness as exported goods and essential inputs for the
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production of exported goods are produced more efficiently. Many
other policies such as those towards industry, education, research and
development, legal process, infrastructure, etc. also affect the efficiency
of the domestic economy and competitiveness.
In principle, there should be no conflict between these policies and
competition policy. Rather, they should tend to complement each other.
Putting large infrastructure projects out to public tender is an example
of such complementarity. However, one area where it is often thought
that conflicts may arise is in the area of industrial policy. Specifically,
for a small open economy, there is an argument that competition policy
may prevent domestic players from attaining the scale necessary to
compete internationally.
In my view, the national champion argument results from a mis-
comprehension of what competition policy is about.
• If the market is truly international, then the relevant market is
international and the domestic market share irrelevant. A good
example of this is Nokia in Finland, where the fact that it dominates
domestic production does not mean that it must dominate
consumption. There is the question as to who polices these
international markets, which I alluded to above, but this is for
another day. There is also the problem that the domestic stock
market may be heavily dependent on the stock of one company. But
there is no conflict with competition policy.
• If national markets are domestic, then there are several reasons to
doubt the merit of a policy to develop a national monopoly to grow
large abroad. First, efficient capital markets, and not monopoly
profits, are the best judge of investment at home or abroad.
Investments funded from monopoly profits are more likely to give a
lower return, so it is not a good use of capital, especially if the
fundamental problem is that capital is scarce in the national
economy. Second, Michael Porters insight that rivalry in the
domestic market is the best stimulus to foreign success is highly
relevant. Too often, the domestic monopoly becomes lazy and is not
so successful abroad. Third, it seems to be based on a false
mercantilist doctrine that exports are good no matter what the cost.
The cost is not just the tax on domestic consumers but also the
deadweight loss.
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Irish economic policy has, until recently, appeared to prioritise national
champion concerns over competition and efficiency arguments. Irish
experience offers several lessons.
• Rents have been created in many industries that are dissipated in
high wages to workers, overstaffing, strategic error, and prices that
bear little relation to efficient costs, thus making the introduction of
competition more difficult to achieve. Where privatisation has
occurred, the employees typically have been given a block of 15%
of the shares, and there are reasons to believe that this may
subsequently retard the efficient working of capital markets.
• The best example of the flawed "national champion" argument is
the Irish whiskey industry. Before it was monopolised in the 1930s,
it has a near monopoly of whiskey/whisky sales in the United
States. Nowadays its share of this market is in low single figures.
• Some of the industries in which monopoly was created or
encouraged have grown, but it is difficult to know whether even the
best of them has performed well relative to the counterfactual.
• The companies involved, even if not state owned, became heavily
politicised and politically influential, which created barriers to entry
and regulation in many other markets.
• It is interesting that one of the most successful Irish business to be
exported, the Ryanair model, resulted from a new entrant that had
first to learn how to win and please customers in the domestic
market. Ultimately, capital constraints were not a problem, and the
legacy of domestic competition was great success.
The other argument that we sometimes here advanced in smaller
countries is that foreign companies can all too easily take over domestic
firms, resulting in a loss of domestic control.4 This argument is blatantly
protectionist and perhaps inappropriate within an EU Member State.
Proponents of this view sometimes argue that mergers should be
controlled on the basis of a "public interest" test, and not just a
competition test, normally characterised incorrectly as narrow or
                                                     
4 Additional arguments are made that central functions such as advertising,
R&D and higher level strategic decisions will be taken abroad. While it is
clear that the previous management suffers, it is not clear that this has an
adverse effect on consumers or shareholders. Indeed, Ireland has been
successful in encouraging foreign firms to establish such central controls in
Ireland.
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technocratic. But because this creates legal uncertainty and makes
takeovers more difficult, it simply reduces the stock market value of
national firms. This is not desirable, and especially not if capital
scarcity is greater in small economies. Ireland has recently passed new
competition law that replaces its public interest test with the US
"substantial lessening of competition" standard.
In summary, I think that the national champion argument never arises in
many cases because the market is international, and that where the
market is domestic, then allowing domestic monopoly is not supported
either in theory or via empirical evidence.
On the other hand, domestic competition has a hugely important
positive effect on competitiveness via a number of mechanisms.
First, the one I just mentioned is Michael Porters argument that rivalry
in the domestic market is the best stimulus to foreign success. Many
believe that spoiled children find it difficult to cope with lifes later
difficulties, whereas those that are exposed to the realties learn lessons
earlier and cope better. Similarly, we can find examples of companies
like Ryanair.
Second, increased competition in individual markets tends to reduce
both prices and costs. Where these products are directly or indirectly
non-traded inputs of exporting companies, they reduce the costs and
make the economy more competitive. This argument is well understood
with regard to infrastructure and education.
Despite trade liberalisation, many markets will remain non-traded and it
will become increasingly important to foster competition in these
markets via domestic competition policy. In Ireland, we see consistently
higher inflation in many of these non-traded sectors, suggesting that a
lack of domestic competition is one of the factors damaging
competitiveness. As the Irish economy grew rapidly, serious bottlenecks
emerged. Many of these were in markets in which the state was the
main supplier and could not respond to the increased demand and,
because it protected its monopoly rights, would not allow new entrants
to pick up the excess.
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Recognising the role of non-traded inputs also allows us to understand
why competitiveness is not driven solely by cheap labour. Economic
efficiency, across all markets, is ultimately a better stimulus to
competitiveness.
The increased globalisation of commerce in recent years means that
mergers and cartels and restrictive practices are increasingly
international in scope, amply illustrated by high profile cases such as
Microsoft, Vitamins, and GE-Honeywell. It is important that there is
increasing world wide acceptance of the important role that competition
policy can play, and an increasing international understanding of the
proper nature of that role in encouraging enterprise by eliminating entry
barriers and supporting rivalry. Greater co-ordination of national
competition policies, and increasing joint work and co-ordination by
national agencies needs to work towards establishing these standards. It
is vitally important that the proliferation of national competition
authorities works with the grain of the market, and does not retard the
development of world markets.
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ECONOMIC POLICY ISSUES IN THE 21ST CENTURY
DENNIS C. MUELLER
The institutions enforcing competition policy should ideally be arranged
in a federalist structure. Some potentially anti-competitive actions by
Austrian companies impact solely or almost solely Austrian consumers,
and should be addressed by the new Austrian competition policy
authority. Some potentially anti-competitive actions by Austrian
companies affect consumers in other parts of the European Union and
should be investigated and challenged, if need be, by the EU
competition policy authority.
In addition to these two rather obvious levels of competition policy
authority, we need to also think about having a world competition
policy authority, probably in some way linked to the World Trade
Organization. National competition authorities face a serious conflict of
interest when enforcing the laws against anti-competitive behavior,
when the anti-competitive actions are directed not only at the
consumers in the nation where a company is primarily located, but also
at consumers in other countries. If Microsoft exploits a monopoly
position in Europe or in other parts of the world, this can only benefit
both the company and its owners and workers in the United States.
Consumers outside of the United States cannot count on the U.S.
Department of Justice (hereafter DoJ) or the Federal Trade Commission
to protect their interests.
As an illustration of the problem, consider the recent merger between
Boeing and McDonald-Douglas. It is of course quite possible that the
DoJ was correct in its assessment that the merger would not have
substantial anti-competitive effects in the United States. But it is also
possible that the merger would have anti-competitive effects in both the
United States and at the world level, and yet the JoD decided to allow it
to go ahead reasoning that the gains to the United States from Boeings
enhanced market power across the world would more than offset the
losses to consumers in the United States from the merger. Such
reasoning would be perfectly rational from the point of view of an
agency of the US government, which is responsible only to its elected
representatives. If the Boeing and McDonald-Douglas merger could be
expected to have anti-competitive consequences harming EU consumers
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then, of course, the EU Commission was certainly justified in raising
objections against it.
As a second illustration of the problem, consider last years proposed
merger between General Electric and Honeywell. The EU blocked the
merger and again its motivation for doing so may have been to protect
European consumers from potentially anti-competitive effects of the
merger. But there were also rumors circulating at the time that it was
European competitors of General Electric and Honeywell, which sought
and obtained protection. My point here is not to second guess the
European Commission on either of these decisions, but to point out that
when it comes to potential anti-competitive effects of actions by firms
not based in the EU, its motivation may be different, and less defensible
than when it confines itself to purely internal, EU matters  and the
same is true of the JoD, the US Federal Trade Commission, the
Japanese Fair Trade Commission and all other competition authorities
around the world. Thus, unfortunately, I do not believe that we can rely
solely upon competition among national competition authorities to
protect the competitive process in a world of multinational corporations
and great international interdependence.
Less this conclusion about the actions of government sound too cynical,
let me point out another illustration. For many years the US government
has required cigarette manufacturers to print on every package of
cigarettes sold in the United States that they are potentially hazardous to
ones health. Cigarette manufacturers were not required to print such a
statement on packages of cigarettes sold outside of the United States.
The motives of government officials regarding the welfare of citizens
from outside of their country cannot be relied upon to promote the
general welfare.
Professor Stiglitz mentioned the problem of anti-dumping rules, which
are almost inevitably impediments to competition, and which harm the
consumers in any country applying them. One important advantage of
having a world competition authority would be that it would then be
possible to ban all anti-dumping rules. The only reason why a country
should be concerned about the low prices charged by foreign exporters
is that it expects that the foreign exporters are charging low prices with
the intention of driving domestic producers from the market, creating a
monopoly and subsequently charging much higher prices. Any world
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competition authority would view such predatory actions as anti-
competitive, however, and thus would step in and prevent them. With a
world competition authority making sure that no firms engage in
predatory actions on a world basis, no country would have to fear
adverse consequences from foreign firms charging prices that are "too
low," and all anti-dumping laws could be repealed.
It is important when thinking about international competitiveness that
we not confine our attention to the private sector. The public sector in
Austria accounts for roughly half of all economic activity, and the
Austrian economy cannot be truly competitive unless both its private
and its public sectors are efficient.
Imagine a group of managers of, say, pharmaceutical firms emerging
from a smoke-filled room and being confronted by representatives of a
competition policy authority who accuse the managers of meeting to rig
prices. The managers respond that they were not fixing prices but only
"harmonising them." As professor Stiglitz pointed out, everyone is in
favor of competition for the other fellow, but at the same time wants an
exemption from competition for his or herself. This is nowhere more
true than for the governments of Europe. There has been much
discussion of tax harmonisation in Europe in recent years. Tax
harmonisation is not what European governments need. They need more
competitive pressure to make them more efficient not less pressure. We
need more competition in the public sector, not less.
Consider higher education as an example. I think that it is widely agreed
among academicians and other observers of higher education systems
around the world that the United States has the best higher education
system in the world. Why? In my opinion an important part of the
answer lies in the fact that it is a highly competitive system.
Universities compete for faculty, universities compete for students,
students compete to get into universities. When one bumps into a dean
or department head at any of the top American universities, he or she
will soon be pulling the latest ranking of universities out and bragging
about the fact that his or her university has just moved up a couple of
notches in the rankings, or bemoaning the fact that it has slipped a
couple of notches. Every university is competing with every other
university, and the results are evident in the quality of the "products"
that they offer. In Continental Europe we have organized our higher
Discussion Forum40
education systems as a series of cartels and state monopolies with the
inevitable consequence that our universities by and large offer low
quality products. To improve on this situation more competition among
universities is needed.
The benefits from improving the quality of our universities would
extend far beyond the public sector. As one looks across Continental
Europe one sees very few silicon valleys. Why? An important part of
the answer, I believe, is that one also sees very few Stanford
Universities in Europe. It is impossible to conceive of a silicon valley
without a Stanford University. If our private sectors in Europe are going
to be competitive with that of the United States and other countries in
the 21st century, our public sectors must become more competitive, and
there is no place where this is more true than in higher education.
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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN
COMPETITION POLICY
MARIO MONTI
1. THE CHALLENGES OF OUR TIMES
For more than ten years now, the Commission has launched a series of
important reform initiatives in order to respond to the challenges of the
fast changing and increasingly complex environment. The Commission
must make sure that it continues to maintain a properly functioning
framework for the protection of competition in the internal market: a
key-factor in ensuring competitiveness of European industry, in creating
the single market and in producing benefits for the consumers.
A first challenge is that, in a world of "global players", competition is
going global as well. One of the Commissions major duties must
therefore be to swiftly identify the changes occurring in the markets and
to react properly. Second, the Union is currently preparing for the
biggest enlargement in its history. It is therefore of highest importance
to prepare workable solutions for a European Union consisting of more
than 20 Member States.
Finally, with the Euro in the pockets of the European citizens, a
properly functioning framework for the protection of competition in the
internal market is as vital as ever as the basis of consumer benefit and
prosperity in Europe.
In order to meet these challenges, the Commission has undertaken a
regular review of the applicable competition law. The purpose of this
continual process of reform is to make the substantive as well as the
procedural law more simple, transparent and user friendly, to empower
the national authorities to apply European competition law and finally
to enable the Commission to better combat serious infringements
wherever they occur in the internal market. Only this approach will in
my view allow the Commission to fulfil its mission to adapt the law, to
foster further integration, to free potential initiatives, whilst ensuring
that consumers will win, not only in terms of price, but also in terms of
choice, service and security. Moreover, the ongoing globalisation
demands not only an enforcement of our bilateral co-operation with our
main partners but also an intensification of international multilateral co-
operation.
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2. A PROFOUND MODERNISATION OF OUR COMPETITION RULES
The main item of our endeavour in the European competition policy
reform has been the revision of the rules concerning the antitrust
procedure and the review of the Merger Regulation.
2.1. THE REFORM OF REGULATION NO. 17
Probably one of the best and most far-reaching examples of our
determination to adapt ourselves to the change of time is the radically
new system of procedural rules concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty, presently governed by Council Regulation No. 17 of 19621. In
this regard, the Commission has launched a major initiative to
modernise the implementation of these rules which was first set out in
its White Paper on Modernisation of April 19992.
The new system will abolish the current notification and authorisation
system governed by Art. 81 (3) EC. Instead, Article 81 (3) EC will
become a directly applicable provision. In other words, agreements
between undertakings will be legal and fully enforceable without prior
intervention of an authority once the conditions set out in this provision
are met3. The saving of bureaucratic procedures will enable the
Commission to do more meaningful enforcement work by focusing on
serious infringements4. At the same time, it will strengthen companies
responsibility, as they have to decide on their own whether they are in
compliance with the conditions of Art. 81 (3) EC or not.
                                                     
1 Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty, Official Journal P 013, 21/02/1962, p. 0204-0211.
2 White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86
of the EC Treaty  Corrigendum, Official Journal C, 12/05/1999, p. 1.
3 Under the current legislation, agreements that may meet the conditions set
out in Art. 81 (3) have to be notified under Art. 4 and 5 of Regulation No.
17, and the Commission has to take a decision in order to exempt those,
which are in line with Art. 81 (3) EC.
4 At this place I would like to point out that we have always expressed our
determination to effectively deter incumbents from the most inadmissible
practices, especially hard core cartels. As an example in this context may
serve our last ten cartel decisions adopted last year, imposing over 1.8 billion
Euro of fines.
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Of even greater importance is that national competition authorities will
be able to apply EC antitrust rules (i. e. Articles 81 and 82) in their
entirety. With regard to the increasing integration of the European
market and the enlargement that will take place in the near future,
European competition law must be decentralised without, on the other
hand, running the risk of a renationalisation of Community competition
law. Procedural rules should therefore allow decentralised application
of Community law by removing the obstacles posed at present,
especially the Commission's sole power to apply Article 81(3)5.
Community law could then be implemented by the body that is able to
do so most effectively. As a rule, competition authorities of the Member
States will be well placed to deal with cases that have major effects on
the territory of their Member State, while cases with a larger geographic
scope will continue to be best placed under the Commissions authority.
Furthermore, and completing this part of our reform initiatives, only
Community competition law will apply in case that agreements or
abusive practices affect trade between Member States. As a result,
businesses will no longer have to comply with a full range of different
legal systems. This satisfies our permanent concern to streamline and
simplify the law, so as to minimise the compliance costs borne by
companies. Seen in a more abstract perspective, in an integrating
internal market, it makes sense to fundamentally shift from the current
separate spheres to a common sphere in which Member States as well
as the Commission apply the same law in close co-operation.
Taking into account the significant progress we have made in
developing those new rules, we expect that the new system will come
into force at the beginning of 2004.
2.2. THE REVIEW OF THE MERGER REGULATION
Our striving to respond to the signs of the time also concerns the review
of our Merger Regulation that has been in force for over twelve years
now6. Fur this purpose, the Commission has launched a Green Paper in
                                                     
5  See Art. 9 (1) of Regulation No 17.
6 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21. December 1989 on the control
of concentrations between undertakings, Official Journal L 395,
30.12.1989, p. 1.
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December 20017, seeking to improve merger case handling in procedure
as well as in substance.
One of the most important points within the current discussion is the
simplification of the thresholds dealing with the necessary Community
dimension of a concentration. While the turnover thresholds laid down
in Art. 1 (2) of the Merger Regulation are to be maintained, it is
proposed that Art. 1 (3) will no longer be directly based on reaching
certain specified levels of turnover. Instead, the fact that a merger gives
rise to at least three national notification requirements would satisfy to
trigger an automatic Commission competence8. Of course, this would
call for a concept of pre-notification between the Member States and
the Commission in order to make the system operational. We therefore
foresee the need to elaborate flanking guidelines on the modalities of
the outlined new referral procedure.
Another chapter in the Green Paper that is of high interest is the debate
on the substantive test for the assessment of concentrations set out in
Art. 2 of the Merger Regulation. Both procedural and substantive
reasons have been advanced for a re-evaluation of the appropriateness
of this test9.
Seen from a procedural point of view, an alignment of the Merger
Regulations appraisal criteria with those applied in other jurisdictions
outside the European Union, especially the United States, could
facilitate merging parties global assessment of possible competition
issues arising from contemplated transactions. The adoption of a
concept similar to this of the "substantial lessening of competition-test"
(the "SLC-test") adopted in the US, Canada and Australia could at the
same time lead to a better basis for multilateral co-operation where
mergers are notified under several jurisdictions. On the other hand, it
must be borne in mind that almost all the Member States have built up
their merger control provisions on the basis of the current Regulations
dominance test. Strengthening of transparency and co-operation in cases
                                                     
7 Green Paper on the review of the Merger Regulation, COM (2001) 74/6 
11.12.2001.
8 Green Paper on the review of the Merger Regulation at II. A. 3. d..
9 Green Paper on the review of the Merger Regulation at III. A..
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where non-EU States are involved could therefore in exchange lead to
disparity within the Community.
Another concern in this context is whether European competition law
should be in favour of a merger test that expressly calls for the
evaluation of merger specific efficiencies, as it is for example the case
in the United States10. For instance, some of the parties are in favour of
such an approach, allowing transactions where especially benefits in
form of price decreases are likely to be passed on to consumers, despite
a situation of dominance or substantial lessening of competition.
Although it is our working target to have a proposal for amending the
Merger Regulation adopted by the Commission by the end of this year,
it is unlikely to reach conclusions concerning the latter discussion
within this time frame, touching on principles of fundamental
importance to competition law.
3. OTHER PROVISIONS IN ORDER TO REFINE EUROPEAN
COMPETITION POLICY
Other recent legislative and procedural reforms of the Commission have
focused on facilitating the application of European competition rules,
creating more transparency, addressing hardcore restrictions and
contributing to the completion of the single market. In this context, I
would like to concentrate on two areas where significant progress has
been made: the review of substantive antitrust rules and the fight
against cartels.
3.1. THE REVIEW OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ANTITRUST RULES
APPLICABLE TO BOTH HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL
AGREEMENTS
In the last few years, the Commission has been completing a systematic
and thorough review of the substantive antitrust rules applicable to
agreements between companies. This process aimed at making them
more simple, basing them on a more economic approach and reducing
or even removing the regulatory burden for companies lacking market
power.
                                                     
10 See the US Horizental Merger Guidelines.
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At the beginning of this process, the Commission adopted in December
1999 a new block exemption applicable to all vertical agreements11. In
the absence of hardcore restrictions, it provides a save haven for
agreements between companies with a market share of less than 30%.
This regulation was accompanied by guidelines on vertical agreements,
set out in May 200012. In November 2000, the Commission also adopted
two new Block Exemption Regulations, regarding specialisation and
R&D agreements, as well as guidelines on horizontal co-operation13.
The recently adopted draft of a new Block Exemption Regulation on car
distribution14 is one of the best known examples of our aim to foster the
integration of the internal market. The car industry has always been a
vital element of our economy. We therefore see an urgent need to
achieve a real single market for cars, the basis for competitiveness in
the car industry, which is in turn the primary condition to satisfy the
consumer needs.
This vast overhaul of substantive antitrust rules is currently being
completed with the review of our Technology Transfer Block
Exemption15, a work that requires the alignment of our rules on
intellectual property licensing with the recent market evolutions.
                                                     
11 Commission Regulation No 2790/1999 of 22.12.1999 on the application of
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted
practices, Official Journal L 336, 29/12/1999 p. 21.
12 Commission notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, Official Journal C
291, 13/10/2000 p.1.
13 Commission Regulation No 2658/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation
agreements, Official Journal L 304, 05/12/2000, p.3; Commission
Regulation No 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development
agreements, Official Journal L 304, 05/12/2000 p.7; Commission Notice
Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal
cooperation agreements, Official Journal C 003, 06/01/200, p.2. p.7;
Commission Notice Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC
Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, Official Journal C 003,
06/01/200, p. 2.
14 Draft new Block Exemption on car distribution, Official Journal C 67,
16/03/2002, p.2.
15 Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the
application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of technology
transfer agreements, Official Journal L 031, 09/02/1996 p.2.
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3.2. THE FIGHT AGAINST CARTELS
One of the Commission competition policys highest priorities is the
battle against cartels. Over the past few years, we have witnessed an
acceleration in the uncovering and prosecution of price-fixing, market-
sharing and bid-rigging cartels. The first Commission Leniency Note of
199616 has lead to a substantial increase in the number of cartels that
have been uncovered and punished.
Experience has shown that the effectiveness of the Notice could be
improved by an increase in transparency and certainty as to the
conditions on which any reduction of fines is granted. That is why we
have released a New Leniency Notice17. The novelty of this notice is
that the first companies that enable the Commission to make a major
step towards the successful prosecution of a cartel will be granted an
immunity from fines, so long as the submission of evidence takes place
at a very early stage of the investigation18. I am convinced that the new
policy will create even greater incentives to denounce this scourge of
the economy which has companies making illicit profits at the
consumers expense.
4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
So far I have focused on the developments in our internal policies.
However, I believe that the challenges of the globalisation process can
only be successfully tackled if we also develop our external policy.
The increasing interdependence of economies world-wide requires that
we develop new instruments of co-operation. Thus, the intensification
of international co-operation, not only within the European Market, but
also with our main partners on the other side of the Atlantic as well as
with our future members, has become one of the most urgent needs. The
Commission therefore pursues the negotiations on the accession of new
Member States, with a particular view to the implementation of
competition policy. Furthermore, the successful co-operation with our
Northern American colleagues has become almost a daily practice.
                                                     
16 Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel
cases, Official Journal C 207 , 18/07/1996 p. 4.
17 Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, Official
Journal C 45, 19/02/2002, p. 3.
18 See point 8 of the Notice on immunity from fines.
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Yet, given the growing number of national authorities we must not limit
ourselves to bilateral contacts. The fast progressing globalisation both
in economic and political areas is resulting in a compelling need for
new co-operation instruments and more multilateral communication.
This is why the Commission has, for more than six years now, strongly
supported the adoption of a multilateral agreement on competition,
initiated by the WTO. This is also why the Commission launched,
together with the United States and others, in October 2001 the
International Competition Network (ICN), an informal network that
will, on a regular basis, bring together antitrust agencies from all over
the world. I am looking forward to the first meeting of the ICN in
September 2002 in Italy.
5. CONCLUSION
Globalisation, integration of the internal market, enlargement, these are
the challenges we are faced with. In the light of recent developments in
the field of competition policy, I think that it is fair to say that a lot of
the necessary work has already been done by the Commission, and we
will pursue these objectives with the utmost determination. The co-
operation with and the support by the competition authorities of the
Member States has always been an essential element for the success of
this work, and I am looking forward to continue this common effort.
Böheim 51
THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIAN COMPETITION POLICY
MICHAEL BÖHEIM
ABSTRACT
Competition policy in Austria faces an exciting future. After long years
of lethargy, and their detrimental effect of having key segments of the
Austrian economy labouring under high market concentration rates,
competition policy is at last making a serious attempt to shake off its
undeserved "wallflower" status, challenged by external as well as
internal pressure to reform.
With its legal and institutional framework conditions recently updated,
Austrian competition policy is now faced with the need to adapt to
European standards governing handling and assessment of restraints on
competition, further aggravated by the requirement to thoroughly revise
its own policy objectives.
The prospect of an institutional reform of Austrian competition laws
should be seen as an opportunity to put Austrian competition policy on
an entirely new methodological and contentual footing. Exemplary
models for this purpose are offered by the European Commissions
Competition Directorate-General, as well as by other national
competition authorities governed by a modern and more economics-
based approach to competition.
In view of past deficiencies and failings in the field, it appears advisable
in general to step up the pace of combating anti-competitive practices
(cartels, anticompetive mergers and abuse of a dominat position within
a market). Even though the political will and practical capacity to repair
past failures of competition policy appear to be limited in spite of the
existence of legal tools, measures nevertheless need to be taken to
ensure that an extremely stringent yardstick, based on a detailed
economic market analysis, is applied in future assessments of restrictive
practices.
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1. WHAT IS THE RAISON D’ÊTRE OF COMPETITION POLICY?
The economic model predicts that more competition will lead to greater
allocation efficiency through the effect that the price of a good will
converge towards the marginal costs of its production. If competition is
perfect, a no-profit state will ensue according to this model, because
prices will be identical with the marginal costs (cf. Bormann 
Finsinger 1999).
Producers thus have an incentive to raise their profits at the expense of
consumers by taking measures to restrain competition. A laissez faire
government would not be able to counter this strategic option. But what
is a strategy to maximise profits at the individual (producers) level,
results in serious consequences that are detrimental to the economy as a
whole  concentration of power in just a few hands, risk of collusion
and welfare losses (cf. Tichy 2000).
Empirical analyses confirm that market concentration will have the
general effect of raising prices and profits, even though the link is
certainly not linear (cf. Bain 1951; Collins  Preston 1969; Geroski
1981; Utton 1986; Scott 1989). But the real threat to competitive
markets is not so much market concentration per se (which is actually
just an indicator of market power), but the danger of collusion which
grows with the rate of concentration. The incentive for a few market
participants to collude is as big as it is real, especially since it offers
them a chance to boost their profits (at the expense of consumers or
suppliers).
The danger of collusion is the greater the fewer participants there are
in a given market. Selten (1973) showed in his game theory model that
the incidence of collusion will decline markedly only when there are
more than five competitors, because an outsider can exploit the
situation to increase his own market share (and thus his own profit) by
behaving contrary to the cartel (i.e. by charging lower prices): In
Seltens model, the probability of collusion is 100 percent for a clutch
of four or fewer competitors; for five competitors it drops to 22 percent,
and for more than five competitors it is down to 1 percent. Several
empirical studies have confirmed his theoretical findings (cf. Hay 
Kelley 1974; Bresnahan  Reiss 1991).
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Concentrated markets have another effect that is frequently
underestimated: they concentrate power in private hands, which,
through lobbying, can exert their influence beyond the purely economic
sphere right into the political sphere1. The fact that major companies
can bring their power to bear on politics is as democratically dubious a
practice as it is widespread. "Big firms represent a concentration of
power in private hands rather than democratically chosen governments.
Such private power can cross economic boundaries and poses the threat
of an extra-market power which can change the rules of the game in
favour of the dominant corporations" (Jacquemin  de Jong 1977, 198).
Restrictions on competition may have a wide range of effects: higher
prices, limited choice of products, displacement of competitors, creation
of market entry barriers, price pressure on suppliers, wage pressure on
workers, loss of jobs  these are just a few of the potential effects that
may occur if powerful companies were to abuse their market-
dominating position. Yet for all the diversity of potential effects, they
are identical in causing welfare losses owing to the misallocation of
resources.
Studies in the US (Harberger 1954; Leibenstein 1966), show that static
resource misallocation (i.e. resources are not efficiently utilised in the
production process) due to inadequate competition is not very grave (it
is estimated at 1% of GDP at most). Yet, according to current OECD
studies (Ahn 2002), dynamic efficiency gains obtained in the long term
by competition-fostering measures should be markedly higher, in spite
of their being difficult to quantify overall.
Dynamic efficiency gains come in the form of productivity increases,
welfare gains and higher economic growth. These are triggered by a
burst in innovation activities on the part of companies (actuated by the
motto "competition drives innovation"): when market participants can
no longer improve their market position by anti-competitive practices,
they will have to make efforts to become more innovative and more
productive than their competitors. Empirically, the premise that greater
competition leads to more (economically desirable) innovation and
                                                     
1 This applies particularly to the media sector, which, like no other sector,
combines and interlinks economic and political interests. Cf. the discussion
below in 2.2.
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economic growth can be evidenced by the robust positive connex
between competition intensity and productivity growth (cf. Nickell 
Nicolitsas  Dryden 1997; Aghion  Howitt 1998; Grosfeld  Tressel
2001; Januszewski  Köke  Winter 2001).
2. REFORMING COMPETITION POLICY IN AUSTRIA
Recently, developments at the European level have conspired with
domestic discussions to press for reform of competition policy in
Austria.
2.1. EXOGENEOUS PRESSURE TO REFORM
Competition has always been one of the key policies used by the
European Union to define itself. Consequently, developments at the
European level are of eminent importance for its Member States when it
comes to designing their own policies on competition.
Currently, European competition policy is undergoing large-scale
change2. In presenting its white paper on modernising the rules to apply
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (reform of Council Regulation
17/1962), the European Commission opted for a fundamentally
different approval system for competition-restraining arrangements.
This system of legal exemptions is based on the direct applicability of
the exemption clause in Article 81 (3), and it is conditional upon the
Commission, the national competition authorities and the courts
applying this provision directly in all proceedings. Upon passage of the
white paper, and following an in-depth consultation process, a draft has
now been submitted for a Council regulation to implement the
competition rules set forth in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.
In its Article 5, this draft regulation refers responsibility for applying
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty to the national competition
authorities. According to Article 36 of the regulation, the Member
States must identify the responsible competition authorities and
comprehensively authorise them to apply the said articles directly and
without qualifications.
                                                     
2 For details about new developments in European competition policy cf. the
contribution by Commissioner Monti in this book.
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Even though the regulation expressly leaves it to the Member States to
"identify the responsible competition authorities", these need to be
independent competition authorities in order to comply with the
Commissions intentions, which co-operate in a network involving the
Member States and the Commission, and which are primarily charged
with relieving the Commission of cases concerning domestic markets.
The reform of the Austrian law on competition reflects developments at
the European level with regard to institutional restructuring, by the
establishment of an independent federal competition authority
(Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde) which does not take instructions from
the government and which is granted comprehensive competences to
investigate and prosecute cases of restrictive competitive practices3.
In addition to setting its institutional framework, the Austrian federal
competition authority will have to base its work on European best
practices. Here again, the direction is determined by the European
Commission which prefers a "more economics based approach" in
handling competition cases4.
2.2. ENDOGENOUS PRESSURE TO REFORM
Without going too much into the details of the critique of the former
cartel regime, it can still be noted that, in spite of widely including the
economic and social partners in the cartel court system, the legal and
institutional framework was inadequate in preventing large-scale market
concentrations in key sectors of the Austrian economy (Table 1).
                                                     
3 Establishment of a federal competition authoritiy is only one part of the
large-scale reform of the Austrian law on competition. The amendments were
only recently adopted by Parliament (20 March 2002). For details about the
new legal framework cf. the contribution by Burger - Handler in this book.
4 Cf. Chapter 3 below.
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Table 1: Sectors showing high market concentration in Austria
Concentration rates (in %) No. of market participants with
market shares
Sector Market
leader
CR2 CR3 CR4 m ≥ 30% 30% > m
≥ 20%
20% > m
≥ 10%
Political news
magazines
100
  
1 0 0
Private health
insurance
50 71 84 94 1 1 2
Drugstores 28 52 76 82 0 3 0
Food retailing 32 59 72 83 1 1 2
Furniture retailing 38 61 70 78 1 1 1
Sports articles
retailing
38 55 67 73 1 1 1
DIY stores 32 48 60 72 1 0 3
Source: Regioplan, own calculations.
What the industries listed in Table 1 have in common is not just the
high concentration rates but also that they operate in markets shared
among fewer than five major competitors. As already outlined above,
game theory deduces a considerable risk of collusion from such closed
oligopolistic markets (cf. Selten 1973), which potentially impairs the
functioning of competition.
Market concentration in Austria is particularly noticeable in the field of
political news magazines, with a single group controlling the entire
market, enjoying, in fact, a monopoly position. Developments in the
media market are exemplary for the failure of competition policy, and
they impressively demonstrate that the former cartel law regime was an
unsuitable tool to ensure that competition would work.
The concentration of political news magazines started off with the
(in)famous "Formil" ruling of the cartel court5, which accepted the
merger of the KURIER group (Profil) and the NEWS group (News,
Format). This was, without doubt, the most important competition case
to be decided by the cartel court since merger supervision was
introduced in 1993. From a cartel law point of view, the case was, on
the one hand, an issue of competition: whether assembling all Austrian
political news magazines (Profil, News and Format) under a single
roof would lead to a dominant position on the Austrian market for
political weeklies; and on the other hand, it involved a democratic issue:
whether this merger would reduce media variety.
                                                     
5 File nos 26 Kt 342, 369, 380, 381, 382, 383/00.
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If politicians and the social and economic partners6 had had their way,
the merger would have been approved without even asking the cartel
court to review the case. Contrary to government announcements,
neither the Republic of Austria nor the social partners had filed an
application for the court to review the case7.
Based on an ex officio review, a procedure which was introduced in
1999 and which can be initiated by the cartel court itself if public
interests are at stake, the Formil merger had its day in court. Even
though the cartel court reasoned for much of its argument that the
merger should be prohibited, in the end it gave its permission8, although
tying it to conditions9. No appeal was filed against the ruling of the first
instance10, so that the merger of Profil, News and Format became
final.
The Formil case produced such an amassment of "sins" concerning
competition policy11 that a veritable avalanche of a public discussion
was launched on the defects and inadequacies of Austrian competition
law which went far beyond the case in dispute. Intense negotiations
                                                     
6 Under the old legal status the Chambers of Labour, of Commerce and of
Agriculture acted as official lobbyists (Amtsparteien) in cartel court
procedures which gave them the right to take competition cases to court.
7 The ruling of the cartel court was preceded by agitated political discussion of
the project  the dailies (without so much as a shred of evidence) even
reported of interventions and attempts at intimidation among the highest
political ranks. While it appears futile today to speculate on why no such
application was filed, it is at least remarkable to consider the hesitancy
evinced by public officeholders in their conduct.
8 According to unconfirmed rumours, the regular judge acting as the
chairwoman at the decisive session was overruled by the two lay judges
appointed by the social partners. This would no longer be possible under the
2002 amendment to the cartel law which provides for two regular judges and
two lay judges.
9 Conditions are a widespread practice also used in EU competition policy.
Nevertheless, they are rarely the result of strict rules but are usually
negotiated in advance. Yet they are rarely more than an alibi (Neven et al.
1993; Sleuwaegen 1998).
10 In this connection it is remarkable to look at the reasoning given by the
minister of justice for foregoing an appeal ("no prospect of success).
11 ... which were, moreover, highly profiled in public due to the media having a
field day in reporting on the case.
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have since produced a new competition regime which certainly is more
suitable as a legal foundation to ensure functioning competition than
was the previous one12.
While there is a positive outlook for the future, the competitive burdens
accumulated in the past will continue to press upon us. The past failure
to prevent market concentrations cannot realistically be made good
again in the future13. Accordingly, what is needed is ongoing monitoring
of sectors that run the risk of or are already in the throes of high
concentration, in order to uncover and prevent future abuse of dominat
positions within markets.
3. THE EUROPEAN SCHOOL ON COMPETITION LAW
3.1. TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM IN EUROPEAN COMPETITION
POLICY
The pace of technological development and globalisation, together with
the rapid convergence of whole sectors of the economy have rendered
obsolete the traditional way of analysing markets with regard to the
aspects of competition law.
In contrast to the American Antitrust Law, which has always been based
on the joint application of legal and economic analysis14, European
competition policy has traditionally been more focused on the law and
has, through the change of its framework, arrived at the limits of its
analytical powers.
Starting in the 1990s with initiatives taken by Commissioner van Miert
and developing the modernisation process further through efforts by
Commissioner Monti, the European Commission has moved towards
awarding a greater role to the economic analysis of competition issues
in order to cope with these new developments (cf. Hildebrand 2000).
                                                     
12 Cf. Böheim (2002A).
13 The reformed cartel law certainly makes ultimate ratio provision for tools to
deglomerate powerful corporate groups. Yet the option as such does not yet
say anything about whether such a drastic tool will be actually used.
14 The US Sherman Act of 1890 is generally viewed as the first competition law
which requires both a legal and an economic aspect in analysing cases of
competitive restraint.
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As a result, the drive to modernise European competition policy has
made for an increased use of economic analysis methods in both
designing and interpreting competition standards and in judging actual
cases.
3.2. THE COMPETITION CONCEPT OF THE EUROPEAN SCHOOL
Modern approaches to competition theory are increasingly gaining
ground in Europe, not least due to the shift from law to economics in
competition policy. The European Commission developed its own
"more economics based approach" as a theoretical underpinning of its
economic analysis, which has since become known as "European
School" (cf. Hildebrand, 1998).
Generally the view prevails that the more widespread use of economic
methods in competition policy is not just highly desirable but actually
indispensable (van Miert 1998). This approach is most clearly
expressed in current documents which explicitly outline the European
Commissions ideas on approaching and evaluating facts of relevance
for competition policy. Examples would be the "de minimis" notice15,
the notice on the definition of the relevant market16, various regulations
to reform group exemption regulations17 and the guidelines for vertical
agreements18.
Even though the greater emphasis on economic analysis will certainly
make for greater complexity in the decision-making process, the
approach pursued by the European Commission is guided by a
pragmatic view. In order to obtain as wide as possible a view of the
problem, both qualitative and quantitative methods are used, as is
evidenced from the definition of the relevant market in practical and
geographic terms. It is only the overall view, furnished by a qualitative
as well as quantitative analysis, which ensures that the facts can be
comprehensibly evaluated. The Commission intends that complex
econometric models and methods are used only when simpler analytical
                                                     
15 Commission notice on aggrements of minor importance, OJ C 368, 22
December 2001.
16 OJ C 372, 9 December 1997.
17 Currently the Commission draft to reform group exemption regulations for
the automotive sector.
18 Guidelines on vertical restraints, OJ C 291, 13 October 2000.
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tools do not produce the desired effect. The priority is on predictability
and legal certainty, especially since the Commissions decisions have to
hold up to the scrutiny of the European Court of Justice.
4. CONSEQUENCES FOR AUSTRIAN COMPETITION POLICY
Traditionally, Austria has emphasised a legal approach to cases of
competitive abuse. But recent developments at the European level have
subjected Austrian competition policy to pressure to adjust, applied
from outside on the institutional and methodological side.
As regards the institutional framework, the reform takes a major step in
the right direction. Establishment of an independent federal competition
authority, which is not bound by government instructions and which is
provided with the authority to investigate and prosecute, not only takes
account of concepts concerning decentralisation of the EU competition
law, but also closes a substantial institutional gap of the previous
system which was unable to prevent significant market concentrations
in Austria.
Methodologically, and viewed against the background of harmonisation
and decentralisation of the EU competition law, the new federal
competition authority will have no choice but to adopt the "more
economics based approach" stipulated by the European Commission. In
the future, a better understanding of competition economics and its
methods will be the conditio sine qua non for successfully analysing
the facts in cases of restrictive competitive practices. What this means
for the rulings of the cartel court cannot yet be foreseen, but it is
certainly expected that the enhanced use of economic tools for analysis
will breathe new life into case assessments  which will doubtlessly be
beneficial for competition in Austria.
Apart from the methodological shift towards a "more economics based
approach", there are some further conclusions to be drawn on the
content of Austrian competition policy (cf. Tichy 2000).
Austrian competition policy was either unable or unwilling to prevent
the extreme market concentration in some sectors (media, food
retailing, etc.). In view of these past failures, it appears both necessary
and useful to take a stricter line against anti-competitive practices
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(cartels, mergers and abuse of a market-dominating position). Although
the political will and practical feasibility to repair past failures of
competition policy appears to be limited in spite of legal tools being
available, measures still need to be taken to ensure that an extremely
stringent yardstick is applied to future cases. Thus, practices such as
mergers would need to be prohibited in sectors already characterised by
high market concentrations19.
Apart from market concentration as such, more attention should be
focused on the number of competitors in a given market. Mergers
should be generally rejected if the number of key market participants in
any given market is down to five (minimum market share). As is
convincingly demonstrated by the theoretical literature and by empirical
studies, the danger of collusion intensifies when that number is lower. It
is important to pre-emptively prevent market structures that encourage
collusion, because collusion is extremely difficult to uncover and even
more difficult to prove.
Markets of fewer than five independent competitors should be watched
even more closely. Market segments characterised by network
externalities (media, telecoms, utilities, etc.) in particular require a
minimum number of competitors. In extreme cases, the authorities
should not shrink from divesting market structures that obstruct
competition.
In order to preventively rein in sectors prone to concentration, but also
as a tool of competition advocacy, constant monitoring of such sectors
is recommended. Based on a standardised evaluation method, it should
be possible to perform both dynamic intra-sectoral comparisons as
well as static inter-sectoral comparisons of the competitive situation.
Serious deviations (both within a sector over time and between sectors)
would be a signal for economic policy to take competition-
strengthening measures in the affected market.
Ultimately, competition policy will be effective only to the extent of its
credibility with those affected. In this connection it may be a problem
that consumers seem to be not sufficiently aware of the implications of
                                                     
19 It would be a serious mistake to continue to "muddle along by issuing a
permit subject to conditions, as had been established practice in the past.
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competition policy on their welfare. The important role of information
and involvement of the public in competition matters has also been
emphasised recently by the European Commission (cf. Monti 2001).
Provided that the Austrian federal competition authority regularly
updates and publishes the findings of its monitoring activities, a true
picture of the competitive situation could emerge for major sectors of
the Austrian economy. Armed with a transparent view of the
competitive position, the interest public could then step up its demand
for measures to make competition work. Public pressure on corporate
offenders and competition authorities would be able to achieve much:
no company can afford to be pilloried for anti-competitive business
practices. Such indirect pressure, which acts preventively and which is
exerted by fully informing the public, might in many cases be more
effective than direct pressure exerted through endless legal rounds at
the cartel court.
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THE CARDIFF REFORM PROCESS OF GOODS AND
CAPITAL MARKETS – WHAT IS TO BE LEARNED
FROM OTHER EU COUNTRIES?
VERENA STEYER
Up to the present, a high level of economic integration has already been
reached in the European Union, and especially the Internal Market is
currently reaching a stage of maturity which requires not just the legal
enforcement of existing regulation, but also the constant monitoring of
market developments and permanent contacts with citizens and
businesses. The emphasis has, therefore, turned now to improving
efficiency in the operation of the Internal Market. To this end, the
Council launched the "Cardiff process" in 19981. The objective of the
process is to monitor economic reform in Member States in order to
improve the functioning of product and capital markets in the
Community and to enable the Internal Market to make its full
contribution to competitiveness, growth and employment.2
The latest (= fourth) national reports on structural reforms and the latest
(=fourth) Commissions Cardiff report3 take a comprehensive look at
the whole ongoing reform processes: the previous ones outline the
measures taken, they assess how well each Member State is carrying out
its reforms, and they highlight the economic consequences of the
reforms; the latter integrates the relevant developments in goods and
capital markets at the European level in the light of the long term
objectives defined at the March 2000 Lisbon European Council, the
                                                     
1 The Council decided to "establish a light procedure under which Member
States and the Commission will produce short year-end reports within their
areas of competence on product and capital markets. This procedure will
(...) help exchange best practice (...)." The European Council also welcomed
the Commissions proposal to "produce a report on structural issues and
policies." (See Presidency conclusions of the June 1998 Cardiff European
Council: URL: http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/car1_en.htm).
2 The Cardiff process is euphemistically paraphrased as "an engine for
continued progress towards efficient product and capital markets" in the
Swedish national report 2001.
3 The national reports and the Commission Cardiff report can be found on the
website of the Economic Policy Committee.
URL: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/index_en.htm.
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March 2001 Stockholm European Council and the June 2001
Gothenburg European Council.4 In the course of giving operational
content to its ambitious target5, it was emphatically accentuated at the
March 2002 Barcelona European Council that "real, effective
competition in markets is a cornerstone of the economic reform
process." Notwithstanding the already achieved progress of the EU
economic reforms, it was in addition emphasised that measures "to
liberalise, open up, integrate and build competition in European goods
markets (...to) boost production, employment, income and welfare” are
still needed "to secure greater economic efficiency and strengthen the
competitiveness of the European Union".6
Due to the prime importance of liberalisation and competition policies
to reinforce effective competition, the recent liberalisation trends in
network industries7 which have been undertaken within the framework
of the "Cardiff reform process" in the Member States are outlined in the
following. Subsequently, attention is drawn to the steps taken by several
Member States to increase powers and the operating capacity of their
competition authorities.
1. NETWORK INDUSTRIES
In the late 1980s, the creation of the Internal Market and the subsequent
removal of trade and competition barriers shifted the attention of
European and national policy-makers on the need to liberalise the
European network industries. This "need to reform" results from the
dual nature of these industries: First, these sectors are economically
important. Network industries currently account for about 6% of EU
                                                     
4 The Presidency conclusions from the Lisbon, Stockholm and Gothenburg
European Councils can be found on URL: http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/
eurocouncil/index.htm.
5 That is "making the European Union the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world." (See Presidency conclusions from
the March 2000 Lisbon European Council; URL: http://ue.eu.int/
Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=60917&LANG=1.)
6 See Presidency conclusions from the March 2002 Barcelona European
Council: URL: http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/makeFrame.asp?MAX=&BID=76
&DID=69871&LANG=1&File=/pressData/en/ec/69871.pdf&Picture=0
7 In particular it will be focused on the telecommunication and energy sectors.
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GDP and employment.8 Furthermore, prices in these industries impact
directly and indirectly on prices in the economy as a whole and hence
on the economys competitiveness. Secondly, ensuring access to high
quality services of general interest to citizens at affordable prices is a
public policy objective9, since the services of general interest provided
by these industries impact directly on citizens welfare. The
liberalisation of EU utilities, notably telecommunications and to a lesser
extent energy accelerated in the late 1990s and has succeeded in
creating new markets, delivering higher-quality services and lowering
costs for the benefit of European consumers.
On January 1st 1998, the telecommunication sector  after a decade of
liberalisation and harmonisation efforts  was fully liberalised in most
Member States. In July 2000, the Commission issued six legal proposals
known as the "telecom package" to enhance fair competition,
transparency and consumer protection. Amongst these measures, the
regulation 2887/2000 on unbundling of the local loop was adopted in
December 2000 and became mandatory from January 2001. Thus
competition in telecommunications is today well-established, mainly in
those countries who liberalised earliest, in long-distance and
international calls and in particularly in the mobile-phone sector. Even
though the market share of incumbent operators has fallen in all
Member States, incumbents still keep high market shares in most
segments of the market, especially in the local calls segment10. The
relatively small number of competitors in the telecom sector is mainly
due to the fact, that the number of players is limited by spectrum and
                                                     
8 Solely the European energy market is worth 350 billion Euro a year. (See:
The Economist, 23rd March 2002, p 29.)
9 In the course of carrying out reforms, this fact is sometimes used as an
excuse for safeguarding a monopoly position in network industries. For
instance France in its national report argues in an ambiguous way that it is
"committed to maintaining the quality and performance of its public services
and to ensure that they cover as much as possible of national territory. The
part played by competition must therefore be compatible with these
objectives (...)."
10 But with the notable exception of UK and Germany, where the incumbents
market share has fallen to 70%.
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that operators have to bid for a limited number of licenses.11 An
important issue to ensure competition is to open domestic markets to
international competition. But in the telecom sector such access may be
limited  as already mentioned above  by the availability of licences
offered by the regulator, by the number of interconnection agreements
between operators, by the availability of lines and possibly by
technology. The prices for the EU-15 in telecommunications equipment
and services have declined by around 16,5% in nominal terms between
January 1996 and August 2001. The decline has been more pronounced
in Ireland, Germany and the UK. In general, the price reductions have
made telecommunication services more affordable to Europeans of
different income levels. Telecom regulators were reformed and
strengthened in Finland and Greece, reforms are underway in Belgium,
Ireland and Portugal.
In electricity, a Community directive (96/92/EC) sets out the basic
rules for opening up markets to competition. A major objective is to
increase efficiency in order to provide lower prices. The directive is
based on two important principles: freedom of choice for eligible
consumers and free third party access (TPA) to the transmission
network. Market opening occurs in three steps. In February 1999, large
consumers were permitted to choose their suppliers. A second step in
February 2000 increased the percentage of liberalised national
electricity demand from 26% to 28%. A third step is set for February
2003 pushing the ratio to 33%. But remarkably many countries (Austria,
Germany, Finland, Sweden and the UK) have decided to go further and
to fully liberalise the demand side of these markets. They will be
followed by Denmark and Spain in 2003, by the Netherlands in 2004,
by Ireland in 2005 and by Belgium in 2007. Currently, about 65% of the
electricity demand in the EU is open to competition. The market shares
of the incumbent in generation and of the three largest distributors are
lower in those countries that are most advanced on the path of
liberalisation  the UK, Finland, Germany, Sweden and Austria. But
nevertheless distribution in some countries is still in the hands of local
monopolies with market share of 100% in the area(s) where they are
active. In Greece, France and Ireland the market share of the
                                                     
11 The market seems to evolve "from a situation of monopoly to a situation of
oligopoly", as remarked in the Annex to the 2001 Commissions Cardiff
Report.
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incumbents remains in general rather high. In the UK, stronger
unbundling was introduced in electricity: Now the same legal person
can no longer hold licences for both electricity supply and electricity
distribution. In addition the UK established a new wholesale trading
arrangement in 2001, which is based on bilateral contracts and which
thus introduces genuine competition. In Belgium unbundling is also
taking place at the regional level, implying that the management of the
distribution grid and production and sales activities will be legally
separated. Luxembourg has the highest degree of openness12 in the
electricity market. Austria and Denmark are quite open relative to their
domestic demand. France is the only large exporter in the EU.
Since the electricity-sector is still at the dawn of liberalisation in most
countries, the effect on prices has been fairly limited for the EU as a
whole. Prices declined by only 2% between January 1995 and January
2001 and recently returned to their 1996 level. But it should be
mentioned in this context, that this decline is still a positive
achievement compared to the evolution of prices in the economy as a
whole. Furthermore it should be alluded to the striking correlation
between liberalisation and downward prices in those sectors and
countries where liberalisation occurred earliest.13 Electricity is now
more affordable for low and average income consumers, even though
households have not gained as much as large (commercial) consumers.
Significant price differences exist across European countries14, which
highlights the need for integration in the Internal Market for energy.15
This was lately accentuated at the March 2002 Barcelona European
Council: "Liberalisation advances have not progressed in parallel in
Member States, the possibilities for intra-community trade are limited."
Therefore the European Council "agrees the target for Member States
of a level of electricity interconnections equivalent to at least 10% of
                                                     
12 The degree of openness is defined as the ratio of the sum of imports and
exports to twice the domestic demand.
13 Of course also other determinants affect the price, like the demand and
supply of electricity, the structure of costs of electricity production and the
intensity of competition.
14 Prices especially remain relatively high in Belgium, Germany, Italy and
Portugal whereas prices in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the UK are far
below EU-average.
15 See also "Energy and lethargy", in: The Economist, 23rd March 2002, p.29.
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their installed production capacity by 2005."16 For saturated
infrastructures, auction systems have already been introduced on the
France  UK and the France  Italy connections to encourage
international trade in energy. The interconnection capacity will also be
increased between Greece and Italy, thanks to a new connection
between those two countries.
In the gas sector, a Community directive (98/30/EC) was adopted in
1998 requiring a 20% absolute minimum market opening from August
2000. This ratio must be increased to 33% by 2008. Today, already
most countries have gone further and about 80% of EU gas demand is
open to competition. Only the UK and Germany have officially fully
liberalised the demand for gas, although there are some delays in the
full transposition of the directive in Germany. They will be followed by
Austria in 2002, by Spain and Italy in 2003, by the Netherlands in 2004,
by Ireland in 2005, by Belgium in 2006 and by Sweden in 2008.
Regulated access to transmission and legal unbundling were introduced
in 2001 into Denmarks revised gas legislation and in Italy a new
company was formed for the gas infrastructure, but is still related to the
incumbent. Greece amended its gas market legislation, implying
unbundling and a proposal for a new tariff structure. Since most of the
gas consumed in Europe is imported from third countries it is not
surprising that  with the exception of the UK  countries display a
relatively large degree of openness of their gas-markets. The evolution
of prices in the gas-sector has followed a pattern determined by oil
prices, origin of supply and domestic demand conditions. In the UK and
the Netherlands, the two largest EU gas producers, prices have been the
lowest between 1992 and 2001. Then come Germany and Italy, with
medium-range prices. France, a fairly small producer, follows, and
marginal or non-producer countries face the highest prices.
In liberalised sectors, regulatory authorities play an important role to
ensure that consumers have a genuine choice of supplier, that
competition between suppliers is effective and that universal services
are being provided. The introduction of competition meant that
incumbent firms found themselves dominant in liberalised markets and
that thus the full benefits of liberalisation have not necessarily been
                                                     
16 See Presidency conclusions from the March 2002 Barcelona European
Council.
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passed on to consumers. To protect consumers against possible
monopoly abuse and to undermine the incentives of firms to implicitly
collude, European and national policy-makers have therefore
established sector-specific regulatory regimes in network-industries,
even if it may seem paradoxical that regulation is required because of
competition. Anyway, the sector specific regulation has to be designed
in a way to oversee the conduct of the incumbent operators, even
though the argument of "economies of scale and scope"17 is often cited
in this regard as a counter-argument for liberalisation. The regulatory
authorities are therefore  when considering measures to reduce
dominant market share of the incumbent  invoked to weight the
benefits of increased competition against the potential loss of
economies of scale and scope.
Regulatory authorities face several utmost important  besides the
above mentioned  tasks: Since effective competition in network
industries depends on the access to the non-liberalised segments of the
sector, regulatory authorities should ensure non-discriminatory
practices in this respect.18 Allowing, legally and technically, foreign
competitors to enter the domestic market, is another difficult job of
regulators. But as well as pursuing efficiency, regulators need to
address fairness considerations too. Social goals such as "universal
service", whereby services should be universal and affordable, play a
critical role in regulation. Because of these widespread tasks, the
regulatory authorities are gradually being adopted to the challenges of
the liberalised markets in all Member States: The responsibilities of
                                                     
17 Economies of scale mean that the average costs of supplying services tend to
decline as output expands. Under competition, when potentially many firms
share total industry output, economies of scale are necessarily sacrificed.
Economies of scope imply that the costs of supplying services may benefit
from "joint production. As firms in the network industries may supply many
different services and products over a common network, there may be
advantages from having large multi-output firms. But since the conditions in
the network industries have changed considerably and since the significance
of natural monopoly elements has been diminished in recent times, it is
increasingly feasible for competition to take place, particularly in areas lying
outside of the main network infrastructures (e.g. in downstream service
provision).
18 In Portugal for instance the energy regulator has taken measures to guarantee
third parties non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure for electricity
transmission and distribution.
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regulators are being expanded and clarified, the powers to enforce
legislation are being strengthened, more resources are allocated to
regulators and the existing regulators are often merged into fewer
regulatory bodies to correspond with market development.19 Most
Member States have opted for sector-specific and independent
regulators. In contrast to this, Germany has not established an energy
regulator. Instead regulation of network access is governed by
Association Agreements20, while public interests are to be handled
under the general competition laws. In Luxembourg one independent
regulatory authority, the Institut Luxembourgeois de Régulation (ILR),
is responsible for ensuring regulation in all three sectors  the
telecommunications, the electricity and the gas sector. The pictures are
quite similar in the Netherlands21, in Ireland22, in the UK23 and in
Italy24, where the regulatory authorities for both, the electricity and gas
sector, are integrated in one single regulation body. In Austria new
regulatory authorities have been entrusted with the accomplishment of
the internal market in electricity: the Electricity Control Ltd and the
Electricity Control Commission.25 The supreme supervisory authority is
the Federal Minister for Economics and Labour. Together with the
opening up of the gas market it is planned to establish an independent
regulatory authority for natural gas as well.26 In Sweden conflicts may
                                                     
19 For instance regulators are being established for the entire communications
and energy markets, respectively.
20 In this regard concerns have been expressed, if the reliance on Association
Agreements and negotiated access to energy networks will de facto allow
new entries and effective competition.
21 The Energy Implementing and Supervisory Board forms part of the general
competition authority.
22 The newly established Commission for Energy Regulation;
23 Besides the establishment of the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, a
new single consumer body for gas and electricity, the Gas and Electricity
Consumer Council (GECC), known as the "Energywatch, was set up.
24 The scope of the Italian Electricity and Gas Authoritys regulatory powers
embraces besides pricing, fixing the levels of service quality and the setting
of technical and economic conditions of network access and interconnection
also administrative unbundling of the various stages in the production and
supply of electricity and gas.
25 See URL: http://www.e-control.at for further details.
26 As regards the use of synergies, it is planned to add the natural gas sector to
the scope of responsibilities of the Austrian electricity regulatory authorities.
(See: Austrian Cardiff Report 2001, p 8.)
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arise because of the governments role as shareholder and regulator in
the electricity, gas and telecommunication sector. But independently of
the regulatory set-up, some elements seem to be essential to ensure
effectively competition: Continuous monitoring and supervision of
access tariffs and conditions, extended powers to interfere fast and
effectively in response to non-competitive practices and the avoidance
of lengthy procedures to settle claims of non-competitive practices.
2. COMPETITION POLICIES
The application of both Community and national competition policy is
faced with more new challenges, in part exacerbated by globalisation,
the single currency, company networking and e-commerce. This places
high demands on competition authorities in their work in practice and
notably in becoming familiar with new market phenomena. A number
of Member States, including Greece, France, Ireland and the UK,
therefore took steps to increase the powers and the operating capacity of
their competition authorities and to foster the co-operation between
competition and regulatory authorities.   
The role of the independent Competition Committee (CC) in Greece27
has been significantly enhanced through the upward revision of the
merger thresholds, the authorisation of the CC to issue opinions on
competition matters on its own initiative, and the reassurance of its
financial independence. This major changes, accompanied with the
increase of its personnel and the improvement of its infrastructure
contributed to the upgrading of the CC and the strengthening of its
prestige.
The New Economic Regulations Law of May 200128 in France contains
a series of provisions on competition which should help to improve the
operation of the markets: Mergers now need to be reported to the
Minister of Economy when total world turnover at the new entity
reaches 150 million Euro. If a merger poses a threat to competition, the
Ministry of Economy may prohibit the operation, after notifying the
                                                     
27 Enactment Law 2837/2000, full implementation of the CC in October 2000.
28 Passed on 15 May 2001, supplements Order No 86-1243 of 1 December
1986.
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Competition Council29. The limit of fines that may be imposed by the
Competition Council for anti-competitive practices has been increased
from 5% to 10% of companies' world turnover.30 The new law also
increases transparency31 and includes a number of measures to simplify
procedures.32 To encourage operators to do more themselves to create
sound markets and to discourage secret cartels, a leniency clause has
been introduced for companies that inform the authorities of an
agreement to which they had been a party. Certain markets which
require specific expertise are subject to sector-based regulation33, which
is carried out by specialised independent authorities. Their activities
supplement the action taken under ordinary law by the Competition
Council or the Minister of Economy.
To ensure that competition law can be more effectively enforced in
Ireland, the authorised staffing complement of the Competition
Authority has been increased substantially. The new competition
legislation in Ireland34 will consolidate existing competition with
merger control law. The responsibility for deciding upon mergers, other
than media mergers35, will be transferred from the Minister for
Enterprise, Trade and Employment to the Competition Authority,
which, in its enforcement role, is now empowered to initiate legal
actions on its own initiative as well as acting on foot of complaints. In
addition tough penalties for competition offences have been introduced.
The UK legislation is based on taking a tough prohibitory approach to
anti-competitive activity whilst avoiding placing undue compliance
                                                     
29 In general the Competition Council (Conseil de la Concurrence), an
independent authority with general powers, and the Minister of Economy are
responsible for ensuring that the rules on competition are complied with
rests.
30 This will help stamp out the practice whereby a legal entity against which
action is being taken may be tempted to substantially reduce its turnover.
31 As soon as a merger is reported, a notice summarising the operation will be
put online on the Ministrys website.
32 E.g.: Regarding the criteria used to identify the authority responsible for
monitoring mergers.
33 For instance financial services, stock markets, telecom networks and
electricity.
34 It will be enacted in 2002.
35 Decisions on non-media mergers will be based solely on competition criteria,
while additional public interest criteria will be introduced for media mergers.
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costs on business. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT)36 and the sectoral
regulators who share concurrent powers, are responsible for applying
the prohibition regime and are provided with enhanced powers of
investigation and enforcement. Firms in breach of the Competition Act
199837 may be fined up to 10% of their turnover for the period of
infringement subject to a maximum of three years.
In Spain approval was given to increasing the resources available to
competition law enforcement bodies resulting in a 20% rise in the
Competition Tribunal budget and an organisationally reinforcement of
the Competition Service by the creation of a new administrative section.
The Competition Tribunal has been transformed into an independent
agency enjoying greater flexibility, freedom of action and management
autonomy. The aim of the new Draft Royal Decree pursuant to
Competition Law provisions on control of economic concentrations is
to incorporate recent legal novelties on the control of economic
concentrations into the Spanish regulatory framework.
In the Netherlands a new competition authority, the Dutch Competition
Authority, was established in 1998 together with a new Competition
Act. This largely independent and unaffected by political influences
authority, next to the general competition authority, is increasingly
responsible for implementing sector-specific laws.
In Finland the financial resources of the Finnish Competition Authority
have been boosted and the authority has enhanced its activities. A
Government bill was submitted to Parliament in June 2001 to establish
a new special court  the Market Court. In the bill it is proposed that
market law matters and competition matters be brought together in one
and the same court.
The Austrian system of cartel law enforcement has often been
criticised, especially because of its shortfalls in respect to its law
enforcement powers and because of the fact, that the law and
enforcement in competition policy has not been applied to EU law. An
amendment recently passed can be regarded as a response to that
                                                     
36 The OFT is currently receiving extra-financial resources from the
Government.
37 Implemented in March 2000.
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criticism: It provides for the establishment of an independent Federal
Competition Authority as an initiative and investigating authority as
well as for the installation of a Cartel Prosecutor, who will be directly
responsible to the Minister of Justice. The Federal Competition
Authority will co-operate with the European Commission, thus ensuring
the coherence between national and European competition law.
Summing up it may be said that several remarkable steps have been
taken towards strengthening national competition authorities, including
moving towards more independent regulatory bodies and the
consolidation of sector-oriented into horizontal agencies. The reforms
undertaken in Austria are completely in line with this European trend:
By being vested with appropriate investigative powers the Federal
Competition Authority is able to act and operate in an effective way.
The reduction of the influence of the "social partners"38 guarantees
more independence of the Competition Authority. However, several
countries need to pursue further reforms along these lines39 in order to
make the competition and regulatory framework more effective in the
future.40
In the opening paragraphe effective competition was circumscribed as
the "cornerstone of the economic reform process." Taking the above
illustrated latest developments in network industries and the already
undertaken reforms in the area of competition policy into account,
results in the "indirect" recommendations which have been formulated
at the March 2002 Barcelona European Council: "Further market
opening, appropriate regulation, improved use of existing networks and
completion of missing links will increase (...) competition (...).
Competition provides the discipline and the incentive to secure greater
                                                     
38 The influence of the "social partners" is limited to assigning lay judges to the
Cartel Court, on the one hand, and to a purely advisory function, on the
other.
39 Especially more effective independence should be given to competition
authorities, in order to avoid the risk that decisions may be based on criteria
other than competition criteria.
40 But  as the Danish emphasise in their national report 2001  "it is important
to note that the competitive situation will rarely change overnight: it takes
time to change the competitive structure of a sector (...)."
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economic efficiency (...)."41 Therefore continued structural reforms 
interacting with growth- and stability-oriented macro-economic policies
 are a key element of sustained growth, high employment and the long-
term competitiveness of the European Union. This "interaction-
strategy" will allow policies to respond flexibly to changing economic
conditions in the short run whilst strengthening the productive capacity
of the economy over the medium run.
                                                     
41 See Presidency conclusions from the March 2002 Barcelona European
Council.
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A NEW INTERNAL MARKET STRATEGY TO REMOVE
BARRIERS TO SERVICES
OTHMAR HORVATH, EVA PFANDL
1. ECONOMIES IN MOTION
Over the last decades, we have seen a fundamental shift in the
composition of the EU market form a manufacturing to a service-driven
economy. In all EU Member States the services sector accounts for
approximately 50 percent of the of GDP and experts still see further
potential to grow, to enhance the competitiveness and thus to create
new jobs.
The fundamental change has been reinforced by the rapid technology-
development seen in the last years which brought about the Information
Society, leading to new business dynamics, lower barriers of entry
(even for companies from non-Member States) and as a result of this to
more competition, especially in the services sector. The cost of
acquiring and transmitting information has been cut immensely, the
innovation-cycle has been reduced and new technologies now diffuse
more rapidly. The disappearing need for proximity has opened the
European Market to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) by
providing more consumers. All in all the cost and revenue structure has
been altered.
Today the EU is the worlds biggest exporter of services  26 percent of
world exports excluding intra-Community export, compared to 24
percent from the United States  and the biggest importer of services.
The failure to reduce and eventually eliminate the failings in the
Internal Market for services can lead to an enormous setback for
Europes economy, as virtually all companies depend on the use of
services of other businesses as inputs.1
                                                     
1 URL: http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/services/services/
servicesfaq.htm, 02.04.02.
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2. THE BASIS FOR THE NEW STRATEGY
At its Lisbon summit in March 2000 the European Council asked the
European Commission to develop an new comprehensive Internal
Market strategy to remove barriers to services in order to contribute to
the goal of making the EU the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy of the world by 2010. The strategy
elaborated by the European Commission aims to eliminate all barriers
that negatively affect the European services sector by the end of 2002
and to give service providers the chance to operate throughout the EU
without regulatory constraints that lead to a distortion of competition.
It has also been realised that SMEs need to be taken into account, which
now are reluctant to look for opportunities in other EU markets. The
benefits from the Internal Market must not only be accessible to
multinational companies, which can afford to pay extensive legal and
administration bills but also to these firms, which are very essential for
the future growth of the European economy. Furthermore surveys
conducted on behalf of the EU have shown that consumers of services
also constraint themselves to national borders. Therefore the EU has to
develop the recognition of the Internal Market on the supply and on the
demand side.
Other than before the new strategy takes the classic sectoral approach
and adds a more comprehensive, across the board approach to reflect
the current trends in business practice. Nowadays it has widely been
accepted, that service activities do not stop at the border of the services
sector (i.e. retail, logistics, accounting, consulting, a.s.o.) but are carried
out by manufacturers as well (e.g. promotion, distribution, marketing,
after-sales care). Additionally, we see the forming of new services. It is
therefore essential to generate a new framework that is sufficiently
flexible to allow these innovative services to develop and still provide
common rules where necessary.2
The implementation of the new Internal Market strategy to remove
barriers to services will contribute to the four key strategic objectives of
the Strategy for Europes Internal Market  namely improving the
                                                     
2 URL: http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/services/services/
services.htm, 02.04.02.
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quality of life of citizens, enhancing the efficiency of Community
product and capital markets, improving the business environment and
exploiting the achievements of the Internal Market in a changing world.
The facilitation of cross-border services will give EU-citizens and
enterprises a greater variety regarding quality, choice and prices. This
will induce more pressure from the demand side so that service
providers are permanently forced to improve the competitiveness, to
increase efficiency and to be innovative.
If the barriers that now interrupt this process are removed, the service
providers will have the chance to fully contribute to the growth and
prosperity of the European market. The services strategy will consider
to balance out legislative and non-legislative activity as well as
harmonisation and mutual recognition. It can lead to a process that
adapts the Internal Market to the fundamental changes that have
occurred and it can help to arm the EU and its companies for future
developments and competition.
3. BASIC PRINCIPLES
The European Commission has defined five basic principles, the
process to remove all barriers to services has to consider:
1. It should be comprehensive: The new strategy should encompass all
services sectors and their inter-linkage and it should go beyond
addressing specific problems in specific services sectors. The
sectoral initiatives currently under way have to be completed as
urgently as possible whilst maintaining their coherence and ensuring
their consistency with the overall strategy towards services.
2. It should make cross-border activities as easy as acting within a
Member State: There should be no need for service provider to adapt
their business plans to unjustifiably different legal and
administrative requirements.
3. It should ensure business and consumers secure benefit from the new
opportunities open to them: High levels of health and consumer
protection have to be assured throughout the Internal Market and
effective systems to treat cross-border complaint, dispute resolution,
redress and enforcement have to be in place.
4. It should keep pace with change: It has to be ensured that
Governments keep their laws and regulations up to date, but not at
the expense of establishing new Internal Market barriers.
EU Policies82
5. It should be coherent with other policies.
4. A TWO STAGES APPROACH
In order to finally implement the free market for services, the European
Commission has developed a timetable with specific actions, divided
into two stages. The first stage, which was originally scheduled to be
completed by the end of 2001 but which is still in progress,
concentrates on accelerating initiatives in a number of specific problem
areas and on identifying and analysing the existing barriers. In the
second stage the European Commission will suggest a further package
of initiative, including a timetable for Member States to dismantle the
barriers identified.
Stage one actions:
1. Launch of a first wave of legislative and non-legislative initiatives
for specific problem areas (e.g. commercial communications,
regulated professions, financial services, electronic commerce,
counterfeiting and piracy).
2. Review of the existing directives that relate to the free movement of
services in order to increase their efficiency.
3. Initiation of a number of non-legislative flanking measures to
improve statistical information on services, raising the skill levels of
ICT in service industries and enhancing the innovative capacities in
companies that provide services to other businesses.
4. Launch of a survey of barriers to services in the Internal Market to
recognise specific problem areas, to identify key areas where
infringement procedures have to be accelerated, to improve the
European Commissions "Dialogue with Business and Citizens"
Internet site, to be presented, discussed and  if possible  solved by
experts, to be complied in a report, to be presented to the Council
and the European Parliament and to be used as a basis for the actions
in stage two.
Stage two actions:
1. Identification of barriers that can be eliminated by the direct
application of Treaty principles and where there are no infringement
cases underway. The Member states will be requested to remove this
barriers according to a given timetable.
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2. Implementation of a package of non-legislative measures such as
Community codes of conduct, alternative dispute settlement
mechanisms and awareness actions designed to improve the flow of
information.
3. Development of harmonised measures to remove horizontal barriers
which include a targeted harmonisation of requirements affecting
several sectors, a mechanism to ensure that the Internal Market can
be used by all European service providers as their domestic market
and procedures to cope with new market and legislative
developments.
5. EXISTING BARRIERS
Studies and surveys which were used by the European Commission to
develop the new strategy have already brought forward a number of
barriers. Of the six stages of the business process that are common to all
service companies across all economic sectors  setting up the business
(establishment), use of inputs (labour, business and funding services),
promotional activities, distributional activities, sales activities and after-
sales support activities  each bears different obstacles that may be
encountered.
Examples for barriers in stage 1 – Establishment of the service
provider
Differences in practices and requirements for establishing a company,
requirements for authorisation to provide services within a national
territory, requirements concerning a physical outlet for service
provision and requirements regarding professional qualifications.
Examples for barriers in stage 2 – Use of inputs
Differences in practices and requirements for labour services
recruitment, cross-border information on local skills availability, use of
financial services by companies, provision of funding services,
differences in access to business and professional services and
purchasing of inputs by public authorities of services across borders.
Examples for barriers in stage 3 – Promotion of services
Differences in how companies can use services to raise awareness of
their output (e.g. commercial communications  advertising, sales
promotion, PR, sponsorship), differences in the provision of
EU Policies84
independent comparative information on goods and services and
mandatory disclosures requirements.
Examples for barriers in stage 4 – Distribution
Differences in logistics, warehousing, conditions for the retail trade,
postal services, home delivery, differences governing creation of and
access to infrastructure allowing the reception of services and barriers
arising from lack of confidence in delivery systems.
Examples for barriers in stage 5 – Selling of output
Differences in practices and requirements for national pricing regimes,
indirect taxation regimes, payment systems, contracting and invoicing
systems and health, safety as well as security concerns.
Examples for barriers in stage 6 – After-sales support
Differences in in-house customer services and customer complaint
handling, extra-judicial redress mechanisms outside the firm and cross-
border judicial redress systems, liability issues and enforcement by
public authorities
6. NATIONAL RESULTS – EXISTING BARRIERS FOR AUSTRIAN
COMPANIES
In Austria the Federal Ministry of economics and labour together with
the Federal Economic chamber and the Federal Committee of Austrian
Liberal Professionals conducted a survey by a detailed questionnaire on
behalf of the European Commission. The questionnaires were sent out
to companies, information events were organised and the data gathered
was summarised and analysed by February 2002. The survey has shown
that especially service providers in regions close to national borders are
affected by barriers and that the obstacles are more common in some
specific branches such as construction, trade, tax-consulting, auditing,
architecture, engineering and health.
The survey has shown, that in fact there exist a number of barriers in
the cross-border trade of services, which can be split up as follows:
1. Differences in business and trading law (bureaucracy in the context
of the establishment of companies and the recognition of
professional education, constraints regarding company structure).
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2. Differences in labour and social law (compulsory registration of
employees, bureaucracy in the context of registration of employees,
papers that have to be carried by employees, differences in minimum
wages and their calculation, different social-insurance systems).
3. Differences in tax law (different tax-rates, compulsory application
for a tax-number, various special taxes, different law-systems and
different application of law).
4. Barriers and bureaucracy concerning licenses and certificates.
5. Bureaucratic and vague regulations for invitation of tenders.
7. CONCLUSION
Within the EU the importance of the services sector to the overall
economy has been realised and the governing bodies now are taking
action to back up this industry. The process of removing all barriers to
services is going to take some time as governments have to open up
national markets for services which so far were protected and mainly
open to national companies.
The analysis has shown that companies in different industries and
regions are not equally affected. For some interest-groups it might be
harder to raise the awareness and develop a clear understanding of their
problems from national- and EU-authorities, which in turn is essential
to cope with present and new problems related to the Internal Market
for services. The analysis on the way services business is conducted
must not stop at this point  more detailed data and more examples for
existing and potential barriers has to be gathered and identified to make
the new strategy even more efficient.
It seems to be clear that it will be very difficult to balance out all the
different interests, as different nations, regions and even businesses and
single companies are affected in various ways. The delays seen in the
two stages process seem to support this concern. However the European
Commission has carefully developed its Strategy and considered all
essential arguments. It has taken into account businesses and
consumers, the changing business environment and the technological
innovations, the global business environment, the particular
characteristics of the different businesses, safety, health and security
considerations as well as environmental liability. It will be essential to
the success of the new strategy to continue on in this meticulous way to
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solve the existing and potential problems. The work has to continue in a
quick way to avoid any further delays. It is still a long way to go, but
the progress is on the way.
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COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
JOHANNES MAYER
1. INTRODUCTION
The scientific discussion about the relationship between competition,
competition policy and competitiveness is still going on. I will not add
another contribution to this discussion, but I will assume that:
• competition is the most effective selection mechanism in a market
based economy,
• competition policy may contribute to a more competitive
environment in the economy,
• competition leads to a better competitiveness of an economy in the
long run.
These principles have to be broken down to the specificities of the
power industry. It seems that there are major trade-offs between goals
of regulation policy (such as strict separation of natural monopoly) and
relations within the industry leading to vertical integration, industry
wide planning and co-ordination structures or other phenomena which
are at least suspect to competition watch-dogs.
Electricity therefore is even less suitably subjected to structural analysis
of the market than other industries. Nowadays practice of EU
Competition authorities is only very roughly examining the specific
issues of the industry. Their conclusions are dominated by the fact of a
still very imperfectly functioning market and essentially national
regulation systems. Conditions for issuing waivers in case of mergers
are therefore regularly instrumental in achieving improvements of
national regulations and broadening the market.
2. IMPORTANCE OF ELECTRICITY FOR THE AUSTRIAN ECONOMY
The electricity sector contributes about 2.5 percent to GDP and employs
approximately 25.000 people. But the importance of the sector is
understated by these figures. The sector produces one of the most if not
the most important intermediate product for the Austrian economy. All
other infrastructures depend on the quality and security of the electricity
supply.
Sectoral Regulation90
Dependence on electricity is even aggravated by the fact that it is hardly
possible to be substituted. Possible market power would therefore have
detrimental effects on final customers (inverse elasticity rule).
3. THE MARKET FOR POWER
Non-storability of power, a very low price elasticity of demand and the
fact that demand and supply have to be matched exactly at all times are
frequently re-iterated as the most important determinants of the power
market. These properties lead to very volatile wholesale prices, high
market risks and a differentiation of the up-stream market (generation).
Interestingly these aspects seem to be of minor interest to economic
analysis of the market. Some comments on the most relevant
competitive factors might therefore be useful.
• Supply: As supply has to follow demand within seconds, there has
to be oversupply at most times. This oversupply has to be sufficient
to cover technical problems of single power stations but also
climatic parameters such as less rain (reducing production of hydro-
power stations), cold temperatures (increasing demand), etc. The
supply curve does not consist of the short run marginal cost of one
optimal technology but of production technologies with very
different marginal costs. Therefore an increase of demand may
drastically increase supply prices.
• Demand: Empirical evidence on price elasticity shows that demand
only slightly reacts to price changes (ε<1). One explanation might
be an informational problem. Customers have no adequate
information about actual prices. Prices for big customers are in
certain cases linked to wholesale prices, which reduces risk
management costs and allows lower contracted prices. But they
have no possibility to change their demand according to short run
price changes. Small customers normally are even supplied at fixed
tariffs revealing no price information. The only very static way to
reveal at least some price information is to implement tariffs that
vary according to the time of consumption. Price information then
reveals price forecasts of the supplier but not actual prices. A
second explanation might be the low degree of substitutability of
power for common uses at least in the short run. Substitution is
mainly done by shifting demand from high to low price periods, by
reducing peaks, etc.  consumption is not reduced but distributed
over time.
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• Balance: Supply and demand via market mechanisms cannot match
perfectly. This would require full real-time information of actual
demand for every customer. The technical solution is a statistical
match of demand and supply (via ex-ante programs) and install a
common balancing mechanism that increases or reduces supply in
order to cover the error (control energy). "Balancing energy" serves
as additional energy supply if control energy is not sufficient to
balance the market. If in certain cases demand for control energy
can partly be predicted it is substituted by balancing energy.
Technically the difference between these to kinds of supply is time.
Control energy reacts automatically whereas balance energy has to
be called off by the grid operator. Time or reactivity of power
stations constitute fundamental sources of value within the power
market. Normally control energy is the most expensive energy in
the system, followed by balancing energy. The balancing energy is
provided by a market mechanism via a bidding system. Arbitrage is
possible between balancing energy and the normal wholesale
products (esp. peak load energy, i.e. constant delivery over 12 daily
hours), which insures in the long run that the power market
responsible for predictable programs provides the cheapest energy.
Within the wholesale market base load energy is the cheapest
product. This is a constant delivery over 24 hours a day, which
refers to those power stations that are not able without substantial
additional cost to change production (nuclear power, big hydro-
power and coal).
• Suppliers and customers have an economic incentive to optimise
their ex-ante programs (matching of supply and demand reduces the
need for expensive control and/or balancing energy). One pre-
requisite for this is a high degree of transparency or public
information about the actual situation of the system.
• Network: The physical network constitutes and determines the
market. Bottlenecks split the market; sufficient capacities of inter-
connectors constitute a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for
the development of a market place. Networks have historically been
constructed to connect local demand with local supply. Inter-
connectors with other national systems essentially served to allow
for eventual unintended physical exchange that balances the whole
power system internationally. The philosophy behind international
co-operation has been that of independent self-sufficient national
systems, where the international network only provides additional
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stability. In some cases actual inter-connectors are not sufficient to
allow market based power flows caused by different production
technologies within the national systems. Further steps forward in
the course of liberalisation within the EU will aggravate this
problem.
• Trade: Traditional wholesale products dominate the analysis of the
competitive situation in the up-stream power market. A much more
in depth analysis of more differentiated products and strategic
behaviour has to be undertaken. Even relatively small shares in the
production market may be sufficient to change energy flows
whereby causing capacity problems in the network. This might lead
to a separation of regional markets. So even small shares in the up-
stream market can lead to a dominant regional position.
4. SECURITY AND QUALITY OF SUPPLY
Even in liberalised electricity markets, security and quality of electricity
supply are major issues. Efficient allocation of resources and
investment is of great importance, particularly in view of the cost
pressures in the area of grid operation, which have arisen through
liberalisation and incentive regulation implemented by many regulators.   
Security of supply is one of the main arguments raised by incumbents in
favour of protection from market pressure or an increase of the rate of
return in the network business. Nevertheless no direct relation between
liberalisation and a decrease of security of supply has been revealed in
practice. Actually in some cases the contrary was true. Liberalisation
increased security of supply and decreased the amount of lost energy.
One of the regulators responsibilities is to guarantee that cash flows
dedicated to security and quality of supply are actually used in the right
way. Especially in vertically integrated companies this leads to a severe
control problem as these cash flows are "invested" into competitive
activities of the own company. It therefore seems reasonable to include
the treasury's success of the transportation or distribution business in
benchmarking procedures. Investing into the company's own supply
business has to match possible gains from other investment
possibilities.
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5. THE AUSTRIAN REGULATORY SYSTEM1
The Austrian regulatory system tries to implement an independent
regulator within the Austrian legal system. At the same time "old"
institutions like the Advisory Board have been assigned new
competences. A special task of the Advisory Board concerns the
problem of "regulatory capture". The Board gets very detailed
information about network costs and relevant tariffs in order to be able
to reveal any case of unequal treatment of regulated network
companies.
5.1. FEDERAL MINISTER OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND LABOUR
The highest regulatory authority is the Federal Minister of Economic
Affairs and Labour, who has three main areas of responsibility:
• Supervising the activities of E-Control;
• Supervising the Federal Governments shareholding in E-Control;
and
• Establishing E-Control's terms of reference.
5.2. ELECTRICITY CONTROL COMMISSION
The E-control Commission is a collegial body with a judicial element in
the meaning of art. 20[2] and art. 133[4] Federal Constitution. Its
members are not bound by ministerial instructions in the exercise of
their office. The E-control Commission consists of three members. One
must be a judge, and the other members must have a relevant technical,
legal or economic background.
The principal duties of the E-control Commission are:
• Approving the general terms and conditions of grid operators for
access to transmission and distribution systems;
• Determining system access charges;
• Prohibiting the application to final customers of terms and
conditions that are contrary to the public interest;
• Ruling on certain disputes between market participants;
• Arbitrating on disputes concerning the settlement of balancing
power;
                                                     
1 For further details see: E-Control "Annual Report 2001"
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• Hearing appeals against decisions by E-Control.
5.3. ELECTRICITY CONTROL LTD
E-Control is a "company vested with sovereign authority" which carries
out the duties assigned to it by law using the resources of the State. The
competence of E-Control extends to all duties assigned to it by law as
regulator, unless the E-control Commission is expressly entrusted with
such duties. E-Control's duties comprise five areas.
5.3.1. Monitoring and supervisory function
The monitoring and supervisory function encompasses the supervision
of competition, the preparation and publication of electricity price
comparisons, and the monitoring of unbundling and of the importation
of electrical energy from third countries. If E-Control identifies an
abuse in the course of its supervisory duties, it must take corrective
action without delay.
5.3.2. Regulatory function
The most important regulatory tasks are the formulation of proposals
for market rules and Technical and Organisational Rules (TOR), as well
as determining the conditions for reciprocity.
5.3.3. "Green" power and mini hydro plant certificates
E-Control is charged with monitoring compliance with the obligation to
purchase "green" and mini hydro-power. The regulator must determine
the extent to which electricity is being sourced from "green" generation
plant. If the uptake of "green" power is below the level stipulated by the
respective implementing acts, E-Control must inform the relevant
provincial government and publish the names of the distribution system
operators failing to comply with the statutory minimum percentage. In
the interests of the promotion of Austrian mini hydropower, EIWOG1
requires all final customers to meet 8% of their consumption from mini-
                                                     
1 ElWOG=Federal Act Providing New Rules on the Organisation of the
Electricity Sector (Electricity Act).
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hydro plants (maximum electrical capacity <= 10 MW). Proof of
compliance takes the form of mini-hydro plant certificates.
5.3.4. Settlement of equalisation payments between grid operators
E-Control has a duty to settle the balancing payments that arise as a
result of the consolidation of networks with different owners. E-Control
must issue an order governing the related formalities.
5.3.5. Other duties
E-Control's additional duties include the administration and collection
of contributions for stranded costs, performance of statistical work, and
balancing group supervision. Finally, E-Control is also the secretariat of
the E-control Commission.
5.4. ELECTRICITY ADVISORY BOARD
An Electricity Advisory Board has been set up at the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Labour to advise the Minister and the regulator
on matters of general electricity policy. The Board includes
representatives of the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Labour;
Agriculture and Forestry, Environment and Water Management;
Finance; and Justice; and of the provinces and the social partners.
6. THE REGULATORY AGENDA
The main tasks the regulator has to fulfil is the design of efficient and
competitive markets and simulating competition in the network in order
to avoid monopoly profits by the network owner and bring about
efficient investments. The set up of the market rules is the core of the
competitive market. Technically efficient systematic solutions
sometimes do not promote competition. The Austrian set of market
rules is being revised in order to eliminate asymmetric information.
Austrian all inclusive prices have been subject to rate of return
regulation until 1999. The effect has been the in theory well known
effect of over-investment and sharing of monopoly profits between
management, employees, suppliers and owners. In order to increase the
incentives for network companies for a more efficient management of
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their business some kind of "RPI-X" regulation will be implemented.
International experience suggests that this type of regulation is very
successful in reducing costs in the companies. Actual discussion
focuses on the question if there might be the danger of under-
investment in the long run. There seems to be a trade-off between
regulatory discretion (one possible way to reduce strategic behaviour of
the regulated companies thereby increasing regulatory efficiency) and
perceived risk in the industry (which increases the minimum interest
rate for investments).
7. IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION IN THE POWER INDUSTRY
Competition in the power industry does not evolve naturally it has to be
constructed. Self-organization of the industry would eliminate
competition. Market rules have do be defined by a regulator to enable
competition between different producers and suppliers. The main
objectives the regulator has to achieve are:
• Limiting the monopoly power of the grid operator by assuring non-
discriminatory third party access and setting prices for grid
utilisation. This enables generators and traders to supply electricity
to their customers over the grid at all times. If the network operator
belongs to an enterprise that also generates, trades and distributes
electricity (vertically integrated company) action must be taken to
prevent it from cross-subsidising these activities. This is achieved
by separating (unbundling) the grid operation function from the
other parts of the business, at least in accounting terms.
• Monitoring price trends and the ownership of market participants
(generators, suppliers and retailers). Information on prices and
ownership structures is the key to assessing the intensity of
competition. It may also be the starting point for monopoly and
market abuse proceedings aimed at combating competitive
distortions if the regulator identifies malpractice.
• Disseminating comprehensive information, especially to final
customers, so as to ensure that the latter have an adequate
understanding of the market and its mechanisms, and of the
structure of the electricity industry, thus reducing information
imbalances between market participants. This makes it easier for
consumers to select the right supplier, and cuts the related
transaction costs.
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8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Introduction of competition in the electricity industry is only partly
achieved. The market mechanism has to be designed by the relevant
regulatory authorities. Experience in the different countries (UK,
California) shows that good market design is essential to the successful
liberalisation. Therefore continuous improvements of the market system
have to be undertaken.
Austria took over many elements of the Scandinavian market model,
which is to date the most successful attempt to liberalise the market.
The next review of the system has necessarily to look at the question
how sensitive information for the market is made public.
Internationally one of the most urgent questions that are raised concerns
the relation of incentive regulation and investment. Predictability of
regulatory actions concerning network tariffs seems to be essential.
Incentive regulation needs public support in this respect. High profits of
network companies have to be seen as intermediate and instrumental to
long term increases of well fare. The British example showed that
erratic changes of the regulatory regime because of public pressure did
not contribute to the confidence of investors and implicitly increased
risk perception whereby raising the necessary interest rate for the
network business.
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THE CALIFORNIAN EXPERIENCE WITH ENERGY
LIBERALISATION
RENATE REICHERT
The electricity industry now is world-wide facing the wide-ranging
consequences of deregulation and liberalisation measures accompanied
by the erosion of international barriers, the globalisation of the world
economy and the impact of new technologies. Californias electricity
restructuring and competition programme, however, attracted by far
most attention due to its unprecedented performance.
The public opinion about the reasons behind this disastrous outcome of
the Californian liberalisation efforts is rather divergent. While most of
the experts accuse the poorly planned market design and regulatory
decisions1, there are also voices that argue that the success of an
electricity restructuring programme largely depends on the degree of
liberalisation2 as well as that liberalisation cannot be blamed to be the
source of the Californian crisis at all3. Nevertheless, the Californian
crisis seems to be the result of a complex web of events originated not
exclusively by the states restructuring programme but also
accompanied by a large number of incidents that were actually not
intended to be part of the liberalisation process.
1. SITUATION BEFORE DE-REGULATION
With about 34 million inhabitants, the state of Californian is the most
populous state within the United States followed by Texas with about
20 million people4. As the fifth largest economy in the world5 and
                                                     
1 Joskow, June 2001.
2 Wright, 2001. The author sets up the hypothesis that the more liberalised an
electricity market and consequently the more competitive the market, the
greater the likelihood of failure.
3 Callum McCarthy, Chief Executive of Ofgem, stated in October 2001:
"California is not the inevitable result of liberalising energy markets. The
British experience, as well as that in the Nordic Countries of Europe and
individual states in Australia, show that privatisation and liberalisation can
bring very real customer benefits."
4 Population Division, 2001.
5 Corporation for Education Network Initiatives in California. 2001.
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largely dominated by technologies, California used to be extremely
dependent on electricity.
The pre-liberalisation circumstances in California, however, largely
differ from international experience. Before the restructuring of the
industry in spring of 1998 started, electricity in California was
generated and distributed by private, investor owned, vertically
integrated utilities which were subject to state regulation in the retail
market. Approximately 80 percent of the states power is delivered by
three big privately owned monopolies which owned and operated
generation, transmission and distribution facilities: Pacific Gas and
Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego
Gas and Electric (SDGE)6. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, the
electricity industry was being liberalised and privatised at the same
time7.
These private utilities were regulated by an independent state regulatory
agency, the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC),
responsible for setting tariffs and standards for performance as well as
for the regulation of investment in new generation and transmission, the
control of the mix of fuels and the promotion of conservation
programmes. The regulation for transmission rates and power
transactions was left to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). The role of FERC initially was both, rather limited  since
most generation was owned and operated by the utilities themselves 
and critical, since the tariff setting within the FERC was lacking
transparency and pursued national rather than local orientation.8
                                                     
6 There are several municipally owned electric utilities which, however, had
not been liberalised. The Legislation of 1996 actually gave the municipal
utilities the option of opting in to the system or remaining outside. Almost
without exception they decided to opt out. Among them the city of Los
Angeles.
7 This difference led to a essential consequence: Once the incumbent utilities
heard about liberalisation, they started a totally rational behaviour from their
perspective, namely to protect their markets and eliminate competition,
which later contributed to capacity shortfalls because private utilities were
refusing cheap energy from competitors.
8 The other Federal agency concerned was the Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC) guaranteeing that in exchange for an special service
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Both agencies traditionally regulated wholesale power and transmission
prices on the basis of cost-of-services-principles, but in the late 1980s
they switched to granting power producers the authority to sell at
market-based rates.
The rapid growing economy of the early 1990s had the important
consequence that overall energy demand was rising and subsequently
more capacity was claimed to be needed. By the mid-1990s California
turned out to supply some of the highest priced electricity in the nation
which was not only the product of the high residential nuclear power
station construction costs. The natural geographic conditions of the
major urban areas in California proved to be easily susceptible to air
pollution and therefore stringent pollution control rules were issued
which restricted the choice of fuels and the conditions under which
energy generation can be carried out9. The Public Utility Regulatory
Policy Act of 1978, for instance, was designed to promote both
privatisation and conservation by forcing electricity utilities10 to
                                                                                                                     
territorial utilities were required to offer reliable electricity to all customers
at a certain regulated rate.
9 "...environmental regulation was under reform pressures as well. California
legislation that had up to the mid-1990s required selective catalytic
reduction devices (SCR) as the best available technology for reducing NOx
emissions from fossil power plants was drastically modified in the south
coast air quality management district (SCAQMD) of California. The Edison
Company argued that SCR was too expensive and that instead SCAQMD
should adopt a credit trading system to control NOx emissions. That
alternative was adopted with the underlying assumption that the electricity
sector would continue to function as it had in the past. Immediately a
number of things went wrong. First, too many credits were issued and most
of them were issued to the private utility – the Edison Company. As a result,
Edison didn’t need to clean up its power plants with all the credits issued to
them directly and the credits that could be purchased very cheaply in the
marketplace". See: Marcus/Harmrin, page 6.
10 A utility is a regulated entity which exhibits the characteristics of a natural
monopoly. For the purposes of electric industry restructuring, "utility" refers
to the regulated, vertically-integrated electric company. "Transmission
utility" refers to the regulated owner/operator of the transmission system
only. "Distribution utility" refers to the regulated owner/operator of the
distribution system which serves retail customers. See:
http://www.energy.ca.gov/glossary/glossary-u.html#u
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purchase power from non-utilities generators11 called Qualified
Facilities aiming at furthering cogeneration and the use of renewable
energy. This bill made utilities to purchase specified amounts of their
electricity at the estimated avoided cost of replacing that power with the
cost of power from new construction.
In 1994  due to a changing political attitude towards reducing overall
government intervention in the economy and supported by the Federal
Power Act of 1992 which gave FERC the authority to deregulate the
wholesale electricity market as well as motivated by both rising
electricity prices12 and by growing energy demand and the imminent
danger of possible generation shortages  the first step towards
liberalisation was set by PUC in ordering new construction to be put out
for private bid13. Not to a lesser degree influenced by the reforms
undertaken in Britain in 199014 that reduced costs for both production
and distribution of power and led to substantial investments in
environment-friendly new power stations, all the proposals for a
fundamental reforming of the electricity industry were laid down in the
so-called "Blue Book". This report included as well the proposition for
a new industry structure in which the production from the generators
and the entry of new plants would be deregulated and their power sold
in a competitive wholesale market.
Based on the PUCs deregulation efforts, who recommended the
utilities to unbundle their integrated systems so that the costs of
transmission, generation and distribution would be transparent and
could be sectioned off and if necessary sold, in 1996 a restructuring law
(Assembly Bill 1890) passed legislation, which introduced overall
                                                     
11 A non-utility generator is defined as a generation facility owned and operated
by an entity who is not defined as a utility in that jurisdictional area. See:
http://www.energy.ca.gov/glossary/glossary-n.html#n
12 Comparing energy prices with other neighbouring states it was commonly
argued that the reason behind the high Californian electricity prices can be
found in the existing system of regulated vertically integrated monopolies,
the high investments in nuclear power plants, high-priced long-term contracts
with independent power producers, the generation of excess capacity and in
the expensive and unproductive regulatory institutions.
13 However, right before its implementation, PUC and the State moved quickly
towards complete deregulation of generation and transmission.
14 See: Reichert, 2001
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liberalisation of the wholesale and retail market in California by March
199815.
2. THE MAIN ASPECTS OF THE 1996 LEGISLATION
The Assembly Bill was predominantly enacted to restructure
Californias electricity industry and implement retail access on the
whole. The electricity industry was, however, unlike international
practice not gradually opened but instead exposed both wholesale and
retail markets to competition escorted by a complex set regulatory
framework.
The restructuring programme mandated the creation of two separate
wholesale electricity market institutions, the California Power
Exchange (CalPX), a spot market for wholesale energy, and the
Independent System Operator (ISO), the market for real-time energy.
Even within the United States the separation of the ISO and CalPX is an
exclusive feature of Californias restructuring programme. The proposal
required the state's three large investor-owned utilities to put part of
their generating capacity on the market and at the same time
discouraged them from entering into long-term supply contracts with
independent power producers. As a result, the utilities had to rely on the
newly created spot wholesale market for about half of the electricity
that their customers demanded. Hence from this time forth the three
largest utilities were required to turn the operation of their transmission
networks over to ISO and procure their electricity through the CalPX
whereas the CalPX and ISO in turn operated public markets with
transparent hourly market clearing prices for electricity as well as
                                                     
15 "As it turned out, the computers required for the transition were not ready –
the first glitch – and opening day was postponed to April 1, 1998 – by
tradition, April Fools day." See: Hall/Weinstein, page 8.
Even when the market was finally opened on April the first, several
important software functionalities were still not working properly, the co-
ordination between the new market institutions was imperfectly organised,
the congestion management, the protocols for planning and investment in
transmission and the interconnection of new generating plants, the real time
balancing markets, the ancillary services markets and other services started
to work insufficiently designed which evidently made wholesale prices
increase.
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operating reserves and managed congestion by using market
mechanisms.
The CalPX was set up as a non-profit public trading exchange to
conduct auctions for wholesale electrical energy which then is being
dispatched in each hour of the next day. The market clearing price for a
megawatt-hour of electricity is set by an interaction between buyers,
primarily the investor-owned utilities, and sellers, the power generating
entities. When there is an excess of supply, prices can be established by
the assets of the investor-owned utilities, and will be very low.
However, when there is a shortage of supply, the price is set almost
totally by the buyers as they compete against each other. If there are a
number of buyers, the ultimate price will be established by the highest
bidder.
More specifically, this day-ahead market establishes price and quantity
of electricity for delivery during each hour of the following day. This
means, that each day 24 hourly auctions are conducted to produce
unconstrained market clearing prices and quantities. After congestion
management is performed, the CalPX issues therefore final day-ahead
schedules and calculates hourly zonal market-clearing prices, which is
determined by the intersection of the aggregated demand and supply
curves formed out of the incoming bids. The winning supply bidders in
each hour made up the CalPXs preferred day ahead schedule which
was then put forward to the ISO. The electricity price, charged to
consumers who did not choose their own electricity service provider
(ESP)16, was set equal to this wholesale spot market price determined
on the this short-term forward market. Price regulation, as a
consequence of such transactions which are wholesale in nature, now
became subject to FERC regulation.
All the three Independent Operating Utilities are requested by
legislation to place all of the day-ahead demand from their default
service customers through the CalPX on an hourly basis and must also
bid all of the energy supplied from the remaining own generating units
or power supplied to them under pre-reform long-term contracts into the
                                                     
16 "no more than 12% of retail demand migrated to ESP". Joskow/September
2001, page 13.
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CalPX as well. Other generators and demand serving entities may
voluntarily trade in the CalPX.
Operational control was  as already mentioned  transferred out of the
hands of the utilities to the Independent System Operator (ISO), the
second private non-profit market institution which is intended to
manage about 80 percent of the transmission system and  similar to the
CalPX  operates as well an hourly auction market for operations such
as energy balancing, ancillary service and congestion management. All
supply from generators selling into the ISO and all demand of the load
serving entities must be physically scheduled with or dispatched by
ISO17. Scheduled by ISO protocols generators now transmit their power
to serve demand over ISOs network through intermediaries called
Scheduling Co-ordinators (SC), any wholesale entity that has been
licensed to schedule power on the ISO network. The CalPX as well was
required to interact as an SC with ISO. ISO accepts hourly schedules
form SCs on a day-ahead basis and an hour-ahead basis to operate the
system and balances out variations in demand and supply in real time.
This new market structure actually meant that the three investor-owned
utilities sold power from their remaining assets into the wholesale
market operated by CalPX and ISO and then bought it back to meat
their default service demand. However, since this type of operation is as
well subject to regulation by FERC, the responsibility about repairing
old and building new transmission had been removed from local control
too.
Strong incentives were put in place to encourage utilities to sell their
fossil fuel generation to unregulated power companies located within
the state of California. The legislation mandated to divest half of their
fossil fuel generation, and gave incentives to get rid of the rest in order
to moderate horizontal power problems.
The utilities were as well required to provide open access to their
transmission and distribution systems at prices determined by the FERC
and PUC but actually retained ownership and control of the distribution
                                                     
17 "Load" is the technical term for total demand for electricity. It is the amount
of electricity that customers are pulling out of the grid at any given moment.
This amount is monitored in real time by the ISO, and published every ten
minutes. The ISO load accounts for about 80% of total electricity use in
California. See: Coughlin/Meier/Van Buskirk.
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system as well as of nuclear and hydro assets and their existing long-
term contracts. As a consequence distribution systems remained
regulated under the so-called incentive regulation mechanism.
Since the primary motivation for reforming the electricity industry was
getting cheaper power for consumers, legislation also planned to reduce
rates by a minimum of ten percent within a four year period. Based on
the assumption that wholesale prices would be lower than the regulated
retail price of generation service, a charge was added on to consumers
bills (amounting to about one third of consumers bills) for
reimbursement of stranded investments, which mainly resulted from
long-term uneconomic contracts and construction costs for nuclear
plants. The net result of the rate was frozen until 2002 or until the
utilities recouped their stranded investments. In view of the fact that
wholesale but not retail prices had been deregulated the customers had
no incentive to conserve energy or to switch the supplier.
3. RESULTS OF DEREGULATION
A number of new private companies started to enter the market, which
bought the generating plants from the utilities. While generation was
owned before deregulation by Utilities (55 percent), Public Agencies
(23 percent) and Qualified Facilities and Others (22 percent), the
ownership structure changed in a way such that Utilities had to cede 40
percent of their ownership to Non-Utility Owners, USA-owned energy
and international active companies.
Large industrial consumers were able to make their own bilateral
contracts or to buy on the CalPX, and so were able to take advantages
of their market power to get cheaper electricity at first. Residential and
small business users technically had the same right, but the ten percent
rate cut in addition to the costs added to every bill cover stranded costs
made undercutting the utilities themselves virtually impossible. That is
the reason why most non-state companies abandoned the residential
market. Consequently, residential and small business consumers saw no
real benefit from deregulation, since there was no competition nor
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decrease in their bills18. A tremendous transfer of wealth from the
consumers and utilities to the generators was the consequence.
From the utilities point of view, the system seemed to work during 1998
and 1999, since wholesale prices declined and, with consumer rates
frozen, vast sums of their stranded costs could be reimbursed. However,
price spikes did occur, but residential and small business consumers
were protected from the market instability by the price freeze. With the
year 2000 wholesale prices started to rise dramatically with ten times
higher peak prices and four to five times higher off-peak prices
compared to the same period a year ago19. Hence SCE and PG&E were
paying far more for wholesale power than they were able to resell it for
retail and therefore soon faced huge losses. Both subsequently were
demanding to remove the price freeze in order to pass the costs on to
consumers, while creditors became increasingly concerned about their
financial conditions20.
California was the first state in the United States to restructure its power
markets followed by Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland, York,
and the New England States. Generally, due to its different market
structures these other markets the utilities have depended upon spot
markets for much less of their retail loads, so they naturally have not
had the same price volatility problems as California.
Since California was dependent on purchasing significant amounts of
power form outside of its state, it is member of a voluntary organisation
called the Western Systems Coordinating Council that oversees the
interconnected transmission systems in the 14 western states of United
                                                     
18 The only exception was San Diego, where SDG&E had a relatively small
amount of stranded investments to reimburse. What is more, a small
percentage of customers who were interested in "green energy benefited,
since they were offered the opportunity to purchase such at a premium.
19 In June prices were routinely hitting the maximum price allowed by the
FERC on the CalPX of $750 for a megawatt hour as compared with $25 to
$35 per MWh a year before. See: Hall/Weinstein.
20 SDG&Es retail prices, however, were allowed to adjust to changes in
wholesale market prices beginning in January 2000, and passed the costs on
to their customers, which ended up in an unignorable public outcry. In
September 2000 a new law passed limiting the price cap to 6.4 cents per
KWh, which was still higher than the cap for the other both.
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States and parts of Canada. California traditionally exported power
during the cold winter months, and therefor the crisis quickly spread to
other states. Since private unregulated generators were no longer
required to sell power to California utilities, they sold power to the
highest bidder whether or not that bidder was in California. In the view
of the fact that FERC allowed the ISO to lower the price cap on CalPX
from $750 down to $250 per MWh and other states were not part of the
Californian ISO, generators were quite willing to export to states at
much higher prices.
FERC took two rather decisive actions during the last four months of
2000. The first was lowering the price cap on wholesale energy without
forcing the generators to give back any of the excessive profits they had
already made as requested by regulation and legislation. They also
allowed the utilities to purchase electricity outside the CalPX, which
the utilities denied fearing to get caught in long-term bilateral contracts
at excessively high prices. Subsequently, disregarding all request to
lower the caps even further, FERC removed them all and replaced them
with a "soft cap" of $150 per MWH. To circumvent this order, all the
generators had to do was filling in some paperwork with some
reasonable arguments why their asking price was higher than that cap.
Some industries such as aluminium even shot down their operations in
order to sell the power which they had already bought on long-term
contracts, at prices which were fixed well before the price rise in 2000.
Other industries like Montanas largest manufactures, on the other
hand, suffered from the rising energy costs and had to scale back
production. Since selling energy to other states increased the potential
shortage in California, the federal government was forced to use
emergency powers and issued emergency orders forcing generators in
the whole western region to sell power to California and to cash-
strapped PG&E and SCE. They both became insolvent in January 2001
and PG&E finally had to declare bankruptcy in April 2001. In order to
avoid blackouts the state of California used state funds of about $8
billion during the first five months of 2001 to buy electricity from
unregulated wholesale suppliers and negotiated long-term contracts
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with suppliers which makes retail prices likely to remain high for a
period of twenty years to come21.
In spite of this the Municipal Utilities, like the Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power (DPW), seemed to be the only real winner by
refusing to take part in the deregulation process. They were able to keep
prices down and sell excess power on the CalPX and to other private
utilities which resulted in surplus in their accounting and by passing on
the benefits in lowered retail prices for their consumers22.
4. SOME CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN
In the ongoing debate about the causes of and solutions to California's
energy problems several arguments had been tried to find in order to
analyse and explain the reasons behind the Californian liberalisation
crisis but most of them proved to be mistaken.
Firstly, the argument of a dramatic increase in demand. Unusual warm
spring weather made demand for air conditioning increase and due to
the fact that several generators were down for routine maintenance
reserves for electricity decreased below five percent. As an immediate
consequence and in order to avoid the whole transmission system
collapsing the ISO issued the order for utilities to reduce service to
several large customers in Northern California, a specific group which
used to pay lower rates for electricity and in turn agreed to curtail
consumption in emergency supply situations. In spite of these measures,
first blackouts occurred in mid-June in Northern California. Despite
several developments which may lead to draw the conclusion of a
similar strong increase in electricity demand, average demand for
electricity was only marginally higher and peak demand was actually
lower in 2000 than in 1999, thanks in part to the effective co-ordination
of utility investments in energy efficiency and the state's minimum
efficiency standards for buildings and equipment.
                                                     
21 An unexpected reduction in interest rates, however, was put in place by the
United States Federal Reserve Bank in December 2000, right after
Californias Governor and Allan Greenspan met to discuss ways out of the
energy crisis which seemed to have an overall effect on the US economy.
22 The success of DPW even made Californias Governor to hire DWPs
general manger for assistance and generated demands for muncipalisation of
electricity in other cities as well.
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Secondly, fuel shortages. While natural gas prices grew three-fold in the
United States and have risen eight-fold in California, there is definitely
no fuel shortage identifiable in California. The increase in the price of
natural gas was the consequence of the first significant cold winter after
several mild winters and less than average amounts of natural gas
available from storage. As one of the major inputs used for electricity
generation, it is commonly argued that gas prices contributed
significantly to the development of electricity prices. While some exerts
claim that this price augmentation cannot explain a seven-fold increase
in the price of wholesale electricity, others even affirm that gas prices
had been stimulated by the rise of electricity prices. However, only
"15% of California generation is gas-fired. In any event, the electricity
price spike did not follow gas prices".23
Thirdly, claiming environmental regulations to have prevented power
plant construction. Environmental restrictions have definitely not been
preventing the construction of new power plants. While in the early
1990s, the California Energy Commission certified eleven power plants
for construction, eight of which were ultimately completed, not one
power plant application reached the Commission from 1994-1997. This
seemed to signal electricity surpluses as well as uncertainties about the
future of electric-industry restructuring. In 1998, however, filing
application set in again and by October 2001 31 large gas-fired plants
with a capacity of 12,000 MW started to operate while more than 9,000
megawatts were under construction by then and financial guarantees
had been approved for 78 smaller renewable-energy systems. The
process by which a power plant site is approved was often criticised to
take longer than construction of the plant itself, which in turn
discourages private capital from locating a plant in California.
However, even before recent legislation streamlined the application
process still further, licensing a plant required twelve months or less24.
Finally, ill-conceived deregulation policy. If deregulation is defined as
less political control over an industry, then deregulation cannot be
blamed to be a reason for the Californian energy crisis. California's
liberalisation efforts have only partially deregulated the energy market
and the energy market is in a state of transition, with many market
                                                     
23 See: Oppenheim 2001. Page 11.
24 See: Natural Resources Defense Council. 2002.
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elements still heavily regulated by the Public Utilities Commission.
California in fact did not really deregulate the market and allow private
companies to compete with each other to provide consumers with
electricity. Instead of deregulating the industry, the state embraced an
alternative re-regulation scenario. Utilities were forced to sell off their
power generating plants and to buy their power at the highest going rate
on the spot market.
The main lesson from the unfortunate experiments in California is that
the liberalisation of former monopolies leaves a monopoly that must be
regulated. The Californian dilemma with liberalisation is not an
inherent problem with deregulation. Liberalisation requires transparent
and reliable regulation.
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REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES:
THE AUSTRIAN APPROACH – A FLASHBACK, A
REGULATORY MODEL, AND A BRIEF OUTLOOK
HEINRICH OTRUBA, STEFAN BERNHARDT
1. INTRODUCTION
More than four years after the final liberalisation, Austria's
telecommunications markets can hardly be recognised anymore.
Austrians can now choose from a diversity of attractive, high-quality
and reasonably priced offers for a vast number of interesting
telecommunications services. Mobile communications and the Internet
are booming to a completely unexpected extent, new services like
GPRS, broadband access to the Internet, etc. are the talk of the day. The
UMTS/IMT-2000 technology, which is the new generation for mobile
communications, is already on the horizon. New access technologies in
the fixed network as well as the more efficient use of local loops
(TASL) have the (technological) potential to offer customers many
more options for selecting their telecom operator in the near future,
turning the access market into a competitive market.
There is hardly any doubt in Austria that the EU programme for the
liberalisation of the telecommunications markets has been highly
successful. Recently, the ground has been prepared at the European
level for a further development of the market order of the electronic
communications markets. It is against this background and more or less
as a closing point to the regulatory activities conducted under the "old
regulatory framework" on the national and European level that a
flashback is to be provided what  in regulatory terms  has been
accomplished since November 1997. The objective of this paper is to
describe the regulatory efforts on the telecommunications markets in
Austria.
The liberalisation of a market, which was previously supplied by a
state-owned company as a statutory monopoly requires some drastic
steps. Since the central product is a service that is provided by means of
a network technology, liberalisation differs significantly from that of a
normal consumer goods' market. Network industries are characterised
by the fact that they require the shared use of the competitors'
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production facilities, i.e. the networks. If a customer of provider A
wants to make a call to a customer of provider B, both
telecommunications networks will be involved in providing this service.
The core of this paper is directed at presenting a simplified
model/approach for opening up a monopolistic network industry. The
model to be discussed here comprises the following individual steps
towards liberalisation: liberalising market access, determining which
companies have a market dominant position, ensuring open network
access, and preventing any abuse of market power. In addition, there are
other regulatory tasks, such as the national administrative control of
limited resources (numbers and frequencies), but also the settling of
disputes on behalf of (end) users.
However, in order to put relevance to such a model, a sort of reality
check should be added. Moreover, since this was not an academic
exercise, a report on the activities of the regulatory authority would be
incomplete without reference to the regulated markets. For this reason,
even this short paper should include a chapter, which deals in great
detail with a description and analysis of the development of the
telecommunications markets in Austria since market liberalisation, and
how these changes compare on an international level. Unfortunately we
simply do not have the space here to provide this comprehensive picture
of what has happened on the Austrian telecommunications markets
since 1998. Still, to the interested reader, reference can be given to a
substantial publication, released by the Regulatory Authority,
containing such a market description, the telecommunications report
2000. Here we have to limit ourselves to giving hints, how markets have
developed since 1998.
To put it in a nutshell: the telecommunications markets in Austria have
experienced a positive development, characterised by vigorous growth
and falling prices. The value added of the telecommunications markets
in the stricter sense of the word grew by approximately 11% in the year
2000. Although this growth began to flatten out towards the end of the
period under review (first quarter of 2001), it can nevertheless be said
that the telecommunications industry in Austria experienced an
extremely positive development between 1998 and 2000 (unfortunately
the figures of the year 2001 have not been available before the deadline
of this publication).
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As in the years before, the main pillars of the market growth in 2000
were mobile telephony and leased lines. In the course of the year,
Austria joined the top league of mobile communications countries
(measured by means of market penetration, namely more than 80%).
Fixed network telephony (voice telephony and Internet access) grew
faster than during the (monopolist) past. At the same time, prices
dropped significantly in all areas.
The telecommunications sector has come to be of decisive strategic
significance for the transition from an information- to a
communications society and the associated new orientation of the
national economy. Technical progress in the field of
telecommunications makes it possible to accelerate data transmission,
as well as to render the following more efficient and faster: material
flows, manufacturing processes, the supply of goods and services, and
work and management processes. Since information and knowledge are
input factors and output components, telecommunications have
therefore become a basic element of almost all economic areas, making
them a supply market for the entire national economy.
Modern telecommunications facilitate new forms of information and
communication, which may have considerable repercussions on the
entire economy, and may dramatically affect the international
competitiveness of a country's economy. A highly developed
telecommunications infrastructure is therefore also of central
importance when it comes to locational decisions. This means an
extension of network access, the construction and expansion of modern
communication routes (xDSL, WLL, point-to-multipoint directed radio
relay, UMTS), but also to translate the technical options into an offer of
new innovative services, for example on the basis of the Internet. The
scope and growth of investments in the field of telecommunications can
be interpreted as an approximated indication for the speed and intensity
of the infrastructure expansion. On the basis of data contained in
different publications (VAT web site, the business reports of Telekom
Austria for 1999 and 2000), investments have taken a very positive
course between 1998 and 2000. They went up from approximately EUR
1.5 billion in 1998 to approximately. EUR 1.78 billion in 1999, and to
EUR 2.07 billion in 2000, which means double-digit growth figures for
every year.
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The growth of the telecommunications sector is also reflected in a
significant increase in the number of jobs in recent years. Although
there are no official statistics on the development of employment in the
telecommunications sector, economic researchers have concluded that a
significant rise in employment figures can be expected, or has already
been realised, in Austria. According to a study, which the Federal
Ministry of Economic Affairs commissioned with the consultancy firm
of Arthur D. Little (supplemented by own calculations), the total
number of jobs in the telecommunications sector  comprising
infrastructure suppliers, mobile communications, fixed network, other
suppliers of telecommunications services  amounted to about 45,000
persons in 2000. It also shows that the increase in staff levels with
alternative operators compensated the jobs lost at the former monopoly
enterprise, so that employment in the fixed-network sector has remained
more or less the same. However, the balance is truly enhanced by the
dynamic development of mobile communications and the data services.
Last but not least, the telecommunications equipment industry, which
benefits from the continuous network construction of all operators, has
also reported expanding employment figures.
Telecommunications have developed in such a dynamic fashion in
recent years that the question as to whether or not this trend will
continue unabated, seems justified. It is not really surprising that no
final answer can be given to this question. As a rule, after every boom
phase there is a period of consolidation. This will also apply to the
telecommunications markets in Austria. Clear indications in this respect
are the slower growth of the mobile sector, as well as the stagnation of
the volume of calls in the fixed telephone networks. However, the
market for Internet services continues to grow vigorously, both with
regard to the access market and the Internet services in the narrower
sense. It must be stated, however, that telecommunications and  in the
future  digital communication will assume an even more important
position than is currently the case already.
2. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION IN AUSTRIA
On 01 November 1997, Telekom-Control-GmbH (TKC) began its
activities according to the provisions of the 1997 Telecommunications
Act (TKG). The Telekom-Control-Commission (TKK) was constituted
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almost at the same time, on 24 November 1997, and was based at TKC,
which is now RTR (Telecommunications Division). With the entry into
force of the KOG 2001 on 01 April 2001, Telekom-Control GmbH was
transferred into the newly founded "Rundfunk- und
Telekomregulierungsgesellschaft mbH", briefly referred to as RTR-
GmbH.
In Austria three major bodies are in charge of preparing the
telecommunications policy and its implementation in Austria. These
institutions are: the Federal Minister of Transport, Innovation and
Technology (BMVIT), and two regulatory authorities  the TKK and
TKC (now RTR-GmbH, Telecommunications Division), which are
responsible for implementing the TKG.
In this connection, there is a clear distinction between the competences
of the BMVIT and Telekom-Control GmbH (now RTR-GmbH) on the
one hand and between RTR-GmbH (Telecommunications Division) and
the TKK on the other. The TKK has comprehensive competences,
which are fully enumerated in the Telecommunications Act (e.g.
granting, withdrawal and revocation of licences, determination of
telecommunications operators to be classified as having significant
market power, approval of the general terms and conditions and tariffs
of companies with significant market power, determination of the
interconnection conditions in case of disputes, etc.). § 109 of the TKG
assigned the general responsibility for all tasks given to regulatory
authorities to TKC (now RTR-GmbH, Telecommunications Division),
unless these were reserved for the TKK.
In keeping with its competences, the TKK is a collegial body with
quasi-judicial functions, conceived in accordance with Article 133, Item
4, of the Federal Constitutional Act (B-VG), it decides independently
and unanimously.
No standard legal remedy is admissible against decisions of the TKK.
Originally, a complaint against the Constitutional Court was the only
possible appeal against decisions of the TKK. On account of an
amendment of the TKG (June 2000) it has become possible to appeal
decisions of the regulatory authorities to the Administrative Court. The
TKK is based with TKC / RTR-GmbH, which is also responsible for
managing the administrative chores of the TKK. In this connection, the
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TKC / RTR-GmbH staff is bound by the instructions given by the
chairperson of the TKK (or the TKK member so designated in the rules
of procedure). A complaint may be launched with the Constitutional
and the Administrative Courts against decisions of TKC / RTR-GmbH.
3. THE REGULATORY APPROACH, A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF
OPENING UP A MONOPOLISTIC NETWORK INDUSTRY
The role of the regulatory authorities in the process of liberalising the
telecommunications markets in Austria can best be understood by
considering the basic issues involved in opening the market of the
telecommunications sector. In many Member States of the European
Union, just like in Austria, the provision of telecommunications
services and the operation of the telecommunications networks were
reserved for state-owned telecommunications organisations (PTTs).
With the 1987 Green Paper (COM(87)290) the EU embarked upon a
very ambitious programme which stated that the express goal would be
full liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in all Member States
and the creation of a common European telecommunications market. In
addition, telecommunications are a so-called network industry. This
means that all providers need parts or the entire network of other
competitors in order to be able to provide their telecommunications
service. If a customer of network A wishes to make a call to a customer
of another network B, then both networks, possibly also other networks,
are involved in providing this service. This fact is of particular
importance, at least in fixed network telephony, since at the time of
market liberalisation the former monopoly enterprises had access to all
customers and thus a tremendous market power.
The predominantly state-owned monopolies of the telecommunications
markets were given an expiry date (01 January 1998). Individual
sectors, like the terminal equipment market (end of the eighties) and the
mobile telecommunications market (middle of the nineties) had already
been transformed into competitive markets earlier. A chronological
sequence of the market-liberalisation events is presented in the
Telecommunications Report 1998  1999 (2000). The last step was the
liberalisation of the fixed telecommunications networks and of fixed
network voice telephony, which were "reserved services" that the state-
owned PTTs of many countries, including Austria, dominated as
monopolists to the end.
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The technological background for the liberalisation of the markets and
for stepping up competition was the rapid development of switching and
transmitting methods (digitisation and fibre optics), as well as the
resulting conviction that there was no longer a natural monopoly
situation for fixed network telephony. The positive practical experience
of other countries, primarily the USA and the UK with the liberalisation
of the telecommunications sector were equally important. Last but not
least, the practical experience with state-owned monopolies and their
clear deficits regarding innovation and customer-orientation, as well as
the resulting inefficiencies also played an important role. Also, the view
gained acceptance that, in the future, telecommunications as a cross-
section technology would be of decisive, strategic significance for the
long-term development of the economies in the EU area.
The decision of the EU in favour of full liberalisation, and thus to give
up previously prevailing monopolised control, was and is radical, and
required complete rethinking by the institutions which were to be
entrusted with opening up the telecommunications markets. This change
in approach manifested itself in the total renunciation of traditional
monopoly supervision authorities, usually based at "postal ministries",
in favour of regulatory authorities for the telecommunications sector,
which had to be newly established and were meant to be largely
independent. Independence was to be guaranteed vis-a-vis both, the
(former) monopolist and the owner. These regulatory authorities were
originally not conceived as competition authorities in the classical
sense, but rather as institutions, vested with the necessary legal powers,
which were to actively pursue the opening of the market. Only later,
after having achieved a sufficient degree of intensity of competition,
was there to be more focus on their character as sectoral competition
authorities.
For many EU Member States it was an absolute novelty, and a great
legislative challenge, to establish an independent regulatory authority,
having the clear mandate to open up the markets and to provide, by way
of intensified competition, an improved range of services, higher quality
and, last but not least, significantly lower prices for the benefit of the
people and the economy.
This new quality of the regulatory authorities, to be newly established,
is also reflected in the European regulatory framework, which is
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designed to support these regulatory authorities in pursuing and
promoting the opening of the market. Essentially, this regulatory
framework is based on the idea that specific restrictions and obligations
are imposed ex ante on enterprises with significant market power (SMP
operators, which are market dominant enterprises within the meaning of
the Austrian Telecommunications Act). Contrary to EU competition
law, it is not required that market power be abused so that these
obligations and restrictions apply. In a number of EU Directives, i.e. the
so-called ONP Directives (Open Network Provision), the
Interconnection Directive and the Voice Telephony Directive, as well as
the Licensing Directive and the Harmonisation Directive, Member
States were requested to transpose this regulatory framework into
national law. In addition, there are a number of Recommendations of
the European Commission and some important documents of the ONP
Committee which explain the contents of the Directives in closer detail
without being directly part of the existing legislation. In Austria, this
European regulatory framework was implemented in the
Telecommunications Act (TKG).
With regard to the issues to be dealt with, several major sub-areas may
be singled out: regulation of market access (licensing), opening of the
networks of the former monopolist, prevention of the abuse of market
power, ensuring universal service, an economically meaningful
management of the limited resources, such as radio frequencies, and the
administration of the numbering plan, as well as tasks in connection
with consumer protection.
From the liberalisation perspective, a first step is to open the market to
new providers. The TKG provides that non-discriminatory procedures
are followed to grant licences for the public provision of mobile and
fixed network voice telephony or other public mobile services, as well
as for the public provision of leased lines (always by means of self-
operated networks). It should be mentioned that specific services only
need to be notified in advance (e.g. in Austria, the provision of Internet
services) or are completely free anyway (e.g. in Austria, the resale of
telecommunications services). On the whole, the licensing procedures
for fixed network licences are very reasonably priced and fast and do
not make high demands on existing or planned infrastructures, which
has also found favour with the EU. In the meantime, a large number of
licences have been granted, but it has to be stated that not all of the
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licence holders have actually begun to operate, and some of them have
already left the market.
Licences for mobile radio communication services are granted by a
different procedure. Since the frequencies required for the provision of
mobile radio communication services constitute a scarce public
resource, the number of possible licences is limited from the beginning.
It is therefore necessary to assign these frequencies to companies, which
are likely to use the frequencies efficiently. The TKG stipulates that an
auction process be used for the allocation of frequencies. During the
period under review, the licences for the third generation of mobile
radio communication (UMTS/IMT-2000) were granted by way of
auctions. This creates the prerequisites for a timely introduction of
broadband mobile telecommunications services. In addition, frequencies
were auctioned off for the construction of radio distribution systems
(Wireless Local Loop) and the remaining GSM frequencies in the GSM
1800 frequency range, as well as frequencies for TETRA-applications.
The second major area of tasks is to provide the new market entrants
with the conditions they require to actually be able to offer their
services on the market. In this connection, the fact that
telecommunications is a network industry must again be taken into
account. Starting out from a de facto monopoly situation in the fixed
network, it must be ensured that the new providers can use the parts of
the network of the former monopolists that they need to provide the
planned services. As it is unlikely that the former monopolist will allow
the shared use of the required network components on a voluntary basis
and at reasonable economic conditions, this is made possible first and
foremost by imposing ex ante obligations, in other words by asymmetric
regulation. In the European regulatory framework such obligations are
related to significant market power (SMP). Since these obligations (and
the associated rights of new providers) have far-reaching implications,
significant market power (SMP) must be determined in lengthy
proceedings. The current status of these proceedings carried out in
Austria established that Telekom Austria has a market dominant
position in the fixed network (voice telephony, leased lines) and in the
interconnection market.
The most important obligation of fixed network operators with a market
dominant position is the obligation to provide open network access
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(Open Network Provisions - ONP) at cost-oriented tariffs. This includes
the interconnection of networks and other forms of network access, e.g.
unbundled access to local loops.
The interconnection of networks is a highly complex subject,
comprising physical and logical interconnection, the services to be
enabled by interconnection, as well as the charges for interconnection
services. The European regulatory framework imposes an extensive
interconnection obligation on operators with significant market power,
the final formulation of which is left to the national legislator of the
Member States. The stipulation that interconnection services shall be
offered according to the principle of cost orientation is of particular
importance, with the "forward looking long run average incremental
costs" (FL-LRAIC) approach having emerged as the best-suited costing
model. According to this approach, a new provider need not pay for the
full distributed costs, based on the historic costs of the SMP operator,
but only for the services directly attributable to interconnection, in
addition to the costs for the provision of efficient services. Apart from
the scope of the interconnection services, calculation of the charges for
the interconnection services is the main point under dispute in the
proceedings. The TKK continued its practice, applied since spring
1998, which has accounted for a stable regulatory framework on this
central issue. The interconnection charges fixed by the TKK, currently
applicable can be found on RTRs website www.rtr.at. Generally
speaking , they are well situated in the European medium range with a
tendency to move to the higher priced countries within the EU Member
Countries. Also resulting from a first landmark decision taken in 1999,
relating to the termination of calls in mobile networks, another clear
lowering of these interconnection services was imposed each year from
autumn 1999 onwards. As a result, the Austrian charges for terminating
calls in mobile networks continue to be at the lower end of the price
band in Europe.
The decisions of the TKK on interconnection have paved the way for
the market entry of new telecom providers, especially the so-called
carrier network operators. As in 1998 and 1999, the intensity of
competition also continued to rise in 2000 and 2001, which was
reflected in rapidly dropping prices and a decrease of Telekom Austria's
market share, with telecom sales as a whole being on the rise. The
strategy of the TKK, i.e. to quickly open up the markets by pursuing a
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liberal licensing policy and by issuing speedy decisions, as well as to
encourage competition by determining interconnection charges
according to the FL-LRAIC, has up until now been crowned by success.
The new competitors especially targeted the markets for international
and national long-distance calls.
With regard to local competition, the situation needs to be seen in a
somewhat different perspective. The issue here is to have customers
who are linked up to the operators' own networks. Contrary to carrier
network operators whose customers are connected to the Telekom
Austria network, access network operators connect their customers to
their own networks. In this respect, several approaches are possible.
The network operator might invest in his own infrastructure and
establish an access network. As a rule, this will lead to a possibly
inefficient duplication of infrastructure, and this approach is only used
for large-account customers. It is also possible to adapt other, already
existing, infrastructure for telecommunications purposes. This applies
mainly to cable TV networks, which are gradually being refitted, at
least in the major towns. Last but not least, Wireless Local Loops
(WLL) and possibly the power supply network may be used with the
help of Powerline technology. In addition, a highly interesting option is
the unbundling of local loops (TASL). For this purpose, a new telecom
or Internet provider leases the copper wire pair, connecting the
subscriber's premises ("network outlet") to the main distribution frame
of Telekom Austria, to provide his services. Pursuant to the TKG, the
market dominant operator must also apply the FL-LRAIC costing
model. The TKK took a decision in this respect which did not restrict
the use of the local loop (TASL). As a result, a new operator may also
provide his broadband services via the TASL. To date, the number of
unbundled TASLs is still relatively small. However, there seems to be
potential for a more widespread use of this option, as the use of the
Internet is spreading and as consumers increasingly wish to have faster
Internet access. With Regulation (EC) No. 2887/2000 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000, which entered into
force on 01 January 2001, the obligation to unbundle TASLs became
directly applicable law. The Regulation requires market dominant
companies to make the local loop (TASL), parts of it, as well as parts of
the frequency spectrum of the local loop accessible for use by other
telecom operators. It therefore broadens the unbundling obligation
which originally existed in Austria.
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The area of safeguards against abuse of market power, i.e. regulation of
competition, is equally vast. Here, too, the concept of market players
with significant market power (SMP operator) is used as a basis. Fixed
network operators with significant market power, in particular, are
affected by a number of stipulations. One should mention especially the
obligation to offer cost-oriented end-user tariffs. This is intended to
protect end-users against SMP operators exercising their monopoly
powers, but also other competitors, against predatory competition.
Fierce competition by means of "predatory pricing", in particular, on
the part of the SMP operator is to be prevented.
Non-discrimination belongs to the same area of tasks. SMP operators
are obliged to act in a non-discriminatory way, which means that they
must treat all market players as equals. This obligation also extends to
services that they provide for themselves or for affiliated companies
under their control. If an SMP operator provides an intra-company
service at a specific transfer price, which should be cost-oriented, he is
also obliged to provide the same service to all competitors at the same
conditions. SMP operators have regular, comprehensive reporting
obligations, which serve to implement this regulation. In addition, the
regulatory authorities have far-reaching rights of inspection.
To ensure that new operators have equal and future-proof access to the
bottleneck resources of subscriber numbers, on the one hand, and to
create also clear and transparent rules for consumers concerning the
services and costs associated with calling specific numbers, on the
other, many countries are in the process of re-structuring their
numbering plans in the process of liberalisation. In Austria, the
Numbering Ordinance was issued for this purpose, on the basis of
which TKC (since 01 April 2001 RTR-GmbH) has to ensure an
efficient administration of the numbers range.
Universal service represents a special complex of problems. The
European regulatory framework stipulates the provision of universal
service, i.e. the provision of a minimum of telecommunications services
for everybody, complying with certain quality standards, at affordable
prices and without any geographic or social discrimination. As a rule,
the former monopolist must provide universal service. It is clear that
this may impose a financial burden on the former monopolist. The
regulatory authorities must ensure that universal service is provided, but
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must also see to it that the company, required to provide universal
service, is compensated for any possible additional financial burden.
Finally, the review and  in case of SMP operators  the approval of the
general terms and conditions serve to protect consumers. The most
important step, in this connection, was the approval of the tariff scheme
of Telekom Austria, which has been in force since 01 September 1999.
With this approval, the basic network access charges were raised to the
level of the costs of the local loop (TASL) and the call charges were, in
part, massively reduced. This helped to create cost-oriented tariffs and
to eliminate any market distortion. Settling disputes between customers
and suppliers of telecommunications services is another important
activity of the regulatory authority.
These seven elements, these seven regulatory steps described before can
be visualised as follows:
What kind of and how many decisions have been taken by the
regulatory bodies in Austria since November 1997? A list of regulatory
actions (broken down by the seven elements of regulatory work
identified before) may provide a first idea of what regulating actually is
made up of. In the following areas, regulatory proceedings have been
launched:
The Regulatory Arches I
1) Opening 
the Market to 
OLOs
2) Identifying 
SMP-
Operators
7) Customer 
Protection
6) Safeguarding 
Universal 
Service
3) 
Interconnection 
& Access
5) 
Managing 
Scarce Resources
4) Regulation 
of Competition
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Elements of Regulatory Work Number of
Proceedings
Regulating Market Access (Opening the market to
other licensed operators (OLOs), licensing
procedures)
186
Designating Operators with SMP-Status (Identifying
SMP-Operators)
5
Network Access (Interconnection and Access) 109
Regulation of Competition (Safeguarding against the
Abuse of Market Power)
46
Managing Scarce Resources (Efficient Administration
of Numbering and Addressing Elements, frequency
allocation procedures included in Regulating Market
Access)
3,687
Safeguarding Universal Service 1
Consumer Interests
 Approval of General Terms and Conditions
 Dispute Settlement between Operators and
   Customers (Arbitration Centre)
131
3,999
An exclusively quantitative approach bears the risk to draw premature
conclusions. The number of proceedings launched does not give any
indication of how complex regulatory decisions can be. Proceedings in
the area of interconnection or identifying SMP operators are by far
more complex than proceedings with a fairly high degree of
standardisation, such as customer dispute settlements or number
allocation. A look at the actual decisions published at RTRs website
(www.rtr.at) may illustrate how comprehensive regulatory decisions can
be. As a rule, interconnection decisions are documents of sometimes
hundreds of pages. These documents are made available for download
on RTRs website.
4. OPERATION AND SELF-PERCEPTION OF RTR-GMBH,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DIVISION
At no point should regulation become an end in itself. The legislator
therefore determined in § 1 of the TKG the general objectives for the
liberalisation of the telecommunications markets, and in § 32 of the
TKG the special objectives for regulating competition. These are the
direct targets set for the activities of the regulatory authority in Austria:
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§ 1 (1) of the TKG: It is the purpose of this federal law to ensure that
the public and business circles are provided with reliable, cost-effective,
high-quality and innovative telecommunications services by way of
promoting competition in the area of telecommunications.
§ 1 (2) of the TKG: The regulatory measures are intended to serve the
following goals:
1. to create a modern telecommunications infrastructure in order to
promote high-level locational quality;
2. to ensure equal opportunities and operative competition on
telecommunications markets;
3. to ensure universal service throughout Austria;
4. to protect users against abuse of a market dominant position; and
5. to ensure an efficient and smooth use of the frequencies.
§ 32 (1): By taking the measures listed below, the regulatory authority
must:
1. ensure equal opportunities and operative competition on the
telecommunications market;
2. promote the market entry of new providers;
3. stop the abuse of a market dominant position and prevent abuses;
4. ensure compliance with the principles of an open network access in
accordance with ONP;
5. implement the sector-specific rules of the European Communities;
and
6. resolve disputes between market players as well as between market
players and users.
These objectives guide the institution in its activities. The targets set by
the legislator and the resulting guiding principles form the framework,
within which the staff members of the regulatory authority perform the
tasks assigned to them. In addition, there is the self-perception that a
service provider must provide the public with high-quality services and
do so with expediency.
In keeping with its self-perception, the regulatory authority considers
itself to be an active and transparent organisation that looks for contacts
with the players on the Austrian telecommunications market, and that
puts its task on a broad information basis, against the background of the
government objectives. In this respect, the decisions, inter alia, are
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made available to an interested public on the web site of RTR-GmbH
(http://www.rtr.at), observing all data-protection requirements, in order
to facilitate a more detailed insight into the regulatory activities
regarding telecommunications.
In order to meet the demand for a high level of transparency, the
regulatory authority has used the instrument of consultations from the
very beginning, whenever important issues need to be discussed. A
consultation can generally be defined as an invitation to a group of
addressees, which is usually not specified in any further detail, to
comment on certain questions. Consultations, which are always based
on a consultation document, the contents of which is to be discussed
and commented, are meant to provide an overview of the different
positions and interests of the market players, and thus to provide a
better basis for decision-making. From 1998 until recently, the
regulatory authority conducted consultations on the following topics,
among others:
• licensing obligation for voice telephony services;
• carrier pre-selection;
• number portability;
• two consultation procedures for unbundling access to the local loop;
• a tender for mobile telephony licences (4th mobile radio
communication licence and licences for networks not having full
national coverage);
• licences issued for digital trunked radio communication;
• call for participation in the development of a bottom-up costing
model for the fixed network;
• UMTS/IMT-2000 awarding procedure;
• allocation of Wireless-Local-Loop frequencies;
• requirements of the SigG for user equipment;
• customer complaints regarding value added services;
• numbers for on-net services;
• ENUM (tElephone NUmber Mapping).
The regulatory authority is convinced that the World Wide Web is the
best-suited medium for conducting such consultations. In addition to
any consultation documents that may be made available, the results of
the consultations are always made accessible to the public on the web
site of RTR-GmbH (http://www.rtr.at).
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Every regulator should make an effort to act close to the market. The
approach in telecommunications is to promote the direct contact with
the licensed companies by means of so-called jours fixes for operators,
in addition to conducting consultations. Such forums, to which
invitations to the premises of the regulatory authority are extended
every second month, offer an opportunity to discuss specific topics or to
comment on key decisions. The objective is to ensure the best-possible
level of information among the operators.
Press conferences on decisions taken by the TKK, background
discussions with the press, individual interviews with representatives of
the press, but also broad-based participation in specific
telecommunications events round off the supply of information.
When trying to understand the operating mechanisms, the activities and
the alleged "omissions" of the regulatory authority, one should not lose
sight of the interaction existing between the different levels of
standardisation in the Austrian legal system with regard to
telecommunications.
The TKG is the basis for all regulatory activities. It contains a number
of authorisations to issue ordinances, which are intended to bring about
more detailed arrangements for selected areas. The statutory provisions
and the stipulations laid down in laws are formulated by the policy-
makers, the most important representative of which in the Government,
is the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology. The
regulatory authority is responsible for the specific implementation and
design of the TKG provisions, which can be implemented directly (in
particular, the sector-specific competition-law elements) and the
provisions that are determined by ordinance. RTR-GmbH and the TKK
implement whatever the legal framework provides.
The "liberalisation areas" of the TKG are gradually provided with
specific stipulations by means of regulatory decisions, in order to make
it possible for the market players to do business on the emerging
competitive telecommunications markets, or - to put into other words:
the TKG and the ordinances derived from it provide the necessary
leeway for liberalisation. The operators are called upon to make the
appropriate use of these "voids", on the basis of private-law agreements.
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Only if market solutions cannot be found, regulation, as defined by the
TKG, commences.
In telecommunations the "primacy of the private-law agreement" is the
guiding principle. Should it not be possible to reach private-law
agreements in the field of interconnecting telecommunications
networks, such a dispute may be submitted to the TKK for decision, as
part of its competences under § 111, Item 6, of the TKG. The members
of the TKK reach such a decision unanimously. The decision is an
instruction, issued in the form of a notice, which replaces the private-
law agreement that the parties to the proceedings were unable to reach.
Concerning issues of sector-specific competition law, the TKC had
responsibility pursuant to the blanket clause of § 109 of the TKG,
which applied until 31 March 2001. Since 01 April 2001, the TKK has
been primarily responsible for such matters (§ 34 proceedings). It relies
on the services of the Telecommunications Department of RTR-GmbH.
The following principle applies: neither the TKK, nor RTR-GmbH can
bring about progress concerning the design and materialisation of the
liberalisation steps taken on the Austrian telecommunications markets
without the necessary submissions or information.
The General Administrative Procedures Act (AVG) provides the
comprehensive basis for the procedure applied to the activities
undertaken by the Austrian authorities. This also applies to all
proceedings pending before the regulatory authority. In addition to the
solid foundations of the AVG, the telecommunications regulator is
trying to establish and to develop further a mode of operation that aims
at comprehensive transparency in the work of the regulatory authority in
the framework of the legal possibilities.
5. OUTLOOK ON REGULATORY ISSUES IN THE FUTURE
The big challenge of regulatory work in telecommunications in the near
future is to further develop and elaborate oncoming decisions based on
the generic regulatory intervention of the past 4 to 5 years. Those key
decisions have to be refined in a way that helps to accomplish the status
of sustainable competition on  and this has to be the ultimate goal  all
(tele-)communications service markets. In such a scenario the ex-ante
approach of regulatory intervention will have to be gradually
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transformed into a sector specific supervision of competition in line
with rules employed by general competition law as outlined by the EU.
Assuming that the (former) telecommunications markets have been
opened up successfully, the new regulatory approach will result in much
more specific regulatory interventions based on refined market
definition and a clearly defined "tool box" of regulatory measures. The
basic idea of asymmetric regulation is still valid and will be employed
in the future  the difference will be in the degree and the extent of
applying asymmetric regulatory measures.
The newly composed seven elements, or seven regulatory steps  as
derived from the recently adopted regulatory framework of the
European for communications networks and services  may be
described as follows:
Technological innovations pave the way for phenomena such as
convergence requiring new approaches for regulatory action. This need
has been recognised by the European Commission (Services), which
triggered a (political) process of establishing a completely new
regulatory package directed at providing a regulatory framework for
platform (i.e. technologically neutral) regulation for digital
communications. This package now consists of five recently adopted
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directives and (in the near future) a number of recommendations and
guidelines derived from these (generic) stipulations.
The regulatory package  as it looks today  consists of five directives,
i.e.:
1. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic
communications networks and services (Framework Directive)
2. Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications
networks and services (Authorisation Directive);
3. Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users rights relating to
electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service
Directive);
4. Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic
communications networks and associated facilities (Access
Directive);
5. Directive 2002/__/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector (Data Protection
Directive  expected to be adopted in the near future);
As outlined before this package is directed at providing the legal base
on a European level to gradually transform the national telecommu-
nications markets  in Austria exposed to competition roughly five
years ago for the first time  away from enforced to self-sustaining
competition on the relevant markets in the (tele-) communications
industry on a European level. The policy objectives and the regulatory
principles of this new regulatory framework are laid down in Chapter
III, Article 8 of Framework Directive (Directive 2002/21/EC). This
regulatory package has to be transposed into national law before 25 July
2002.
Regulatory frameworks, almost by nature, lack behind breathtaking
innovations and shortened product lifecycles  both on the technical but
also on the service side of the telecommunications industry. Still, the
recently adopted regulatory package offers the opportunity to continue
regulatory work  based on detailed analysis  wherever it appears to be
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necessary in order to be in line with the objective of paving Europe its
way to the information society in the age of (digital) information.
Fostering full-coverage broadband access of Austria to the digital world
of global communication networks  which undoubtedly is a
prerequisite in all developed economies and societies today  is a topic
of outstanding importance high up the agenda of Austrian
telecommunications- and economic policy. The regulatory authorities
are prepared  within the scope of their respective responsibilities and
capabilities  to support this objective to the maximum possible extent.
In each and every regulatory decision to be taken, it will have to be
considered, how this challenging goal can be accomplished. Austria
should not only be a country of Internet users in the heart of Europe but
also a location of high economic value added in the world of Internet.
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RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE LIBERALISATION OF THE RAIL MARKET
GERHARD H. GÜRTLICH
1. BACKGROUND
It all began on 22 May 1985 with a judgement passed by the European
Court of Justice on the Council's obvious failure to act: "The Court must
find that in breach of the Treaty the Council has failed to ensure
freedom to provide services in the sphere of international transport and
to lay down the conditions under which non-resident carriers may
operate transport services in a Member State" (ECJ, Case 13/83,
European Parliament vs. Council of the EC, 1985). The reason for using
this rather unusual instrument of legal action was that the six EU
founding members obviously showed only little interest in taking action
towards common transport policy.
• Until then, transport policy was mainly rail transport policy. There
would have been no grounds to object to this fact, if the focus had
not been on the protection of state railways vis-a-vis other (state)
railways, giving preference to national over foreign rail industries.
This can be illustrated by a number of examples (interoperability of
railway systems was rather a chance result and was not encouraged,
railway markets were identical with state territories, domestic
railway products, even in smallest series, were preferred, etc.).
• In contrast to this, road transport policy was more or less
understood as the unrestricted implementation of the "laissez faire"
principle, which was liberally applied focussing on the postulate of
freedom of circulation and unrestricted availability.
Today, this period in transport policy development is merely of
historical interest as the ECJ judgement "enforced" a fundamental
change in Community transport policy and regulations, in particular in
the rail sector. The detailed changes and new approaches in the EU's
transport policy were set forth in a number of different coloured
"Papers":
• A Community Strategy for sustainable mobility (COM (92) 494
final),
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• Growth, competition, and employment  The challenges and ways
forward into the 21st century (COM (93) 700 final),
• The Common Transport Policy Action Program 1995-2000 (COM
(95) 302 final),
• The Citizens' Network: Fulfilling the potential of public passenger
transport in Europe (COM (95) 601 final),
• Towards Fair and Efficient Pricing in Transport: Policy options for
internalising the external costs of transport in the European Union
(COM (95) 691 final),
• Fair Payment for Infrastructure Use: A phased approach to a
common infrastructure charging framework in the EU (COM (98)
466 final),
• The Common Transport Policy  Sustainable Mobility:
Perspectives for the Future (COM (98) 716 final),
• European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to decide (COM (2001)
370 final).
The main objectives common to all these "Papers" can be summarised
by a few keywords and there is no indication as to whether they will be
fundamentally changed in the near future or whether rail will obtain a
special position by the introduction of derogations for the rail sector:
liberalisation and harmonisation, no state intervention in the transport
market, independent management, clear rules for public aid and
payments, opening the market for competitors, granting access to
transport networks for all those who are entitled to access,
interoperability of systems, level playing field for all service providers,
market segmentation, no monopolistic service providers, opening up
network monopolies, etc.
2. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF EU RAIL TRANSPORT
POLICY
2.1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS
In the rail sector, the EU Directive 91/440 of 29 June 1991 on the
development of the railway undertakings of the Community was the
first tangible step towards the implementation of the ECJ judgement
referred to above. Liberalisation brought about a rather paradoxical
situation, and this is true not only for Austria:
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• It was a long-standing tradition that railway traffic was almost
exclusively dominated by national (protective) regulations for the
state railways, and
• specific "legal instruments" of the railway authorities were
necessary to assist in transforming the state railways' operating
rules and service regulations into generally valid railway
regulations.
To implement the Directive 91/440, it is therefore necessary,
• prior to the liberalisation or deregulation of the railway market, to
introduce regulatory measures to supplement the state railways'
internal operating rules and service regulations by generally valid
laws and regulations,
• before it is possible to introduce deregulation in place in a second
step.
Thus, it is only logical that the Austrian act on the liberalisation of the
rail market, the Rail Market Regulation Act (Federal Law Gazette No.
166/1999) includes a section IVa on the "Regulation of the rail transport
market" although it is to pave the way for deregulation at least in the
field of railway infrastructure.
Recent efforts of the EU Commission to continue to develop railway
transport policy include the Rail Infrastructure Package, which includes
three Directives:
• Directive 2001/12/EC (amending Directive 91/440 /EEC)
• Directive 2001/13/EC (amending Directive 95/18/EEC)
• Directive 2001/14/EC (amending Directive 95/19/EEC).
2.2. DIRECTIVE 2001/12/EC ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
COMMUNITY'S RAILWAYS
The EU Directive 91/440 was the first Community legislation for the
railway sector setting forth the requirements of keeping separate
accounts for the business relating to the management of rail
infrastructure on the one hand and the business relating to the provision
of transport services on the other hand, state-independent management,
financial rehabilitation of the railways, granting access to the network
to international groupings and for the purpose of operating international
combined transport services.
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The "amended" Directive included more detailed requirements on the
separation of the businesses relating to infrastructure management and
provision of transport services, setting forth that separate profit and loss
accounts and balance sheets shall be kept and providing for the option
to separate these two sectors in terms of organisation. In integrated
railway companies (Transport Operations and Infrastructure managed
by one single undertaking) at least the following functions shall be
entrusted to independent organisational entities: granting of licences,
allocation of paths, infrastructure charging, technical standardisation
and certification of rolling stock, monitoring observance of obligations
required in the provision of certain services.
As for the setting of infrastructure charges, Article 4 of the amended
Directive sets forth: "While respecting the framework and specific
charging and allocation rules established by the Member States, the
infrastructure manager shall have responsibilities for its own
management, administration and internal control".
As meritorious as these provision may be, they also suggest some sort
of market failure since in markets without state intervention managers
of corporations do not need Directives to remind them that they are
responsible for their activities and decisions and the resulting
consequences.
2.3. DIRECTIVE 2001/13/EC ON THE LICENCING OF RAILWAY
UNDERTAKINGS
This Directive sets forth the conditions of access to the market
(licences) applicable to railway undertakings and the conditions to be
fulfilled by undertakings applying for access (e.g. requirements
applying to staff and rolling stock, conclusion of an insurance), as well
as the mutual recognition of the bodies responsible for network access
(previously, network access had been restricted to the extent defined in
Directive 91/440/EC). Now, the right of access to the market is
expanded and applies to all major railway undertakings (exception:
railway undertakings which only operate urban or suburban services,
undertakings which carry out freight operations on "company-owned"
railway infrastructure).
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2.4. DIRECTIVE 2001/14/EC ON THE ALLOCATION OF RAILWAY
INFRASTRUCTURE CAPACITY
This Directive replaces Directive 95/19/EC, which previously set forth
the principles applicable in this field, and shall enable infrastructure
managers to market and make optimum use of the infrastructure
available. The infrastructure manager shall develop and publish a
"network statement", which shall contain all the information relevant to
the nature of the infrastructure which is available and serve as a basis
for any contract on the usage of infrastructure. The States have to
ensure that the infrastructure managers can achieve balanced accounts
in respect of their income and State funding.
In this Directive, too, there is reference to the fact that the development
of an efficient rail infrastructure market has not yet been finalised, as
can be seen from two provisions contained in the Directive:
• The State may require the infrastructure manager to balance his
accounts without State funding.
• The infrastructure manager shall be given incentives to cut
infrastructure costs.
The first provision is obviously meant to remind the bodies responsible
for infrastructure management to achieve cost coverage not only by
maximisation of State funding but to increase income also by taking
initiatives of their own. The second provision reinforces the first
provision as it is not necessary to dictate forwarding agents or hauliers
to make use of cost-cutting incentives but also to provide them (rather
the contrary would be necessary).
Taking into account its underlying principles the Directive represents
the laudable effort to achieve EU-wide harmonisation of infrastructure
charging schemes while at the same time revealing the strengths and
weaknesses of the EU:
• In spite of all its weaknesses that are reflected in specific details,
the Directives is aviable compromise (criticised by many to be "the
least common multiple") with a great many options for
implementation, and
• expresses the opinion and potential of the individual directorates of
the Directorate, General for Transport, the Directorates General of
the EU Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, and
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the fifteen Member States. Insofar what has been achieved to date is
considerable.
3. DIRECTIVE 2001/14/EC AND ITS PROVISIONS ON THE LEVEL OF
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES
3.1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS
What is striking about the Directive is the many different cost concepts
used all of which have completley different meanings. One could
dismiss this fact as being indicative of the "typical incapability" of the
EU Commission to come up with clear and binding rules. The
timeframe in which the discussions between the EU Commission and
the Member States were held, however, is evidence of the EU
Commission's effort to
• develop a Directive with a balanced relationship between
perseverance and liberalisation while at the same time having
sufficient substance, and which
• provides the Member States with a very differentiated instrument
for the setting of infrastructure charges and the pricing of additional
and ancillary services for infrastructure access.
• It is now up to the Member States to make use of the great variety
of possibilities, that are contained in the Directive to liberalise rail
traffic, in respect of the level of infrastructure charges and possible
calculation methods, if need be, also against opposition from the
state railways
3.2. OBSERVATIONS ON THE COST CONCEPTS USED
The following examples illustrate the many different ways in which the
cost concept is used in the Directive, thus leading to a plethora of
different possibilities for determining the infrastructure charges:
• Taking into account and making allowance for competition on the
railway network, infrastructure charges shall, as a rule, be set at the
cost that is directly incurred as a result of operating the train service
(principle of marginal costs).
• Under specific conditions the cost of the environmental effects
caused by the operation of the train may also be taken into account
(the EU calls this the principle of social marginal costs).
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• In some paragraphs, there is implicit reference to the principle of
recovery of full cost.
• The infrastructure charge may include a charge which reflects the
scarcity of capacity of specific segments of the infrastructure during
periods of congestion (principle of scarcity cost).
• In order to obtain full recovery of the costs the infrastructure
manager may, if the market can bear this, levy a higher than usual
infrastructure charge, based for example on individual contracts,
using mark-ups or a system of fixed charges and variable charges
(principle of cost bearing capacity or willingness-to-pay).
• Higher charges may be levied for the funding of new lines which
could not otherwise be or have been built (principle of levying
mark-ups).
• The Directive explicitely allows discounts on the charges while at
the same time limiting them by qualifying that the level of actual
cost savings (permanent) as well as the (time-limited) development
of new rail services and the use of considerably underutilised lines
shall be the reference standard for discounts on the charges (mix of
premium system and market penetration system). This provision can
be interpreted as yet another reference to the fact that a functioning
rail infrastructure market is not yet existing. Why else should
explicit reference be made to the fact that discounts are permitted
while at the same time significantly limiting the bodies responsible
in their possibilities of granting discounts?
• To avoid undesirable disproportionate fluctuations, the
infrastructure charges may be averaged over a reasonable spread of
time (introduction of principle of average cost).
• Article 6 (1) explicitely sets forth that obtaining full recovery of
costs is the long-term objective.
• Charges lost as a result of rail infrastructure maintenance work may
also be levied (principle of opportunity cost).
• Cost recovery applies in the pricing of additional and ancillary
services for rail infrastructure access, without, however, specifying
the costs (principle of "non-specified costs" (!?).
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3.3. OBSERVATIONS ON THE CHARGING OF COSTS AND THE
ALLOCATION OF PRODUCTIVE FACTORS
Meritorious as the efforts may be, two provisions reflect that the EU
obviously has a strange understanding as to full recovery of costs and
an optimum allocation of productive factors.
• Article 7 (5): Charging of environmental (external) costs via the
infrastructure charges, which results in an increase in the overall
revenue accruing to the infrastructure manager, shall be allowed
only if such charging is applied at a comparable level to competing
modes of transport. In the absence of any comparable level of
charging of environmental costs in other competing modes of
transport, such charge shall not result in the overall change in
revenue to the infrastructure manager.
• Article 10: Time-limited compensation schemes [note: this
obviously also refers to State aid to the railway operator(!)] may be
put in place "... for the use of railway infrastructure for the
demonstrably unpaid environmental, accident and infrastructure
costs of competing modes in so far as these costs exceed the
equivalent costs of rail."
With regard to both provisions the question arises as to why the
environmental costs caused by rail traffic shall be charged to the
railway mode only if environmental costs caused by a competing mode
(this obviously refers to road) are also charged to that competing mode.
Was this meant to protect road against too high infrastructure charges
(road pricing) under the pretext of holding rail infrastructure charges
low and to provide for the States to take over payment in the field of
railway transport?
These provisions do not, however, represent a significant barrier to the
liberalisation of the railway market and the access to rail infrastructure,
but they do give way to fundamental criticism as to the EU
Commission's economic understanding.
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3.4. OBSERVATIONS ON THE EXCEPTIONS
Article 8 of the Directive on "Exceptions to the charging principles"
does not, strictly speaking, specify an exception but sets forth a
fundamental economic principle, laying down of which, however,
would not have been necessary had a viable railway infrastructure
market not depending on State aid existed for a longer period of time. In
essence, Article 8 provides: "Should the infrastructure manager not be
able to obtain full recovery of the costs incurred by him or his revenue
target, mark-ups on infrastructure charges may be levied, if the market
can bear this, on the basis of efficient, transparent and non-
discriminatory principles, while guaranteeing the competitiveness of
international freight. The mark-ups must, however, be structured in
such a way as to ensure that no market segment is excluded from the
use of infrastructure due to the level of the infrastructure charge."
Prior to transposal into national law the following two provisions under
Article 8 also need to be clarified. Specifying the obligation to pass on
productivity increases while at the same time setting forth the principle
of marginal cost charging with markups taking into account the cost
bearing possibility of the railway operator under a single Article seems
contradictory if detailed explanations are lacking (implementing rules):
Article 8 (1): "... The charging system shall respect the productivity
increases achieved by railway undertakings. The level of charges must
not, however, exclude the use of infrastructure by market segments
which can pay at least the cost that is directly incurred as as result of
operating the railway service, plus a rate of return which the market
can bear."
In spite of these contradictions, or because of them, this provision also
provides sufficient scope for flexibility when setting infrastructure
charges in agreement with the criteria on easing access for third parties
and liberalising the railway networks. The precondition being, however,
that the Member States are willing to make use of this scope of action
when transposing the Directive.
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4. OUTLOOK
From an economic point of view, the principles laid down for the
calculation of infrastructure charges could be more or less heavily
criticised as they do not provide for a unified procedure and are often
contradictory. They do, however, represent a political compromise:
• They take into account that the conditions concerning railway
infrastructure undertakings differ from Member State to Member
State
• The provisions take into account and make allowance for quite
diverging revenue targets of infrastructure managers  ranging from
marginal cost charging aimed at a level playing field for all modes
of transport to recovery of full costs.
Nonetheless, they represent a first-time successful effort to define a
framework within which the Member States can determine their
infrastructure charging schemes. This represents a major advance over
previous regulations. However, further clarification and harmonisation
will be necessary. In particular, the EU Commission will not get around
to develop binding directives on infrastructure charging in the road
sector, too.
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LIBERALISATION OF POSTAL SERVICES: SOME FIRST
AND PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER
1. INTRODUCTION
Liberalisation of former public utilities which had quite often (in former
times) a (natural) monopoly, is an actual topic for most state/public
authorities. In this paper some preliminary considerations about the
liberalisation of postal services are undertaken.1 In table 1 an overview
about the liberalisation of postal services in the 15 EU countries is
given.
The table clearly shows that in Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland,
Luxemburg and Portugal in the postal system so far almost no
liberalisation has been undertaken and that on the other side only in
Sweden and Finland a full liberalisation of the postal system has been
achieved, followed by a partly liberalisation in Denmark, Great Britain,
Italy, Netherlands and Austria. After nine years since the full
liberalisation of the Swedish postal system one still observes that the
former public monopolic supplier, the Swedish post, has a dominant
position with over 90% share of the letter mail market. In Finland,
which has a total liberalised postal system, too, potential (competitive)
suppliers have to pay a very high licence fee so that so far no
competition has been taken place. In all other countries, as table 1
clearly shows, the liberalisation of the postal system is in the beginning
(i.e. an early stage) and the major steps to fully liberalise the postal
system have to come in the next years. If one compares these results
with the one of the telecom sector, there is a vast difference with the
                                                     
1 Due to the short notice/invitation to write this paper only first thoughts can
be elaborated. Important aspects as pricing, competition rules, the role of the
regulator/operator are only touched or not treated at all. Moreover, a careful
empirical and/or theoretical analysis of important questions (like pricing,
operators tasks, privatisation, competition rules, vertical and/or horizontal
splitting up of the public utilities, etc.) is missing, too. In general, there are
much more studies in the area of (de-)regulation of the telecom sector
compared to the postal sector at least in the European Union. Compare e.g.
European Commission (1998) and Elsenbast and Smit (2000).
Sectoral Regulation148
achievements of the liberalisation in the telecom sector, which is much
more advanced in all 15 EU countries.
Table 1: Overview of the liberalisation of Postal Services in EU-
Countries, 2001.
Country Letter/Mail
Services up to
250g (reserved
Delivery)
Liberalisation
of Advertising,
Deliveries/
Mailings
Liberalisation
in the
international
Postal
Deliveries
Liberalisation in
the local Area of
Postal Deliveries
(Letter Mail
Market)
Austria No Yes No No
Belgium No No No No
Denmark Yes No Yes No
Finland Yes Yes Yes Yes
France No No No No
Germany Yes No No No
Great Britain Yes No No No
Greece No No No No
Ireland No No No No
Italy No No No Yes
Luxemburg No No No No
Netherlands Yes Yes No No
Portugal No No No No
Spain No Yes No Yes
Sweden Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Elsenbast and Smit (2000, p.11) and own investigations.
In this short paper some actual topics of the first steps of liberalisation
process of postal system are elaborated. In chapter 2 the problem of
cross subsidisation in the postal services is shortly presented. Chapter 3
deals with the German liberalisation process of the postal system and in
chapter 4 the experience of a liberalisation in New Zealand is shown.
Finally in chapter 5 a comparison between the telecom and postal
system is undertaken and some conclusions are drawn.
2. CROSS SUBSIDISATION IN THE POSTAL SERVICE
Cross subsidisation in the postal service is an often observed fact as due
to political reasons an uniform tariff structure is demanded. A
fundamental requirement for an anti-competitive cross-subsidisation is
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the fact that an operator/regulator is active on markets with different
degrees of competition.2 If operators/regulators on a monopolised
market are able to gain profits which are above the stand-alone costs of
services or products, the operators have the possibility to finance loss-
making services on markets open to competition. If  on top of this 
these products are offered with the aim to drive competitors out of the
market or to prevent potential competitors from entering the market, the
operator is applying in a predatory pricing-strategy financed by cross-
subsidisation.3
The possibility to proof cross-subsidisation exists within the bounds of
the so called "incremental cost-test. According to that a multi-product
operator earning zero profits is free of cross-subsidisation as far as
she/he is fulfilling the requirements that each product has to bear its
incremental costs and that the returns of each product do not exceed its
stand-alone costs. For the statement of costs of an operator/regulator
normally is not lined out to calculate the incremental costs of a service,
it is the question which kind of statement of costs is suitable for the
appropriate determination of incremental costs. In this case the
statement of activity based costing (ABC) is particular suitable; it is a
modern way of showing the fully distributed costs, which follows the
principle of cost causation.
The European Directive combined with the notice on the application of
competition rules to the postal sector provides the necessary
requirements for an effective control of anti-competitive cross-
subsidisation by laying down an activity based costing method. In
Germany and in Austria legal feasibilities for relevant rules do exist, for
example the necessity of accounting separation, which has to be done
concerning the determination of incremental costs. In the United States
of America the Postal Rate Commission is basing its rate case decisions
on cost data derived out of activity based costing. Actually, the Postal
Rate Commission is determining the incremental costs of each service,
which include the variable costs as well as the capacity costs of each
service.4
                                                     
2 Compare Brennan (1990), Schmidt and Schmidt (1997) and Niederblum
(2001).
3 Compare Niederblum (2001).
4 Compare Kay (2000).
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3. EXPECTED ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A LIBERALISATION
OF THE POSTAL SYSTEM: THE CASE OF GERMANY
Since the beginning of the year 1998 with the enforcement of the new
German Postal law a new regulatory framework was created which
offers market entry possibilities to potential competitors of the
Deutsche Post AG. From 2003 on it is intended to fully open the market
to competition. With this intention Germany in comparison to other
European countries is among the leading and first countries with respect
to postal market liberalisation. Against this background of an
asymmetry in market entry possibilities among different EU Member
States a political discussion is to be expected whether to prolong the
exclusive licence for the Deutsche Post AG until a symmetric European
liberalisation process will be possible.
In anticipation of this discussion among the EU-countries first studies
have been undertaken to analyse which consequences are to be expected
on the German economy from the granting of a full market access to
potential competitors.5 Potential developments under different
regulatory frameworks were analysed in these studies using two
alternative scenarios:
1. Full liberalisation of the letter market from the year 2003 onwards:
Due to the opening of the letter mail market there will be a bigger
market potential for alternative postal operators. Thus, it is to be
expected that the market share of the alternative postal operators will
increase. Nevertheless, the market position of the Deutsche Post AG
is characterised by a first mover advantage due to the economies of
scale within her postal network and the qualitative reputation which
has been build up over years. The expected reactions of the Deutsche
Post AG to the entry of alternative postal operators will be a
variation in price and quality policy. The competitive development
will lead to a falling overall price level and a changing price
structure. Tariffs will be rebalanced between different user groups.
Furthermore, the product variety will increase. This will lead to a
better satisfaction of users' needs.
2. Prolongation of the exclusive licence (current status): A maintenance
of the current market access conditions for alternative postal
operators implies that the biggest share  at least two third  of the
                                                     
5 Compare e.g. Elsenbast and Smit (2000) and the there mentioned studies.
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letter mail market will remain under the exclusive licence of the
Deutsche Post AG and therefore will be excepted from competition.
Against this background it seems to be unlikely that competitors will
overcome their current "niche existence". Due to the limited scale of
competition it is to be expected that only bigger business customers
will profit from the selective market entry of some few competitors.
Furthermore, it can not be excluded that the Deutsche Post AG
might use its monopoly position to prevent potential competitors
from entering the market.
To summarise: Only a full market access will lead to lower prices for
the customers and more competitive and efficient communication and
logistic systems which are of utmost importance to the competitive
position of the German economy. As a conclusion it can be stated that
from an economic perspective a full opening of the market is to be
preferred against a prolongation of the exclusive licence.
4. THE LIBERALISATION OF THE POSTAL SYSTEM IN NEW
ZEALAND
In New Zealand the reform of the postal sector started already in the
80ies.6 The postal sector reform then formed apart of a wider reform
process of the whole economic system in order to increase the
efficiency and performance of the economy. The underlying principle of
this reform process was the replacement of the interventionist and
protectionist attitude of the state by a more liberal and market oriented
economic system. The reform of the postal sector during these times
was twofold:
Firstly, the Post Office was transformed into a state owned enterprise
and as such had to undergo a major restructuring process in order to
become competitive.
Secondly, the creation of a competitive framework for the postal market
was one of the major tasks of the reform process. After an eleven year
period of gradually reducing the monopoly area of New Zealand Post in
1998 remaining privileges and monopoly areas for New Zealand post
were abolished. Since then there have been no restrictions for
                                                     
6 Compare Smit (2000), Campell (1998, 2000) and Knorr (1997).
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competitors to enter the postal market even in the letter mail segment.
Moreover, an agreement was negotiated with New Zealand Post that
obliges New Zealand Post to offer network access. This network access
obligation enables competitors to compensate for their insufficiently
large own network at the time of their market entry. Thus, competition
is not only possible on a local scale but also increasingly on a national
scale. The market development that is triggered by this competitive
framework is accompanied by a light handed regulatory system which
in accordance with the liberal ideas of the reform process resigns to
implement a sector specific regulatory authority and tries to minimise as
far as possible state intervention into the market process.
The central aim of the New Zealand reform process of the postal system
was to increase market performance with respect to the satisfaction of
customer needs and thus to quality and price. An evaluation of these
central parameters of customer satisfaction shows that the reform
process has been fairly successful. The situation in the postal market
today is determined by low prices, high service standards and an
increased efficiency. Even the common fear that a universal service and
a unitary tariff will not be guaranteed in a liberalised market proofed to
be groundless. Although the state does not pay any compensation for
the universal service, New Zealand Post more than fulfils the agreed
universal service standards and maintains a uniform national letter mail
tariff.
Although the reform process and market liberalisation proof to be
successful after two years of competition, it is uncertain whether this
development will be sustainable in the future. It has to be assumed that
most of the pressure especially on New Zealand Post to improve
customer satisfaction has to be attributed to the fear of market entry of
potential competitors as the actual competition still remains weak.
Whether this will change in the future highly depends on the
functioning of the regulatory framework and the behaviour of New
Zealand Post. Anyhow, there is the danger that the pressure attributed to
potential competition might decrease as New Zealand Post makes the
experience that a market entry that really affects New Zealand Post is
not easy and takes quite a long time during which the company can
adjust to the new situation. The conclusion is that a market
liberalisation can be quite successful but one should consider that New
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Zealand is an island compared to a quite different situation in Europe
with much more possible competition (especially in small countries!).
5. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE TELECOMMUNICATION
SECTOR IN COMPARISON TO THE POSTAL SECTOR
Since the fixed link of telecommunication market (e.g. voice
telephoning and internet services) was opened up completely at the
beginning of 1998, substantial progress in the appropriateness of the
regulatory environment to enable competition can be observed in most
of the countries. Yet, there are still remarkable differences across
European countries. With regard to the degree of liberalisation
Denmark and the United Kingdom have top positions at the end of
2002. Germany and Austria have made considerable progress in
establishing regulatory conditions promoting competition, however, it is
still lagging behind the top countries. Generally it can be stated that in
Europe the liberalisation of the core network has made much more
progress than the liberalisation of the subscriber access network.
The analysis of the actual competition situation in the fixed link market
segment shows that the intensity of competition has increased
considerably in almost all European countries. Sweden holds the top
position at the end of 2001 followed by Denmark. Germany and Austria
rank only in a medium position. The intensity of competition is in
principle much stronger in the long distance segment of a country than
in the local segment in old European countries. The market
concentration in the long distance segment usually decreases in Europe.
In contrast, the market concentration in the local segment is still
relatively high, but is decreasing since 2001. In almost all European
countries price competition in the long distance segment is already very
intensive.
There are substantial differences of the growth dynamics across the
countries. In particular, a positive growth rate of minutes frequently
goes along with a decline of the growth rate in the market volume of the
telephony segment. At the end of 2001, Germany belongs to the
countries with the highest growth. Yet, Denmark ranks at the top
position at this point in time.
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The fixed link telecommunication markets (e.g. voice telephoning and
internet service providers) of Telecom markets of European Member
countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany. France, Italy, Sweden, United
Kingdom) have been opened up completely since at least three years.
One can observe substantial progress in the appropriateness of the
regulatory environment to enable competition in most of the countries.
Yet, there are still remarkable differences across European countries in
particular with regard to the treatment of still existing bottlenecks. This
heterogenity rests in particular on the differences as regards
interconnection and access to the local loop. With regard to the degree
of liberalisation, Denmark has a top position at the beginning of 2001.
Although considerably behind Denmark, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Sweden have also made considerable progress in
establishing regulatory conditions promoting competition.
An analysis of the actual competition situation in the fixed link market
segment shows that competition is most intensive in Denmark and
Sweden. Germany and Austria7 ranks only in a medium position. In
almost all countries voice telephony price competition is very intensive
and prices have fallen considerably. The concentration in the long
distance segment is low. In contrast, the market concentration in the
local segment is still relatively high. According to the penetration of
broadband access as well as prices of internet usage and leased lines,
there are strong differences among the European countries.
At the beginning of 2002, Austria and Italy belong to the countries with
the highest growth. Across all countries the growth rates in the internet
segment are higher than in the voice segment. Italy has the highest
growth rates in the internet segment, France is ranking at the second
position.
If one compares the development of the telecom sector with the postal
one, one immediately realises that the telecom sector more or less has
been transformed from a state monopoly situation to a competitive
market situation for almost all EU countries. Prices have fallen
considerably, new products and services have been offered, hence,
                                                     
7 Compare Elixmann, Schimmel and Schwab (2001), Elixmann,
Kuhlenkampff, Schimmel and Schwab (2001), and Immenga, Kirchner,
Knieps and Kruse (2001).
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enterprises and consumers using telecom products and services have
considerably profited from the deregulation and the introduction of
competition markets in the telecom sectors. The development of the
liberalisation of the postal sector is much behind the telecom sector and
major steps have to be implemented in most of the single EU-countries.
Whether we well observe a similar development of the postal sector is
likely but when and to what extend is an open question.8
First results point to a similar direction like in the telecom sector but the
spirit now (2002) and the political altitudes towards this sector may not
be the same as in the beginning of the nineties. As we also realize now
some negative developments (due to political interventions) in the
whole deregulation/privatisation business (compare e.g. the sluggish
liberalisation process of the Austrian public energy/power utilities!) one
should first develop an economic policy frame ("ordnungspolitischer
Rahmen") before considering further deregulation/privatisation of the
Austrian postal system.9
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COMPETITIVENESS AND COMPETITION IN A NEW
ECONOMY: THE ROLE OF THE NEW FINANCIAL
MARKET AUTHORITY
PATRICK DARLAP, ANDREAS GRÜNBICHLER, KURT PRIBIL
The financial services sector was probably one of those "old" sectors
most destined for the implementation of the technical means of the
"new economy". The growth of the number of internet users and the
development of successful online business has certainly been way
above average especially in the banking sector. This is in particular due
to the specific fit between financial services and the possibilities offered
by the new media: Banks and insurance firms have been on the
forefront of implementing electronic data processing decades ago and
still are the businesses most prone to efficiency gains from
automatisation.
But the use of web technologies in its various forms is not the only
point of contact between "new economy"-tools and the financial sector.
Generally speaking we can see the sector concerned as a user, as a
financial provider, as a possible business partner or even in competition
with new technology businesses.
This article will in short line out the areas concerned by these
developments, it will touch upon the various problems entailed for
prudential supervision in the sector and it will finally try to sketch the
role the new Austrian Financial Market Authority will play in this
context, having special regard to the specificities of the integrated
approach to supervision we have in Austria.
1. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR AS A PRIMARY USER OF ICT
Regarding the use of information and communication technology (ICT)
products, probably the most prominent result of the technical advances
is their contribution to the accelerated pace of globalisation. Transfer of
services and communication among market participants are the main
components of networking amongst service providers and of an
unprecedented scope of competition as well. The tremendous reduction
in transaction costs supports cooperation and market entry alike and the
impressive growth of internet access has allowed globalisation to go
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beyond the ownership structure of financial conglomerates and to reach
the retail markets. In fact, many banks are using their online operations
to expand into new markets.
Besides these rather geographical aspects, convergence within financial
services is another main issue, leading to the development of integrated
financial service providers, which may combine banking, insurance and
other services under one chapeau (phenomenon known as
"bancassurance") either through in-house product development or
through mergers and acquisitions. The force of this development can be
assessed in hindsight by the confirmation of this trend of
universalisation through the abolition of the long-standing separation of
the US banking industry through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.
In contrast, the dramatically lowered transaction costs may lead to a
marked contraction of the value-added chain. Intermediation as a
primary function of banks in the financial market may be replaced by
direct transactions between investors and enterprises seeking credit or
equity, both of course being primarily characterised by and highly
dependant on their credibility in the market.
Certain parts of a previously homogenously offered product may now
be supplied by a third party, without the customer even noticing this
fact, like customer service via call centres. Other parts of the value
added chain may be supplied by highly specialised enterprises in
cooperation with and for the financial service providers (like data
management) or in direct competition with the market incumbents for
retail customers, forcing them to follow suit in terms of technology and
pricing policy. Mergers and acquisitions may also render previously
separate systems in each entity obsolete, thus leading to an increase in
systemic efficiency. But of course the failure of one such increased
chunk of the financial system is a much bigger problem for the stability
of the payment system at large than before.
One of the most interesting forms of competition between two extremes
within each the old and the new paradigm in the financial services
industry will certainly be the one between universal banks and internet
portals. The specific formation of hybrid forms somewhere in between
the two extremes of the spectrum will, of course, depend on the market
environment. Nevertheless, there seems to be no generic superiority of
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any one of these two, and the necessities of the respective regulatory
regimes will determine the specific outcome of this struggle to a large
extent.
The decentralized structure of certain financial services (customer
service points in the insurance business or investment advice for
example) is supported by remote access to central enterprise databases
(and may be seen as a special form of teleworking). These connections
are an important issue in the security provisions of such companies,
forming part of the operational risks in the provision of financial
services which are a core aspect of prudential supervision and will be
addressed later in this text. This risk, lying in the individual and
separate connection of each user, may in part be avoided by a centre-
based access policy, but the intrinsic potential of ICTs for the creation
of entirely new dimensions of customer satisfaction has to render such
solutions only second-best.
Pretty good technologies of granting secure access have already been
widely implemented, such as passwords, smart cards or biometrical
methods. This expertise is, of course, often provided externally and may
lead to the establishment of standards  a typical effect in the new
economy branches  possibly leading to temporary monopolies or 
which may be worse  trapping of the whole sector in certain
technologies.
Most importantly, the connection between individual participants in the
markets has to be secure in order to attract widespread use. The
techniques have to be reliable, integrity and confidentiality of
information have to be granted and liabilities well defined.
Of course, there is a whole host of new products based on the technical
feasibilities of ICT regarding large-scale-data-management and
information-processing capabilities, giving financial markets much
more instruments of stabilisation and destabilisation as well. It is
needless to mention the trend of securitisation on the one hand and the
abuse of derivatives in constructing synthetic income on the other.
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2. FINANCING THE NEW ECONOMY
This leads to a second kind of developments associated to the
specificities of the "new economy" which are affecting the sector:
These are financing issues, relating to the role of financial
intermediation.
Financing is an inevitable and most important precondition to the
evolvement of any enterprise, but specifically of those belonging to the
ICT sector. Depending on the stage of development of an ICT start-up,
different kinds of financing are better suited than others. This not only
has an impact on the development of different finance-providers, but in
reverse is often cited as one of the reasons for a slower pace of growth
in regions with a less flexible and more bank-centred financial system,
as we find it in continental Europe.
The financial structure of an enterprise may vary depending on many
different factors, which can in general be traced back to the agency
costs1 incurred during different stages of a businesses life. The
underlying asymmetries of information between the entrepreneur and
the investor make the typical source of finance for an ICT-start-up
insider finance or a "business angel". Only after the provision of a
certain minimal track record, documenting its growth potential, external
finance will become available to the firm. Venture capital or a bank
loan go hand in hand with the screening and monitoring of the business
activities to address the agency problem, leading to a mitigation of
moral hazard through the development of control mechanisms which
will eventually become apt to also satisfy the needs of the stock market
for the final stage of development, the IPO.
From a financing perspective, the dominant characteristics of "new
economy" firms are2:
• The considerable uncertainty of investment due to the "high risk 
high return"-profile of the typical "new-economy" market
characterised by network effects and standard-setting.
• The extreme dominance of fixed over variable costs, rendering the
cash flow significantly negative during the initial phases.
                                                     
1 "Principal-Agent Theory". See Jensen, Meckling 1976.
2 See Houben, Kakes (2001).
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• The rapid ageing of ideas and thus obsolescence of products in
combination with the intangibility of a firms assets (patents,
networks or goodwill for instance) making them ill-suited to serve
as collateral.
• The over proportionate asymmetry of information between
entrepreneurs and investors.
• The heavy reliance of a firms performance on human capital and
its implication for incentive mechanisms as e.g. stock option
schemes.
Furthermore, the payoff-scheme related to the performance of the
investment is, of course, not at all beneficial to the creditor. The
creditors return is strictly limited and does not give him a stake in the
upside potential of the firm, while exposing him to the full downside
risks. In contrast, the return on equity is fully related to profitability
without an upper limit. Any attempt to internalise this risk profile
through a higher interest rate may delete the credit demand or lead to
adverse selection.
Due to these facts equity is superior to credit as an instrument of
financing in the ICT sector and the financing role of banks is of minor
importance. Nevertheless, banks do have an important supporting role
by directly providing other bank services (from payments to IPO
consulting) and indirectly by funding venture capitalists.
3. FINANCIAL STABILITY ISSUES RELATED TO NEW ECONOMY
FINANCING
Apart from their role in channelling funds to "new economy"
investments, financial markets have an important role to play in the
absorption of market and credit risks.
They react to these potential cost factors through credit ratings, stock
prices and interest rate spreads. But even though it can be shown3 that
the stock market volatility in the new economy sectors (IT; Telecom,
Media, Technology) has been way above average in all major economic
areas over the past six years (1995-2001), they will not threaten
financial stability, as long as contagion is limited through respective
                                                     
3 Houben, Kakes (2001).
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provisions. Especially banks involved in ICT investment might be prone
to transmit problems in the sector to the whole economy through credit
conditions or altered risk taking behaviour. However, the direct
exposure of banks to "new economy" firms is generally small due to the
already mentioned general inappropriateness of credit financing in the
sector. Nevertheless, there are some areas, where this does not hold
true: This is the case in particular in old economy sectors having
invested heavily in new economy business, like the telecom sector in
UMTS or media tsars in TV transmission rights. This confronts banks
with an asymmetric downside risk: loans and credit lines tend to be only
extended when a firms performance does not convince any other
investor, furthermore the delay of real investments might render the
investors anxiousness a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The already mentioned indirect involvement of banks in the new
economy sectors through the funding of venture capital (especially in
our still bank-centred financial markets in central Europe) might also
lead to concerns for prudential supervision. But even though banks are
the major funding source of venture capital in Europe (27,5%)4, their
exposures are generally very limited and below one percent of total
assets. Furthermore, venture capitalists professionally diversify their
risks, thus reducing the potential losses further.
Looking into the near future it is worth mentioning, that the new Basle
Accord provides a special category for risk capital, requiring higher
solvency margins for venture capital (150% weighting).
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRUDENTIAL AND SUPERVISORY POLICY
All the implications of the described aspects of the "new economy"
have to be addressed by those responsible for financial market
supervision correctly. The treatment of risk is currently undergoing
considerable changes: The growing use of derivates and off-balance-
sheet operations, coupled with the diversification of activities across
countries and sectors has made traditional risk-management-techniques
obsolete.
                                                     
4 EVCA (2001).
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One major approach of financial market supervisors to respond to these
challenges is a strong focus on increased transparency and the explicit
accounting for specific risks. While the Basel Committees 1988 quite
rigid recommendations on capital adequacy were relativised by the
evolving new markets for credit derivatives and an unprecedented
growth in loan sales and securitisation, bank managers could actively
manage their risk and engage in regulatory capital arbitraging, thus
reducing the capital required under the Basel I recommendations
without a commensurate reduction of the effective risks for the bank.
The new proposal addresses this problem in its first pillar, providing for
individual risk management, but is far from being satisfactory at this
stage due to the difficulties connected with both the external and the
internal credit rating approaches. The current debate about the
calibration of the model can only touch upon one aspect of the whole
three pillar approach5 to improving the supervisory process according to
the new needs.
In addition to this, there is an ongoing discussion at which level certain
problems should be tackled, given the international or even global scale
of certain players in the market. Current EU and international
conventions provide for supervision of the international operations of a
bank to be under the responsibility of the supervisory authorities of the
banks home country. To enhance transparency, discussion is under way
how best to consolidate financial statements and how to achieve a
certain level of harmonisation in accounting, auditing and reporting
standards. The closure of gaps in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage is a
related topic.
It has to be noted that the increasing access to information by retail
clients along with widening the scope of market participation has
increased the benefits of distorting information, not least within the
securities sector. Safeguarding market integrity and protecting
unsophisticated investors is at least partly a further task for supervisors.
The universalisation in financial services and the growing
sophistication of finance closely linking financial institutions of
                                                     
5 Pillar one of the New Basel Capital Accord relates to minimal capital
requirements and the consideration of operational risk, whereas the second
and third pillars are centred on an enhanced supervisory review process and
market discipline through effective disclosure, respectively. See Basel
Committee (2001).
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different types have made a comprehensive approach to risk assessment
necessary. The establishment of an independent supervisory body for
the capital markets in Austria is thus a major step forwards in the
development of a state-of-the-art institutional framework for financial
business. As of 1 April 2002 the new Austrian Financial Market
Authority (FMA) is responsible for prudential supervision in the
banking, insurance, pension funds, securities and stock exchange areas.
These supervisory tasks were transferred to the FMA from the Federal
Ministry of Finance and the Austrian Securities Agency.
FMAs independence is a strong asset for the credibility of the Austrian
governments plans to provide the Austrian financial markets with a
transparent, effective and efficient supervisory framework. It is
safeguarded by constitutional provision, which was unanimously
supported by all parties represented in the Austrian Parliament early
this year.
The Austrian approach to financial system supervision is concentrating
on the core functions performed within the financial system, rather than
on institutions or sectors and is thus in line with a functional approach
to supervision. The new, single financial supervisory system overcomes
the old institutional segmentation and has considerable potential for
increased cost efficiency. In addition, the new system is sector neutral
and ensures a level playing field for all financial institutions doing
business in Austria. To enhance the enforceability of supervisory
measures, the FMA is vested with administrative penal power and the
power to enforce its supervisory rulings. In order to keep FMAs legal
framework flexible enough, FMA may issue ordinances specifying the
general obligations stated by law.
With the formation of the FMA, there is an independent, efficient
Austrian supervisory regime in line with the international developments
described. It is actively searching to improve its supervisory instruments
to meet the requirements of the modern national and international
financial markets.
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MARKET BARRIERS AND COMPETITION –
THE EXAMPLE OF SHOP OPENING HOURS
GERHARD CLEMENZ
1. INTRODUCTION
In 1958 in a small European country a law was passed which forced
chocolate producers to reduce the number of chocolate varieties to the
following four: milk, bitter, hazelnut and coconut. In a semi-official
comment the following justification for this remarkable piece of
legislation was given: "The law is based on the idea that competition
should not force chocolate producers to increase the number of
varieties in excess of what would be economically justified". Since then
several attempts have been made to abandon the law or at least to soften
it, with limited success. Trade unions opposed any liberalisation
because they feared that the stress for workers would be unbearable if
they had to produce more than four types of chocolate. In addition, and
somewhat surprisingly, most chocolate producers were also against a
change because they claimed that consumers didnt want more than four
varieties anyway, and small producers would be at a disadvantage
because they would be hard-pressed to create additional varieties and to
produce more types of chocolate than the four permitted by the law.
Opponents of the "Chocolate-law" maintained that it should be up to the
market to find out whether there was a demand for additional varieties,
and that small producers would benefit from developing their own
specialities such finding a market niche for themselves. The advocates
of the law, however, remained unimpressed. At the end, all they
conceded was that in areas with a lot of tourists and before Christmas a
fifth variety may be admitted by the local governor. Today, this country
enjoys some fame as the only one in Europe with a strict chocolate law,
though it is not exactly a favorite spot for chocolate puffs.
In case you are still wondering which country this may be I should
admit that this tale is partly fictitious: To the best of my knowledge
there is no country which has ever introduced such a chocolate law, let
alone maintained it until today. However, the story is partly true:
replace "number of chocolate varieties" by "number of shopping hours",
and there you have your law: It is called "Ladenschlußgesetz vom
9.7.1958" ("store closing law"), and the country is Austria.
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I may be wrong, but I suspect that most readers  even Austrian ones 
found it rather strange that a law should protect producers from being
forced to offer more varieties of chocolate than would be economically
justified. At the same time I suspect that quite a few readers  even non-
Austrian ones  would not be surprised that a law should restrict the
number of shopping hours in order to protect entrepreneurs from being
forced to keep their stores open in excess of what would be
economically justified. If my conjecture is correct then the question is,
why is there a tendency to make a difference between those two
regulations? Why does it look quite outlandish to restrict the number of
chocolate varieties, but at least not unusual and may be even reasonable
to restrict the number of shopping hours? Economic theory is not of
great help in solving this puzzle: It is quite easy to make a case in favor
of restricting the number of variants of chocolate  or of any other
differentiated product for that matter  since many theoretical models
show that competition yields a proliferation of varieties in excess of a
social optimum under a large variety of circumstances (see below). It is
not at all easy to make such a case with respect to shopping hours. On
the contrary: under reasonable assumptions competition is extremely
unlikely to lead to longer shopping hours than would be socially
desirable. In addition, by depriving shops of one strategic variable 
opening hours  competition tends to be weakened, thereby protecting
less efficient shops and, in turn, harming consumers. So why do we rely
on markets in a case where market failure is not unlikely whereas we
resort to regulation in a case in which the market can be expected to be
doing quite well?
I do not attempt here to give an answer to this question. I shall only try
to summarise the theoretical arguments against shopping hours
regulations hoping that some day they will look as strange to everybody
as a chocolate law would look today (and I hope nobody gets ideas
about introducing a chocolate law in addition to existing shopping hours
laws).
2. MARKETS MAY FAIL
One of the virtues of perfect competition is that inefficient firms are
driven out of business, and that the remaining ones are forced to
produce at socially optimal levels. In reality, unfortunately, competition
is usually less than perfect. More often than not, firms have some form
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of market power which allows them to enjoy monopoly rents at the
expense of consumers1. If goods are standardised and homogenous they
can do so by reducing the output, thereby raising prices above
competitive levels. If goods are differentiated with respect to their
quality it is less obvious what the profit maximising strategy is. The
quality offered by a monopolist may be better or worse than the social
optimum, depending on which segment of the market is more profitable.
The number of varieties may be smaller or larger than would be socially
desirable, and it can easily happen that private firms decide to produce
varieties which from a social point of view are inferior to others which
are not produced because they are less profitable. In other words, in
reality so called "market failures" are the rule rather than the exception.
So, should markets not be trusted after all, and government
interventions be the rule, even when they are as numerous as in Austria?
Well, let us not jump to conclusions. While it is true that markets rarely
conform to the ideals set out in our textbook models, the same can be
said with respect to the regulatory activities of governments. Ideally,
governments, having detected the sources of a market failure, identify
the appropriate instruments, apply them with great care and monitor the
success of their interventions, with social welfare as the sole criterion
guiding all their decisions. How often do we see this ideal in reality?
3. GOVERNMENTS MAY FAIL TOO
Market failures are a necessary, but by no means a sufficient condition
for government interventions and regulations. The reason is that
governments rarely are the benevolent and omniscient maximisers of
social welfare they are assumed to be in the benchmark models of
textbooks. In reality regulations may be governed not by the common
good, but by the interest of lobbies, quite often of those who are
supposed to be the subject of regulation. But this phenomenon, referred
to as "regulatory capture" is not the only problem. Very often the task
of a regulator is extremely complicated and requires the collection and
processing of huge volumes of information. In addition, the subject of
                                                     
1 The rapidly increasing field "Industrial Economics" is dealing extensively
with markets with imperfect competition. The most comprehensive source
where many of the following arguments can be followed up in detail is Tirole
(1988).
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regulation may be rather complex, and the regulation would have to be
very intricate and detailed in order to account for all contingencies and
special cases. A frequently encountered dilemma therefore is that either
the regulation is too simple to be appropriate for a complex matter, or it
becomes so complicated that it is costly to administrate and
insufficiently transparent to be effective.
Consequently, a serious discussion of market regulations should take
into account at least the following aspects:
1. Is there convincing theoretical and empirical support for the
existence of a market failure?
2. Is there an effective and cost efficient remedy for this market
failure?
3. Is the existing regulation really in the interest of society as a whole,
or is it in the interest of specific groups?
4. What would the consequences of abandoning the regulation be?
In what follows, I shall briefly take up each of these points in turn. My
conclusion is that the case for shopping hours regulations is very weak
with respect to all four aspects.
4. UNREGULATED SHOPPING HOURS – TOO MANY, TOO FEW?
The market failure, shopping hours regulation is apparently supposed to
mitigate, is that free competition would lead to longer hours than are
socially optimal. Unfortunately, the law-makers have never really
bothered to substantiate this claim, so it is difficult to discuss its merits.
Now as mentioned above, there is some theoretical support for the
claim that competition tends to lead to a proliferation of brands, or 
which is formally analogous  to an excessively high number of
locations if there is spatial competition. In a nutshell, the theoretical
reasoning goes as follows2: Suppose there is a large number of potential
producers, and each can decide whether to produce one variety of a
differentiated product (or to open a shop at a particular location) or to
stay out of the market. When a firm considers entering the market it
compares its additional private revenues to its additional private costs,
and it will go ahead if the former exceed the latter. Part of the additional
                                                     
2 For a rigorous formal model see Salop (1979).
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private revenues does not, however, reflect additional social utility but
is simply taken away from existing varieties (or outlets). Put differently,
an individual firm compares marginal costs to average industry profit
and not to marginal industry profit (which is smaller). This "business
stealing" effect induces more firms to enter the market than would be
socially efficient.
This line of reasoning, however, is not immediately applicable to the
decision of existing firms concerning the length of their shopping hours.
There are crucial differences between competition via shopping hours
on the one hand and competition via shop locations or product varieties
on the other hand. In the latter case a firm choosing a particular variety
or location can be quite sure that it will retain a "monopoly", however
small, either because it is physically impossible to replicate its choice or
because it is economically better for competitors to maintain some
difference, though varieties and locations can be very close to each
other. This is obviously not the case with shopping hours. Furthermore,
and even more important, shopping hours are an interval on the time
line and not a point in geographical space or in the space of all possible
varieties.
To see the importance of these differences recall where the brand
proliferation (e.g. of different types of chocolate) comes from: A firm
decides to occupy an empty spot in the space of varieties or locations if
there is a sufficiently large number of potential customers and the
nearest competitors are far enough away. It does not care what happens
to the profits of other varieties or locations because those belong to
other firms. That is why competition may yield brand proliferation. If
we allow firms to produce several varieties of a differentiated product
or to run outlets at several locations, results are far less clear cut. It is
still conceivable that a dominant firm attempts to preempt the market
and essentially mimics the competitive outcome with respect to the
number of varieties. It seems more plausible, however, that the number
of varieties becomes smaller if the number of firms is reduced because
now they internalise the business stealing effect that occurs when a new
variety is introduced. In any case, one cannot expect a unique
equilibrium as in the benchmark models, but a rich menu of possible
outcomes.
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Now a firm that increases the length of its shopping hours usually
continues to stay open at the same hours as before and simply adds
some additional time. It cannot ignore the effects of this move on its
profits during the previous shopping hours. In addition, in contrast to
models of spatial competition or of product differentiation, a separation
between the different instruments of competition is not easily possible.
In spatial competition it makes sense to separate the decision
concerning the location from price competition for given locations,
especially if relocation is costly. In contrast, shopping hours can easily
be varied (without regulation, that is) and are in a sense substitutes for
other strategic variables like prices, qualities, service, etc. For example,
a shop may decide to stay open for a short time and to charge low prices
in order to attract customers whose preferred shopping time is outside
the opening hours, or it may stay open for longer and charge a higher
price. One deplorable consequence for economists is that a theoretical
analysis of shopping hours competition is much harder than that of
spatial competition, and it is not surprising that so far only a very few
models exist.
One of those (Clemenz 1994) assumes that in a market for a
homogenous product consumers are completely indifferent between
individual shops, they only care for the price. They differ, however,
with respect to their preferred shopping times. This is captured by a
willingness to pay a higher price if the offered shopping time is closer
to their most preferred one.
Now consider, at one extreme, a pure monopolist without any actual or
potential competition. What is his incentive to increase his opening
hours beyond any arbitrary given level? By increasing the shopping
hours he could increase the price without loosing any customers
because those with preferred shopping times outside the previous
opening hours are willing to pay for their increased convenience,
whereas those who remain within the old opening hours have no reason
to stop shopping even at higher prices. The monopolist will compare the
additional costs of staying open longer with the increased returns, and
he will continue increasing the shopping time as long as the latter are
greater than the former. It is easy to see that this leads to shopping hours
which are longer than the social optimum because only those who
would have preferred a shopping time outside the previous one benefit,
but all consumers have to pay the higher price. So there are excessive
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shopping hours, but the problem is not competition, but rather the lack
of it. Forcing the monopolist to reduce the shopping hours is at most a
second best remedy. What should be done, if one decides in favor of
regulation, is to prevent the monopolist from extracting a monopoly
rent.
Consider next the other extreme, merciless price competition between
identical firms. Since keeping a shop open causes quasi-fixed costs, the
equilibrium is that of a contestable market. There will be only one
active firm in the (local) market who chooses a combination of price
and shopping hours which makes profitable entry of a competitor
impossible. This equilibrium is not unique, but it does not in general
imply shopping hours longer than the social optimum. Furthermore, it
can be shown that lifting existing regulations is either without any
effect  if the legal shopping hours already corresponded to some
equilibrium  or there is an increase in social welfare if shopping hours
were shorter than the social optimum. In any case, even very stiff
competition does not imply excessively long shopping hours.
Clearly, in reality neither of these two cases is likely to be encountered.
Most markets have some competition, though its intensity varies
considerably. Consequently, there are no general results concerning the
social efficiency of shopping hours in unregulated markets. The above
reasoning suggests, however, that ceteris paribus overlong shopping
hours are more likely the weaker the competition is. The argument is
the following: Increasing the shopping time can be profitable for a firm
because of two effects: It can attract some consumers who did their
shopping at another shop, but at an inconvenient time, and it can charge
a higher price because some consumers are willing to pay for more
convenient shopping times. But the profitability of attracting additional
consumers is increasing in the markup on each product, which in turn is
increasing in market power, and a price increase for longer shopping
hours will be greater the weaker the competition is. Consequently, the
closer we get to the pure monopoly case discussed above, the more
likely it is that shopping hours are too long. But then there is the
problem that several inefficiencies occur simultaneously, and it is far
from clear that concentrating on shopping hours is the best solution.
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My conclusion is that so far no convincing theoretical foundation has
been provided for the claim that competition leads to shopping hours
which are longer than a social optimum.
5. REMEDIES – FOR WHAT?
Now if one is convinced  as I am inclined to  that regulations should
only be considered if there is a strong reason to believe that a market
failure is likely to occur, the discussion could stop here. However, even
though there is no presumption that shops would open for too long
without regulation it remains true that competition does not necessarily
lead to the socially optimal length of the shopping day. The problem
with regulation is that it is extremely difficult to determine this optimal
length, since it depends on the individual market conditions, including
the type of good and the intensity of competition. Somehow the
lawmakers and/or the regulators seem to have realized this as one can
tell from the various exceptions and special regulations made in the
current version of the "Öffnungszeitengesetz 1991" ("law for shop
opening times"; presumably the lawmakers thought this sounds better
than "store closing law", the original title). For example, shops at
railway stations are allowed to keep open longer than other shops, but
they are not allowed to sell all items at all times. Similar provisions
hold for convenience shops at gas stations. In addition there is a host of
special regulations for flower shops, chocolate shops (here we are
again) etc.
Another curiosity might ring a bell for everyone who ever took an
introductory course in macroeconomics. There one learns that gross
domestic product is reduced if the lord marries his housekeeper and she
continues to do all the housework as before, but without official
payment. There is a similar provision in §6 of the shop opening law: if
the shop owner marries her employee then apparently the efficient
shopping time is increased as family enterprises are allowed to keep
open longer than others.
Adding to the rather complex and differentiated framework of shopping
hours regulations in Austria the fact that other countries, as long as they
had any, came up with quite different regulations, and that the patterns
of opening hours in countries without regulation are quite different from
each other, I conclude that it is not only hard to detect any market
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failure with respect to shopping times at all, but it is almost impossible
to come up with regulations which are both, simple to implement and
superior to the free market outcome.
6. WHO BENEFITS?
If the case for shopping hours regulations is so weak, why do we still
have them? The exception for family enterprises mentioned above
suggests a likely answer: This regulation is not in the interest of society
as a whole, but in the (supposed) interest of specific groups. One such
group are small scale retail shops who are threatened by big chain
stores. Are they really helped by shopping hours regulations?
In one sense the answer is yes. Several authors have shown that longer
shopping hours would harm inefficient shops and benefit efficient ones.
The reason given by Clemenz (1990) is that shopping hours restrictions
limit the search time at least of a large fraction of consumers, so they
have to accept inferior offers, though better ones could be found if there
were enough time. Morrison and Newman (1983) and Tanguay et al.
(1995) argue that large stores are more efficient, but they have a high
access time. This becomes less important for consumers if shopping
hours are longer, and demand would shift from less efficient small local
shops to efficient large shops. This in turn may induce market exit of
the least efficient shops.
While this may explain the reluctance of many store owners and their
representatives to accept a liberalisation, it is a rather weak argument in
favor of regulations. First of all, it is not at all clear that small shops are
really less efficient when it comes to opening hours. They are more
flexible, in a sense closer to their customers and better equipped to
serve special individual needs. In fact, the experience in countries with
free shopping hours shows that many small shops benefited from this
liberalisation. The above mentioned provision for family enterprises in
the Austrian shop opening law indicates that this has already been
recognised.
Secondly, it is questionable how effective shopping hours regulations
really are in protecting inefficient shops. On the one hand there are new
developments in the retail business, like e-commerce, which diminish
the importance of shopping hours anyway. On the other hand, society is
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changing fast, and pressure to soften regulations by creating exceptions
and loopholes is enormous and quite successful, even in Austria. The
only way to save small scale shops is to help them increasing their
efficiency and competitiveness, otherwise one can at best slow down
their exit, but not avoid it in the long run.
The third, and in my view most important argument is, however, that
regulation should mitigate and not create market failures. If one of the
main virtues of market competition is to eliminate inefficiencies it is
ridiculous to impose regulations which prevent markets from doing
what they are good for.
Now one argument in favor of protecting small scale local shops is that
many elderly and immobile consumers would suffer if those local shops
would disappear. But again, this is a very contrived argument. I am all
in support for helping the needy, but this should be done as efficiently
as possible, which usually means, one should deal with the problem as
directly as possible. If immobility of some groups of consumers, and
their lack of access to shops are the problem, organise home delivery,
shopping tours, etc. Why using the very indirect and indiscriminate
method of supporting inefficient shops?
Finally, it is often claimed that employees must be protected from
unacceptable hardship which would be caused by longer shopping
hours. There are two points to be made in response. First, in many
occupations, also in parts of the retailing business, this hardship already
exists. If it s really unacceptable, why protect only one part of the
society, at the expense of others? Presumably, employees haven chosen
jobs with "unusual" working times because they feel they are
appropriately compensated, which they should be if labor markets
function. Secondly, if employees in the retail sector are really in a much
weaker position than employees in other industries, then this is a
general problem for their trade unions. Why concentrate on shopping
hours? Make the labor market function better.
To sum up, shopping hours regulation are not in the interest of society
as a whole, but at best in the interest of special groups. But it is doubtful
that these regulations are really an efficient way to further even their
interests.
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7. WHAT HAPPENS IF RESTRICTIONS ARE LIFTED?
The surprising answer to this question is: In many instances  nothing.
There are only a few models in the literature which attempt to explain
the length of the shopping time as a result of competition, but in all of
them it is a possible equilibrium that no firm has an incentive to deviate
from the given shopping time, even if it is allowed to do so (Clemenz
1990, 1994, Clemenz and Inderst 1989, Inderst and Irmen 2001). To
illustrate one of the reasons for this consider a market in which
consumer search is important. If only one shop stays open longer
consumers have little incentive to go shopping since searching in just
one shop is not worthwhile (Clemenz 1990). As an example recall an
experiment conducted in Vienna some years ago. Antiquity shops are
typically clustered in a relatively small area, because they offer highly
non-standardised goods, and searching is a major part of the fun for
customers. Now in Vienna antiquity shops were allowed to keep open
on Saturday afternoons. Since there was no co-ordination of their
opening hours many of them kept closed, which reduced the incentive
of shoppers to visit the area, and the experiment flopped.
In many other instances shops will stay open longer. Usually this will
result in lower prices since competition becomes more intensive. From
a purely theoretical point of view, however, price increases cannot be
ruled out. Inderst and Irmen (2001) show that in a duopoly an
equilibrium may exist in which one shop is open only at night, and the
other one 24 hours a day. This means that competition is softened
during the day as compared to a situation in which both firms were
forced to stay open only during the day, and prices would go up. Since
by assumption longer opening hours do not increase costs it is hard to
address the problem of optimal shopping hours in a meaningful way,
and the result just mentioned is mainly interesting as a  surprising 
logical possibility and not as a prediction about reality. Similarly, in the
above mentioned model of Morrison and Newman (1983) the shift from
inefficient to efficient shops leads to increased prices of the latter, but
nevertheless consumers are better off without than with shopping hours
restrictions.
On the whole it is hard to see why it could be dangerous to eliminate
shopping hours restrictions altogether. In particular, experiences with
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relaxing the restrictions in the past have been quite encouraging. Why
not take the final step?
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that a market failure justifying a restriction of shopping
hours is quite unlikely, and it is less likely the more competitive a
market is. Even though it is true that markets do not necessarily yield
the optimal length of the shopping day, the task of calculating and
implementing this optimal length for each individual market is certainly
beyond the capability of any regulatory agency. Current regulations are
not in the interest of society as a whole but at best in the interest of
specific groups, but it is doubtful that even these groups really benefit
in the long run. Theoretical reasoning as well as experience in many
countries suggests that no harm is to be expected if restrictions are
lifted. So let us go ahead.
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COMPETITION POLICY – CHALLENGES FOR
AUTHORITIES AND BUSINESS
CHRISTINA BURGER, HEINZ HANDLER
The following remarks are intended to provide an overview of current
issues in competition policy, incorporating in particular the results of
the Competition Discussion Forum and the other papers contained in
this volume.1
1. WHY COMPETITION? WHY COMPETITION POLICY?
Market economies make use of search processes which are supposed
to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. In an ideal neo-classical
world, competition between a (large) number of fully-informed
producers and consumers would end up in a price system which
conveys information about the relative scarcity of goods. The speed of
adjustment is assumed high, if not infinite. This secures equilibrium at
virtually all times with prices equalling marginal costs and profits
vanishing. In such a world, disequilibria and processes towards
equilibrium are not deemed to be of great relevance. In the real world,
however, information is not perfect and market power is not distributed
evenly to the effect that monopoly situations often exist at least for
some time. Dynamic processes may thus occur which are protractedly
aloof from equilibrium paths.
As already observed by Adam Smith, the behaviour of economic agents
is guided by self-interest. Although this is a central assumption in neo-
classical economics, it may, under asymmetric distribution of market
power, prevent markets from functioning orderly. E.g., if profit
maximising suppliers and their lobbying organisations face weak
consumer interest groups, this may result in rather high prices,
suboptimal quality, limited choice and even pressure on other suppliers
and on employees. Under certain circumstances, consumers may not be
inclined to engage in enforcing competition, in particular when they, as
employees or self-employed persons, expect to profit more from
individual income security then from general price reductions or quality
improvements.
                                                     
1 In the following text, these papers are quoted by the name of the author,
without reference to the year of publication.
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Competition, alongside with the quality of production factors and
demand conditions, is seen to contribute significantly to long-term
economic growth (Porter 1990). A big threat to the growth potential is
inherent in permanent monopolies or oligopolies which, apart from
price distortions, also tend to neglect the search for innovative products
and new markets (Farhauer 2001).
In securing market conditions, the state plays an outstanding role
(Lösch 2000). Governments and parliaments establish and maintain the
legal framework which guarantees free market entry, precludes
individual suppliers or demanders from accumulating excessive market
power, deals with external economies in research and education, and
prevents other market failures. There is, however, also a substantial
literature elaborating on the reasons for and effects of state failures.
Some even hold that the sheer existence of markets depends on
regulatory intervention by the state (Rauchway 2002).
However, state regulation can also have the effect to weaken
competition. Governments can not in any case be considered the
benevolent and omniscient maximisers of social welfare. Quite in
contrast, they may at times be governed by their own interest to be
reelected, or the interests of lobbies and be subject to regulatory
capture. Competition may be weakened, e.g., by restrictions to the
market entry of new competitors or by the regulation of shop opening
hours (Clemenz). What has been said above concerning the advantages
of competition can of course also be held against state monopolies. A
more competitive environment, e.g. in the education sector or the tax
system, should increase efficiency and is therefore of crucial
importance for the quality of publicly provided services (Mueller).
Knieps (2001) lists a number of aims of competition policy: (1)
economic freedom, which he sees as indispensable for achieving the
maximum of potential transactions; (2) distributional justice, to be
attained by confining income differentials to those created by
differences in performance, but not by monopoly rents; (3) the optimal
allocation of scarce resources; and (4) the realisation of technical
progress. Day-to-day competition policy is particularly concerned with
the efficient allocation of resources which is achieved through a shift of
resources away from inefficient production processes to more efficient
ones, in particular form inefficient firms to more productive and
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innovative competitors, and especially to new entrants. While the latter,
in the first phase of operating a new business, are generally less
productive than the incumbents, those able to survive are likely to
improve their performance quickly.
An important operational target of competition policy is to prevent the
accumulation, and in particular the abuse, of market power. Therefore
measures to enforce competition include the opening of markets to
potential new competitors and an efficient control of mergers and
cartels. However, anti-competitive behaviour can take forms which are
less blunt than open cartels or the visible abuse of a dominant position.
One may think of recommended prices as a soft version of price-fixing
agreements, or of non-competition clauses in employment contracts
which restrict market entry. More obvious forms of anti-competitive
behaviour are market-sharing agreements restricting the choice of
suppliers or limiting the range of products on offer. The accumulation
of market power tends to re-enforce itself: If market pressure can be
exerted, it can also be used, via the takeover of competitors, to further
accumulate market power. In order to avoid such market failure, policy
intervention should take place as soon as the accumulation of market
power becomes apparent.
Competition may be reinforced by other policies. Within the European
Union, efforts to complete the internal market currently concentrate on
the removal of barriers to the trade in services between Member States
(Horvath/Pfandl). Stiglitz points at the importance of pursuing
competition policies with proper regard to trade policies. Imports often
substitute for new firms entering a market, as they put pressure on rents
and prices to be reduced. Consequently, in an open market with imports
the degree of competition need not be linked to the number of firms in
the market. The number of market entrances and exits is more relevant,
as with a constant number of firms existing market shares tend to
become petrified (Aiginger 1995). However, in spite of comprehensive
trade liberalisation, many goods remain non-traded. Therefore,
competition must anyway be secured at the national level (Fingleton).
In Europe a lot has been done in recent years to increase the degree of
competition, but studies still indicate that competitive intensity remains
considerably below that of the USA. As a result, prices are consistently
higher, and show an increasing divergence, in the EU than in the US.
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Empirical evidence underscores that in the sectors sheltered from
international competition (such as the housing market and public
services), prices tend to be higher than in exposed sectors.
As a small economy, Austria has perceived herself as rather open to
international competition, although she has repeatedly (e.g. in the EU
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines) been classified as rather sheltered
compared with other small open economies. In fact, until recently
significant parts of the economy remained subject to market rules, price
regulation and public ownership of large companies. Internal failures in
the nationalised industries and international developments rendered it
unavoidable to make up for a certain loss of competitiveness by
adjusting to the globalisation philosophy. Fostered by EU membership,
most of the previously sheltered markets have in recent years been
opened with surprising speed. It is now generally recognised that open
markets and competition enhance the growth potential and thus serve
the interest of the society at large.
2. TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN COMPETITION AND OTHER ECONOMIC
GOALS
Competition drives productivity growth, and in turn also
competitiveness and overall domestic welfare. Provided companies are
induced and willing to expose themselves to competition, they will
thereby increase production efficiency and be more competitive on
international markets. Competition also ensures that the benefits of cost
reduction and innovation are passed on to consumers in form of lower
prices, increased quality and greater choice of products. However, in
cases of market failure (e.g. in sectors which constitute natural
monopolies) and to achieve additional policy goals (e.g. health,
security), state regulation may be required. This also holds for the
liberalisation of network sectors in order to reduce the size of remaining
monopoly activities.
2.1. DO PROFIT OPPORTUNITIES RISE OR FALL WITH
COMPETITION?
Competitors in a market environment will be eager to increase their
profit, either by bargaining for a better deal, or by innovating new
products. Stiglitz argues, however, that enterprises can generate more
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profit by suppressing competition than by innovating and producing
better products. Therefore it is the core task of competition policy to set
the right incentives.
Schumpeter characterised the development of markets by a sequence of
short term monopolies  one temporary monopoly would over time be
replaced by another one and thereby result in dynamic competition.
Stiglitz complements the argument by considering that a firm, being
able to establish a temporary monopoly position, would often also find
opportunities to perpetuate that monopoly. One should moreover
distinguish between competition in the market and competition for the
market. In the former case firms compete with each other by offering
lower prices or better services, the latter case suggests that firms
compete through innovation to eventually dominate the market.
Competition in the market leads to minimal costs and assures that prices
equal the marginal cost of production. Competition for the market
results in scale economies which, together with network effects,
produce a single firm with lowest cost and a large share of the market.
Successful innovators charge (temporarily) more than marginal costs to
be compensated for their fixed costs and the high risk inherent in
research investment. Winners in this case can expect huge profits that
counterbalance the forfeitures incurred by the losers (Ahlborn et al.
2001).
2.2. DOES COMPETITION FURTHER OR HINDER INNOVATION?
The intensity of competition is supposed to influence the innovation
efforts. The relationship could take the shape of an inverted U: When
many firms compete on equal terms, the rents derived from innovation
are soon competed away, and there is thus little incentive for R&D
investment. On the other hand, low competition may also reduce
investment incentives: Since R&D is risky, a dominant firm might be
content with earning its established monopoly rent and not invest in
R&D (Ilzkovitz/Meiklejohn 2001, Röller et al. 2001).
R&D policies should provide incentives to prevent market failures
through external economies. Without such incentives, many firms
would ex ante not engage in innovation and R&D, because they would
ex post, due to the public-good characteristics of R&D, be unable to
retrieve appropriate rents from their efforts. In other words, even if
Summary190
firms earn excessive profits ex post, from an ex ante perspective they
can only expect average profits. R&D cooperation may reduce
competition, but this may be justified in cases when a firm, because of
lack of manpower or financial resources to develop a new product,
would otherwise not engage in R&D (Franz).
The expectation of some form of (temporary) monopoly, e.g. via the
protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), is a necessary
condition for firms to invest in R&D. IPRs do not create
overproportional market power in the antitrust sense, as long as the
market remains open to substitutes outside the protected patent. IPR
protection can be viewed as a precondition for introducing innovations.
Although temporary allocational distortions are created, they can be
justified by the long-term welfare increases for consumers. The rents
created by patents should not be treated like other monopoly rents,
because in the long run, in a competitive environment for innovations,
the expected gains from the R&D activities are zero (Knieps 2001).
2.3. COMPETITION POLICY VERSUS INDUSTRIAL POLICY
There is a potential conflict of interest between competition policy and
industrial policy (Sasi 2002). State aid is a particularly important
instrument of industrial policy and should thus be included in the
considerations of competition policy. Due to political failure (e.g. the
excessive influence of vested interests) or institutional failure (e.g.
inadequate enforcement mechanisms), state aid may be directed
inappropriately. This undermines competition, fairness and efficiency.
There is, on the other hand, a clear role for well-targeted state aid in
alleviating market failures and promoting structural reform. This
pertains with the EU state aid regime, which, for the aid to traditional
industries, is governed by strict rules, and by more permissive rules for
addressing market insufficiencies (e.g. R&D and environmental
protection). This distinction takes care of a fair distribution or other
social considerations which the market does usually not account for and
which may be achieved by state aid.
2.4. CAN PRICES BE TOO LOW?
Although a competitive environment is conducive to low (market)
prices, it may happen that, from the point of view of competition policy,
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prices become too low. In the case of predatory pricing firms
temporarily charge under-cost prices in order to drive out competitors
from the market and to increase their own market shares. To recover
costs, prices are then raised above the competitive level, where they
remain as long as competition is lacking. However, under-cost prices
can be efficient for a limited time  without resorting to a strategy of
destructive competition. A case would be when a new product is
introduced (when a critical mass of consumers must be approached
early on). Producers facing severe negative demand shocks and with
given capacities which cannot be adjusted quickly, may temporarily be
forced to cut prices below marginal costs. One could also think of
selling off outdated stocks of goods to clear storage facilities. In all
these examples consumers profit from low prices without destructive
competition (Kruse/Haucap 2002).
3. NEW CHALLENGES IN THE NEW ECONOMY
3.1. GLOBALISATION AND THE "RELEVANT MARKET"
Just as there is no competition without a market, there is no competition
policy without a "relevant market". This term is used by competition
enforcers to provide a frame for the microeconomic examination of
demand and supply factors that determine, in the event, whether or not a
potentially anti-competitive behaviour results in damages to other
market participants. Such damages are unlikely to occur to consumers
when, in the wake of an anti-competitive behaviour, price-elastic
demand and the availability of substitutes prevents prices from rising.
The possibility of competitors to quickly enter the market would also
put a lid on price hikes. Thus, for a specific (antitrust or merger) case,
the relevant market (in terms of products and/or in geographical terms)
is determined by sufficiently homogenous competition conditions, in
particular by the possibilities of demand substitution, of supply
substitution and by the contestability of the market (European
Commission 1997, Monti 2002). High price elasticities or high
substitution elasticities vis-à-vis competing products or locations
contribute to a relatively large market and thus to reducing the market
dominance of any single firm. When it comes to specific cases, this
general assessment of a relevant market can lead to different results
depending on, e.g., whether the examination is prospective (as in the
case of mergers) or rather retrospective (as in antitrust cases). The
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ambiguous element in the market definition has led some authors to
question the usefulness of the concept at all.2
Since business activities have become more and more international,
the question comes up how this would impinge on the definition of the
relevant market. In an open economy, a supplier who dominates
domestic production does not necessarily dominate domestic
consumption. Therefore, just to look at the domestic market share
would in many cases be insufficient (Fingleton), all the more, as market
shares can in general only provide a first indication of the competitive
situation. One needs complementary information on concentration, ease
of market entry and the possible existence of substitutes to determine
whether a firm dominates a market or not: If a firm has a market share
of 100%, but faces easy entry to the market for new suppliers
(especially for firms producing similar products which can easily be
adapted to this market), such a firm has only little market power (Fisher
2002). The elasticity of demand is often seen as an indicator for the
degree of competition, although a high elasticity may not only reflect
vigorous competition; it can also be an expression of monopolistic
power, when the monopoly has already raised the price above the
competitive level (Kuoppamäki 2002).
Concerning the relevant geographic market, Monti (2002) holds that
the definition depends on national preferences, preferences for national
brands, language, culture,life style. Other arguments for distinguishing
a location or region from another one are the existence or absence of
regulatory barriers and the need for a local presence; therefore retail
markets tend to be of local or at best of national dimension. In the EU
as a union of sovereign states, the definition of the relevant geographic
market is far more complex than in the US where cultural and linguistic
differences, regulatory barriers and diverging preferences play a much
lesser role. Nevertheless, in the US domestic mergers are usually
approved even when they lead to large national market shares, provided
the market is open enough for imports to constitute a significant
component of competition.
                                                     
2 For a summary of the discussion on the usefulness of market definitions see
Fisher (2002) and Kuoppamäki (2002).
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In the wake of regional integration and globalisation, there is a clear
tendency for previously local or national markets to cross their
traditional borders towards EU or even world markets. As the range of
supply and demand expands, and market conditions become more
similar, markets are defined to cover an increasingly broader area or
product scope. Simultaneously, market power of existing firms is
reduced.
In recent years international business has increasingly been
characterised by large mergers and co-operation arrangements between
companies. This has largely been the consequence of globalisation and
the creation of the single European market which have revealed the
necessity of corporate restructuring. According to Sasi (2002), it makes
a differences whether a merger occurs in a small or in a large market. In
a small market, particularly in a small country, large mergers easily lead
to a dominant market position and to interventions by the authorities. In
larger countries it is more likely that an international competitive
position is achieved without approaching the level of dominance in the
national market. The EU Commission has been criticised for applying
the same criteria across all Member States when defining geographic
markets, and not allowing for country size. Monti (2002) counters that
companies do have other ways to grow and become internationally
competitive than by merging with another leading company at home. He
specifically points (a) at internal growth of a firm which may eventually
result in a dominant position, though gained by offering lower prices
and better products than competitors, and (b) at mergers with companies
abroad which in general are less harmful for domestic competition.
Mergers are targeted to increase the market power, but this may be
offset by higher production efficiency and lower prices
(Ilzkovits/Meiklejohn 2002). There are various channels to increase the
efficiency, inter alia through rationalisation, reaping economies of scale
or scope, reducing managerial inefficiency or diminishing factor costs
(Röller et al. 2001). Trade-offs between efficiency and competition
should hence be expected. A large market share, especially in network
industries, does not necessarily signal deficient competition, but can
also mirror significant economies of scale. Policies to decrease the
dominant market share have to weigh the benefits of increased
competition against the potential loss of economies of scale (ECOFIN
2002).
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The merger of firms tends to foster the internalisation of innovations
and may thus stimulate R&D investments. The scope of technological
capabilities increases when the firms involved dispose of
complementary skills, and synergies can be gained if they previously
conducted overlapping research. By eliminating duplications and
sharing knowledge, they should be able to slash costs and raise
innovations. Counterbalancing effects are of course also possible, when,
e.g., the merger of research units decreases research trajectories which
in turn diminish the probability of successful innovation
(Ilzkovits/Meiklejohn 2002).
3.2. THE INTERNET AS CHALLENGE FOR COMPETITION POLICY
Whenever major new technologies are introduced, competition
authorities have to be alert of the potential consequences for the
competitive environment. The production of new technologies is
characterised by high fixed costs and low marginal costs. This produces
increasing returns to scale and puts pressure on industries to concentrate
(Ahlborn et al. 2001). New technologies force companies to restructure
their production processes. Computers and the Internet offer ways and
means to reorganise activities, in particular to decentralise by
outsourcing some tasks and moving others on-line.
The Internet has raised concerns about its natural monopoly element,
although it certainly also has the potential to enhance competition by
decreasing transaction costs and facilitating price comparison. With the
Internet established definitions of the relevant geographic market
become blurred (Stiglitz, Franz). New markets are created and technical
developments come up at a speed which often renders competitive
advantages of suppliers irrelevant within a very short time span
(Kuoppamäki 2002). The main competitive pressure for producers of
existing goods and services comes from new superior products.
Potential competitors not currently in the market represent the major
competitive force upon firms enjoying large economies of scale. Such
firms may be able to retain their position only by continuously investing
in innovation (Ahlborn et al. 2001).
The value of many networks increases in line with the number of
people linked together. Suppliers of complementary products may also
seek co-ordination to achieve a critical mass (Franz). In such networks,
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it may easily happen that only a single technology survives  although
not necessarily the most efficient technology (Stiglitz). Users of an
established norm are reluctant to incur the costs of switching to another
technology. The market success of a competitor will hence depend
heavily on its ability to connect with complementary products (Franz).
As a result, monopoly or oligopoly are the standard market form in
network industries, and prices often depend on network sizes (Ahlborn
et al.).
A similar problem, although not bearing any network effects, occurs in
software and hardware industries serving PCs: Software applications
produce large economies of scale, but can often only be used on a
specific operating system. Therefore, software writers are heavily
induced to concentrate on the operating system with the highest number
of users. Similarly, users prefer the operating system for which many
applications exist. As a result, an operating system that has already
acquired a large share of users and software writers will tend to become
ever more attractive (Fisher 2002).
4. TOWARDS MORE EFFICIENT COMPETITION POLICIES
So far we have elaborated on the relevance of markets, market power
and competition in general as well as on some of the influences of the
New Economy on competitive behaviour and the consequences for the
instruments of competition policy, such as the market definition. We
now turn to the discussion how to improve competition policies to cope
efficiently with the New Economy and other recent developments.
One of the more significant adjustments in the European Community
has been the increased emphasis on an "economic approach to
competition policy" (Monti 2002), also labelled the "European School
in EC Competition Law" by Hildebrand (2002a,b). It is an outgrowth of
the modernisation efforts in the European Community which have also
stimulated a debate on the analytical model and the tools to detect and
pursue competition deficiencies. Purely judicial considerations have
now been replaced by a mixture of legal and economic reasoning.
Hildebrand (2002b) classifies competition law as economic law which
"is meaningless if the actual economic circumstances are neglected". In
this respect, competition authorities around the world have become
rather sophisticated by using a variety of tools and concepts, such as
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market shares, concentration measures, price elasticities and elasticities
of substitution, to examine the presence or absence of market power
(Fingleton). Analyses of prices and ownership data provide key
information to assess the intensity of competition. Such data are a
regular starting point for proceedings to combat anti-competitive
behaviour. As regards concrete measurement, competition enforcers
also use different concepts as demonstrated in merger cases where the
EU relies on the dominance test (Article 2 of the Merger Regulation),
while the United States, Canada and Australia employ the concept of
substantial lessening of competition (SLC test). The latter addresses
competition deficiencies not just by the notion of dominance or
monopoly, but more broadly also by other forms of reducing
competition. Some of the EU Member States (United Kingdom, Ireland)
have for national purposes switched to the SLC test, others keep an eye
on it, and the European Commission (2001c) has initiated a discussion
with the aim of possibly introducing this test also on Community level.
Others are not convinced that, when applied to individual cases, the
outcomes will significantly deviate from the dominance test.3
The competition authorities have to undertake an ongoing monitoring of
sectors characterised by high concentration in order to prevent (further
or future) abuse. In international discussions it is generally accepted
that competition policy can only be effective if managers are dissuaded
from engaging in collusive behaviour. To achieve this goal, a promising
way is the threat of painful punishment. Average expected profits from
participating in a cartel must be negative, divestments are an important
instrument at hand (European Commission 2001b).
4.1. LIBERALISATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES
Economic theory and policy have long regarded natural monopolies as
untouchable and exempted from competition. It has only gradually been
recognised that some liberalisation is feasible and can serve consumer
interests. In the case of network industries which in the past enjoyed the
natural monopoly status, liberalisation has helped to separate the
production, distribution and sale of the real product (which can be
achieved under market conditions) from the network itself (which may
                                                     
3 These issues are discussed, e.g., in Hildebrand (2002b), Wish (2002) and
Böheim.
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remain a natural monopoly). For the monopoly part, efficient regulation
must replace competition (Fingleton). The owner of the grid, usually
also the incumbent producer of the goods and services, must concede
access to the grid for competitors in order to maintain cost-efficiency
and must charge fees for the use of the grid which are transparent if not
regulated. Providers of services in network industries are often admitted
to the market only if they agree to care for "universal services" which
take into account various policy goals. E.g., in the telecommunications
industry, it is thereby secured that dislocated customers receive service
even if the fees to be paid do not cover costs. With the liberalisation of
entry conditions it is intended to create “contestable markets":
Monopolists or oligopolists who exploit their market position by
charging high prices must be aware to attract new competitors
(Burger/Handler 2001).
In practice the process of generating entry into formerly monopolised
industries is slow and proceeds on different speeds. The success of
liberalisation is considerable in the telecommunications sector, where
prices have been slashed and product ranges increased (not just because
of the advent of the mobile phone). In contrast, there has not yet been
any visible movement in the EU postal market (Schneider). The
situation is quite different in the financial sector for which regulatory
systems, nationally and internationally, have been in place for a rather
long time. The 2002 reform of the supervisory system in Austria takes
care of globalisation effects and the increased substitutability between
different financial assets. A single independent supervisory body is now
responsible for the prudential supervision of the capital market as well
as for banks, insurance companies, pension funds and the securities and
stock exchange (Darlap et al.).
Liberalisation has not been a straightforward process, but has
experienced flaws and opposition. One of the main counter-arguments
raised by incumbents, notably in the energy sector, was that consumers
would not any more enjoy the security of supply. However, according to
Mayer, no direct relation between liberalisation and a decrease of
security of supply has so far been identified. Stiglitz maintains that
market power remains concentrated in these sectors and can thus easily
be leveraged or abused, and he therefore calls for regulation. As the
"Californian case" shows, liberalisation can fire back if the market
design is poor and regulatory decisions are suboptimal (Reichert). As
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regards the ongoing liberalisation of railway infrastructures, problems
have occurred in terms of not providing for a unified and consistent
charging system. Within the EU it is already considered a success that
for the first time a framework has been defined within which the
Member States can determine their infrastructure charging schemes
(Gürtlich).
Successful deregulation in the network industries is supposed to result
in lower prices (as experienced e.g. in the energy market), it is
moreover also expected to increase the range of goods and services
supplied. Looking at the experience of the Austrian telecommunication
sector, consumers were able to profit from both effects of liberalisation:
increased diversity of high-quality, but reasonably-priced services
(Otruba/Bernhardt). The benefits of liberalisation are, however, not in
any case fully passed on to consumers (Steyer).
In the context of regulation policy, several trends can be observed in
the EU: the responsibilities of regulators are extended and clarified; the
powers to enforce legislation are strengthened and more resources are
allocated to regulators; and existing regulators are often merged into
fewer regulatory bodies to correspond to market developments. In
principle the prohibition of cartels and of the abuse of a dominant
position as stated in antitrust law should suffice for an ex-post
enforcement of competition. In the case of natural monopolies,
however, ex ante monitoring and supervision of market entry, of access
tariffs and other customer conditions are essential to ensure effective
competition (ECOFIN 2002). With liberalisation progressing,
regulation policy should in future be characterised by a gradual
transformation from the ex-ante approach of regulatory intervention to a
sector specific supervision of competition in line with the rules
stipulated by general competition law (Otruba/Bernhardt).
According to a first assessment of market performance in the network
industries by the European Commission (2001a), low and medium
income households did on average not suffer a loss in the affordability
of services. As regards employment, job losses in incumbent
telecommunication companies were more than fully offset by
employment in new firms. In the postal and energy sectors, such effects
could not be proven. In contrast to the telecommunications sector,
where new products (in particular the mobile phone segment) have
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opened the market rapidly, in other sectors consumers are hesitant to
change suppliers. This can also be explained by bundling strategies of
incumbent firms and a lack of price transparency. The importance of
network industries is not only demonstrated by their share in GDP
(about 6%), but also by the fact that their output often serves as an
important factor of production in other sectors which influences the
price level there as well. Especially in the modern knowledge economy,
a highly developed telecommunications infrastructure is moreover of
central importance when it comes to location decisions
(Otruba/Bernhardt).
There has been some debate on the relationship between sectoral
regulators and the national competition enforcement authorities.
Although either has core competencies which do not overlap with the
other, legislations do not in all countries clearly separate the two areas.
In any case, it seems advisable to find work agreements and
coordination between the various authorities to ensure an overall
consistent decision practice (Burger/Handler 2001). Stiglitz would
perhaps not subscribe to such collusive behaviour, but rather favour
competition between the various authorities. In EU Member States there
is, however, a tendency towards horizontally-organised agencies
(Steyer).
4.2. GLOBALISATION REQUIRES REFORM OF COMPETITION
POLICIES
In the wake of globalisation markets have become interconnected over
the world, thereby enhancing competition. To some degree, however,
the interconnections have encouraged co-operations which limit the
degree of competition. That is why on a international level (e.g. in the
World Trade Organisation or the newly-founded International
Competition Network) measures are discussed to link national
competition policies together and set international standards for the
substance, organisation and proceedings of such policies. Among these
standards could be the independence of prosecution and decision of
individual cases, leniency policies, adequate sanctions (which should
have a strong deterrent effect and adequate redress for the parties
harmed), and activities to increase the public profile of competition
policy. Public pressure seems indispensible for the success of
competition policy and a competition-prone climate in which no
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enterprise could afford to be denounced for anti-competitive business
practices.
At the European level, competition law and policy are vital instruments
for securing free market conditions and completing the internal market.
A major reform is currently negotiated with Member States to keep up
efficiency of the system on Community level. The reaction of Member
States on the original Commission proposals on modernisation,
containing the primacy of EU law and the decentralisation of
enforcement, was rather mixed. Decentralisation, although putting new
burden on national courts and competition authorities, was rather
welcomed as it is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. The
proposals should reduce EU bureaucracy by the abolition of the
traditional notification system. This will allow the Commission to
concentrate on more serious distortions, especially the investigation of
hard-core (i.e. secret) cartels4. Enterprises have complained about this
because they will no longer receive comfort letters which in the past
have provided a great deal of legal security. The draft regulation refers
responsibility for applying the EU competition rules to the national
authorities and courts which have to apply the relevant articles directly
and without qualifications.
The decentralisation move will only be successful if complemented by
some institutionalised horizontal co-operation between national
competition authorities. Because of the increasing importance of
cross-border markets, they should at least share information and find
mutually acceptable procedures to conduct joint investigations
(Fingleton). In a world of multinational corporations and international
interdependence, competition policies should not fall back on
competition among national authorities. In an international setting,
freedom of competition can be seen as a public good. It is created
thanks to those countries which give up part of their national
sovereignty in favour of an international competition policy. Countries
which do not contribute to this freedom benefit from it as free riders
(Hep 2000). The advantage of co-operation between authorities or even
having a world competition authority would be the possible fight
against international cartels and predatory pricing (Mueller).
                                                     
4 See OECD (2002) for an in-depth analysis on the nature and impact of hard-
core cartels and their treatment in national legislations.
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In Austria a major change in competition law has come into effect by
mid-2002, adopting much of the EU modernisation principles and
diminishing the hitherto overwhelming role of the social partners.
According to the new law, two independent authorities will be involved
in competition cases: (a) the traditional decision-making cartel court
which is not endowed with investigation capacities, and (b) a newly-
created administrative body, the Federal Competition Authority. The
latter is also independent (not subject to political influence) and vested
with the power to investigate cases (in particular, to request information
from parties, including inspection of business documents and home
searches, and to negotiate remedies in merger cases) and to file motions
with the court. Previously, investigations were mainly conducted by the
Joint Committee on Cartel Matters, consisting of nominees by the social
partners; applications could also be filed by the government. A Federal
Cartel Prosecutor, reporting to the Minister of Justice, can take up
merger cases should the Competition Authority refrain from acting. The
Authority will co-operate with the European Commission, thus ensuring
the coherence between national and European competition law. The role
of the social partners is now reduced to assigning lay judges to the
cartel court and to participate in the new Competition Commission
which has but an advisory function. Thereby conflicts of interest will
virtually be ruled out. In contrast to the international discussion, most of
the criminal sanctions have been abolished and substituted by fines of
up to 10% of annual turnover. While on the one hand the new Austrian
construction is criticised because of double-track inefficiencies
(independent competition authority, dependent cartel prosecutor, cartel
commission with advisory function), this is a compromise model to
accommodate the political factions in Parliament. In practice, this
system promises to work efficiently, and, by the way, it stands for
competition in every respect, even competition among several
competition authorities within one country, as advocated by Stiglitz.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The creation of markets which permit competition between many
producers and many consumers helps to efficiently allocate resources,
keep monopoly rents close to zero and stimulate innovations. In the real
world, where market power is distributed quite unevenly, these effects
are by no means guaranteed. State intervention is usually required to
secure market conditions, although in many instances the state also
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complies with opposing interests. Regulation and surveillance by
authorities is often associated with restrictions. Competition policy,
however, should remove restrictions from free and well functioning
competition (Sasi 2002).
The main target of competition policy, to put it in a nutshell, is to
protect competition, not competitors (Stiglitz). This is not as self-
evident as one may think, at least not in the European system of market
economies augmented by social and environmental considerations.
Although during the second half of the 20th century, the degree of
competition has substantially increased in Europe, it still remains
significantly below that of the USA. The effects of the New Economy
and the liberalisation of network industries have contributed to general
globalisation and to an increase in competition, and have also increased
the pressure to reform competition policies all over the world. The EU
Commission aims at a decentralisation of enforcement activities which
should enable the Community level to concentrate more on the severest
violations of free competition. The tendency of companies to co-operate
across national borders also increases the challenges for competition
policies on an international scale. Therefore national competition
policies will in future more and more have to rely on international co-
operation. In Austria a new competition law provides, as from 1 July
2002, for an improvement in institutions to better link to other national
authorities and thus serve competition.
Competition may not always seem consistent with other policy goals,
although most of the inconsistencies vanish when observed over a
longer time horizon. The state should not abandon competitive
structures in favour of short-term industrial policy goals, although state
intervention may be justified in cases of external economies or infant
industry aid, but not to prevent badly-managed companies from
breaking down. One can infer from a number of studies that a higher
degree of competition not only reduces short-term monopoly rents, but
also creates a potential for strengthening the long-term competitiveness
of companies supplying to an international market, thereby enhancing
growth and employment in the locations concerned.
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